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Abstract 
In three papers, I employ parametric and nonparametric methods in order to further examine the 
determinants of value creation in M&A deals financed with contingent earnout payments. The 
first paper investigates the short-run wealth effects of earnouts in deals in which financial 
advisors are counseling the acquiring firms. The results suggest that relative to using non-earnout 
payments, acquirers enjoy higher abnormal returns from earnout use only when consulting 
financial advisors. Specifically, once accounting for potential selection bias, advised earnout-
financed deals significantly outperform deals that are financed with: (a) earnouts without the 
involvement of financial advisors and (b) non-earnouts regardless of the involvement of financial 
advisors. Thus, the likely ability of financial advisors to efficiently address the inherent 
complexities of the design of earnouts leads to greater acquirer gains. The second paper 
examines the impact of the acquiring firm’s informational environment on the announcement 
period wealth effects of earnout-financing. The results suggest that under increased information 
asymmetry over the acquiring firm, the market’s reaction to an earnout-financed deal mainly 
reflects its inference that the acquirer’s stock is underpriced, rather than the deal’s synergy 
potential. To this end, earnout acquirers are illustrated to be relatively undervalued prior to the 
deal’s announcement. In contrast, the selection of earnouts by big acquirers with low information 
asymmetry sends a strong signal for value creation that also prevents market participants from 
inducing a size-related discount. Lastly, the third paper investigates the wealth effects of 
earnouts in international changes of corporate control. The results suggest that when firms 
choose to join a multinational network through the acquisition of a foreign company earnout-
financing offers a major value-creating opportunity yielding greater announcement period 
abnormal returns to acquirers relative to domestic and remaining cross-border deals. In contrast, 
the likely presence of agency problems and monitoring costs appears to deteriorate the expected 
synergy gains from non-initial earnout-financed international M&As.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) offer a reliable means of shareholder value creation by 
exploiting synergies, increasing market power, accelerating growth, replacing inefficient 
managers, and extracting benefits from financial and operational restructuring. Nevertheless, 
asymmetric information between the involved firms in corporate takeovers generates uncertainty 
over the outcome of the deal when negotiating its price and payment method.
1
  In return, under 
the presence of substantial valuation disagreements, merging firms’ managers often agree to 
defer part of the entire transaction consideration and employ contingent payments, or earnouts. 
Accordingly, this doctoral thesis contains three empirical papers (chapters 3 to 5) that aim to 
broaden our insights on the workings and wealth effects of earnout-financing in the markets for 
corporate control of the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (US).  
Specifically, three topics are investigated. These are: (a) the contribution of financial 
advisors, counseling the acquiring firms, towards the efficient design of earnout-financed deals, 
(b) the effect of the acquiring firm’s informational environment on the short-run wealth gains 
associated with earnout-financing and (c) the wealth effects of earnouts in cross-border M&As, 
conditional on the extent of the acquiring firm’s multinational network.  These papers were 
written between the Fall of 2011 and the Spring of 2015 during my Ph.D. studies at the School of 
Economics and Finance of the University of St Andrews. They are presented in the form of 
articles with the intent of being published in academic journals. Throughout the papers, I use the 
term ‘we’ in order to recognize the critical guidance and suggestions provided by my supervisor 
Dr. Leonidas Barbopoulos. In the following lines, I introduce each topic and summarize its main 
findings. 
Earnout-financing constitutes a contingent payment mechanism in which, after the 
completion of the deal, the target firm becomes a subsidiary of the acquirer, while its 
management remains in administration and receives the total transaction consideration in two 
parts: (a) an initial up-front payment at the time of the deal’s announcement and (b) a deferred 
payment that is conditional on the achievement of certain pre-specified performance-related 
                                                          
1 Leading research work in this field includes Coase (1937), Akerlof (1970), Alchian, Crawford and Klein (1978), Williamson 
(1979) and Grossman and Hart (1986). Witinh the M&A context, Chang (1998) offers a detailed investigation of the effects of 
information asymmetry on the selection of an acquisition’s financing currency. 
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goals post-merger (Kohers and Ang, 2000). Such goals relate to cash flows, sales, pre-tax 
income, gross profits and net income, whereas their measurement predominantly occurs 
annually, followed by semi-annual and quarterly assessments (Cain, Denis and Denis, 2011). The 
accomplishment of the earnout thresholds ensures the delivery of the deferred payment, while the 
time period between the two payments lasts between three to five years (Cain et al., 2011). The 
first-stage payment can be in the form of cash, stock, or mixture of financing currencies, while 
the deferred payment is usually in the form of cash (Eckbo, 2009) and can reach up to 33% of the 
total transaction consideration (Cain et al., 2011).  
By deferring a significant portion of the entire deal value and linking its delivery to the 
target’s performance post-merger, earnout-financing offers a reliable solution to the implied 
valuation disagreements, while also reducing the acquirer’s exposure to valuation risk 
(Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; Datar, Frankel and Wolfson, 2001). Along these lines, 
earnouts are more likely to be employed when small firms acquire targets that are subject to 
substantial valuation uncertainty, such as unlisted firms operating in intangible-rich sectors 
(Kohers and Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012). Furthermore, the contingent 
properties of earnouts incentivize the target firm’s management to maximize performance post-
merger, thus also reducing moral hazard and further increasing the probability of realization of 
the expected synergy gains (Datar et al., 2001; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009). Accordingly, 
earnout-financed deals have been consistently illustrated to generate positive announcement 
period abnormal returns accrued to the acquiring firms’ shareholders, significantly 
outperforming the gains generated by deals financed with single up-front payments. The above 
reflect the market’s optimistic expectation of high value-creation (Kohers and Ang, 2000; 
Barbopoulos and Sudarsnam, 2012). 
Despite the risk-mitigating and value-increasing properties of earnout-financing, a series 
of issues regarding the workings and wealth effects of this contingent payment method remain to 
be investigated. First, ‘evidence shows that earnouts are complex, multidimensional contracts 
exhibiting substantial heterogeneity in the size of the potential earnout payment, the performance 
measure on which the earnout is based, the interval over which performance is measured, the 
performance thresholds that must be achieved in order to receive the earnout payment and the 
form of the earnout payment’ (p. 152) (Cain et al., 2011). Similarly, Lukas, Reuer and Welling 
11 
   
(2012) claim that earnouts constitute intricate payments with substantial heterogeneity in their 
terms and structure among different deals. The above suggest that, despite the inherent 
advantages, the design of earnouts involves significant complexities that small acquiring firms, 
to which earnouts mostly appeal, may lack the necessary technology to properly address. 
Consequently, a failure to account for the inherent intricacies can ultimately offset the implied 
benefits. Nevertheless, the channels through which firms engaging in earnout-financed deals can 
enhance the efficiency of their design are yet to be identified.  
Second, earnouts are illustrated to reduce information asymmetry faced by mainly small 
acquirers of unlisted targets, thus limiting their exposure to valuation risk (Kohers and Ang, 
2000). Nevertheless, information asymmetry also exists between acquirers’ managers and 
outside investors. Evidently, the former know more about the true value and growth prospects of 
the firms they manage than the latter. Eventually, the firm-specific information held by 
acquirers’ managers is transferred to the market either through the passage of time, or through 
some information-releasing event (Dierkens, 1991).
2
 Accordingly, Moeller, Schlingemann and 
Stulz (2004) argue that acquirers’ wealth gains at the announcement of an M&A deal should 
reflect ‘the economic benefit of the acquisition for the shareholders of the acquiring firm together 
with the stock-price impact of other information released or inferred by investors when firms 
make acquisition announcements’ (p. 202). As earnout acquirers consist of mainly small firms, 
the available information is limited (Banz, 1981) and, hence, information asymmetry between 
their managers and market participants is greater. Nevertheless, it remains to be investigated how 
influential is the release of acquirer-specific information, relative to the deal’s synergy potential, 
in shaping the well-documented superior short-run acquirer gains attributed to earnout-financing.  
Third, acquisitions of foreign targets are characterized by greater valuation uncertainty 
due to the inherent complexities of international business expansions.
3
 Nevertheless, despite the 
intuitive appropriateness of the contingent properties of earnouts, evidence suggests that, relative 
to domestic deals or international deals financed with single up-front methods, acquirers at best 
                                                          
2 Information asymmetry corresponds to only a subset of the total uncertainty about the firm as the managers of the firm and the 
market are likely to be equally well informed about market-wide variables influencing its value. Thus, until the time of the deal’s 
announcement, the market bears some firm-specific uncertainty (Dierkens, 1991). 
3
 These include unfamiliar institutions and cultural values, disparate accounting practices, capital restrictions, tax policies and 
disclosure requirements, divergent contract enforceability due to legal and regulatory differences, as well as unpredictable future 
cash flows due to unforeseen exchange rate movements.  
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break even when using earnouts in cross-border M&As (Mantecon, 2009; Barbopoulos and 
Sudarsanam, 2012). However, the implied benefits of international business expansion are not 
uniform across all cross-border deals. Likewise, the extent of asymmetric information faced by 
acquirers, thus calling for the use of earnouts, is not similar across all international corporate 
takeovers. Specifically, Doukas and Travlos (1988) postulate the Multinational Network 
Hypothesis (MNH) illustrating that the benefits of cross-border deals mainly stem from 
arbitraging institutional restrictions, capturing informational externalities, and cost saving by 
joint production in marketing and manufacturing. Consequently, firms should experience greater 
gains when their multinational network increases, i.e. when firms expand internationally for the 
first time in their business history or at a subsequent time in a new country. Nevertheless, the 
wealth effects of earnouts in cross-border transactions, conditional on the extent of the acquiring 
firm’s multinational network, remain to be investigated.  
Accordingly, the first paper (chapter 3), Do Financial Advisors Affect the Design of 
Earnouts, draws from a wide array of studies focusing on the effects of financial advisor 
presence in M&A deals. Current evidence illustrates the ability of consulting firms, advising 
acquirers in large public-to-public deals, to increase their likelihood of success via the 
identification and, in most cases, extraction of valuable synergies (Bowers and Miller, 1990). In 
so doing, financial advisors are portrayed to actively participate in the valuation and negotiation 
process of the deal (Sudarsanam, 1995; Fleuriet, 2008). As a result, the presence of top-tier 
(reputable) consulting firms has been illustrated to result in greater acquirer gains (Bao and 
Edmans, 2011; Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2012). Nevertheless, the impact of less-
reputable financial advisors on the success of smaller, yet risky, deals involving unlisted targets, 
which appeal to earnout-financing, remains to be investigated.
4
 To the extent that the inherent 
complexities of this contingent payment method are better managed under the presence of 
financial advisors, the above suggest an incremental economic value added from their 
contribution towards the efficient design of the deal. The above should send a strong signal to 
market participants, reflecting the deal’s increased synergy potential.  
Our main findings show that the use of earnouts in the financing process of the deal, 
along with financial advisor presence counseling the acquiring firm, lead to significantly higher 
                                                          
4
 Golubov et al. (2012) find ‘no effect of financial advisor reputation on bidder returns in acquisitions of unlisted firms’ (p. 273).  
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acquirer announcement period abnormal returns than the use of earnouts without financial 
advisor presence, or the use of single up-front payments with or without financial advisor 
presence. In order to address potential self-selection considerations that could bias the validity of 
our results, as well as their causal interpretation, we employ Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
and the Rosenbaum-bounds (RB) methods. PSM allows for an unbiased causal inference by 
pairing treated M&As (advised earnout-financed deals) to untreated ones, based on a propensity 
score that is estimated at deal level using observable pre-treatment features. Subsequently, a 
comparison is conducted between acquirers’ abnormal returns in the two groups of treated and 
untreated M&As as the response random variable (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). In addition, the 
RB method is utilized in order to further account for potential hidden variable bias in the 
propensity score estimator (logit model). Our results indicate that advised earnout-financed deals 
significantly outperform their counterfactual (matched) deals that were identified via the PSM 
method. These include: (a) non-advised earnout-financed deals, (b) advised non-earnout-
financed deals, and (c) non-advised non-earnout-financed deals. Similarly, ‘optimal’ earnout-use, 
financial advisor presence and advised earnout occurrences, as identified using the calculated 
propensity scores from the PSM method, are illustrated to offer significant value gains to 
acquirers. Lastly, when examining simultaneously the wealth effect of the interaction between 
earnout-financing and financial advisor presence, along with other deal- and merging firm- 
specific features, we find that earnout-financed deals involving unlisted targets yield significant 
gains to acquirers solely when the latter consult financial advisors. 
The acquiring firm’s informational environment and its impact on the short-run wealth 
effects of earnout-financed deals is scrutinized in the second paper (chapter 4), Acquirer 
Idiosyncratic Volatility and Earnout-Financing. Extant literature illustrates the appropriateness 
of idiosyncratic volatility (sigma) as an accurate proxy for information asymmetry over a 
publicly traded firm (Dierkens, 1991) that affects acquirers’ abnormal returns at the 
announcement of M&A deals (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2007). Accordingly, if deals 
financed with earnouts offer greater potential for value creation than deals financed with single 
up-front payments, acquirers’ shareholders should enjoy greater announcement period abnormal 
returns, regardless of the release of acquirer-specific information. Therefore, both high and low 
sigma acquirers should enjoy higher abnormal returns when announcing earnout-financed deals, 
14 
   
relative to deals financed with single up-front payments. In contrast, if the market’s reaction to 
the announcement of earnout-financed deals is sensitive to the release of acquirer-specific 
information, high sigma acquirers should not enjoy greater short-run abnormal returns when 
employing earnouts. As increased asymmetric information (high sigma) over small acquiring 
firms is likely to imply undervaluation, the market’s reaction would reflect its inference that the 
acquirer’s stock is undervalued. It therefore reacts favorably, yet not more favorably relative to 
similar M&As in which it would also infer that the acquirer’s stock is worth more than its market 
value, such as acquisitions of unlisted targets financed with single up-front payments. On the 
other hand, under low acquirer sigma the dissemination of acquirer-specific information is less 
substantial. Consequently, the deal’s synergy potential, which is heightened via the use of 
earnouts, should lead to greater abnormal equity gains. 
The main findings of our analysis illustrate earnout acquirers exhibiting the highest 
sigma, on average, relative to acquirers utilizing single up-front payments. We proceed to extend 
the findings of Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) and find that, at the 
time of the deal’s announcement, earnout acquirers are characterized by the lowest levels of 
firm-specific and time-series sector valuation errors, compared to acquirers using single up-front 
payment methods. The above observation persists within all deals, as well as within high and low 
acquirer sigma deals. Regarding the distribution of announcement period abnormal returns, our 
results indicate that high sigma acquirers do not enjoy significantly greater gains when financing 
M&As with earnouts, relative to single up-front payments. Moreover, under high acquirer sigma, 
earnout-financed deals significantly underperform their control non-earnout counterfactuals, 
identified via PSM. In contrast, under low acquirer sigma, earnout-financed deals significantly 
outperform their control non-earnout counterfactuals, identified via PSM. As low sigma 
acquirers are mainly big firms (Banz, 1981; Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu, 2001) we 
proceed to examine the likely exposure of earnout acquirers to size effect considerations 
(Moeller et al., 2004). We find that their shareholders enjoy positive equally weighted and value-
weighted announcement period average abnormal returns, irrespective of firm size. In contrast, 
acquirers not using earnouts experience losses during M&A announcements as their size 
increases. The above results persist within a multivariate framework, while controlling for other 
factors shaping the market’s reaction simultaneously. 
15 
   
Lastly, a thorough examination of the wealth effects generated by earnout-financing in 
international changes of corporate control is conducted in the third paper (chapter 5) of this 
doctoral thesis, Cross-Border Earnout-Financing and the Multinational Network Hypothesis. 
Specifically, firms engaging in a foreign M&A transaction for the first time (FT) in their 
business history face a great opportunity for value creation as they gain access and operate 
within a multinational network. Yet, FT deals also incorporate greater valuation uncertainty, due 
to the inherent complexities of exiting the home country for the first time and entering a new, 
and at most time less developed (Doukas, 1995), geographic market. Therefore, the risk-
mitigating contingent properties of earnout-financing should be value enhancing. On the 
contrary, non-FT international M&A transactions increase the acquiring firm’s global 
diversification, thus inducing a discount on synergy expectations, closely related to managerial 
hubris and agency problems (Denis, Denis and Yost, 2002). Moreover, non-FT international 
expansions in countries where the acquiring firm has already engaged in an M&A deal in the 
past do not alter the market’s perception over the acquirer’s ability to benefit from operating 
within a multinational network. This is expected to reduce more synergy expectations. Further 
accounting for the implied costs of monitoring the performance of an earnout post-merger, the 
above suggest that earnout-financing should be less value enhancing in non-FT deals. 
Our results portray earnout-financing as the second most frequent payment method in 
international changes of corporate control. When examining acquirers’ announcement period 
abnormal returns, earnout-financed FT deals significantly outperform all domestic corporate 
takeovers. Within cross-border M&As, earnout-financed FT deals yield significantly greater 
gains to acquirers, relative to FT deals financed with cash, as well as relative to non-FT deals in 
either a new country or not, irrespective of payment method. The above are further verified 
within a multivariate framework, while including other factors known to influence both domestic 
and international takeover outcomes. Moreover, when examining the performance of earnouts 
solely within the FT portfolio, our results indicate that, consistent with Doukas (1995), acquirers 
enjoy greater gains when using earnouts in less developed countries, which incorporate a greater 
level of investment risk. We employ PSM and RB in order to account for potential selection bias 
within the FT portfolio. Our results indicate that treated earnout-financed FT deals significantly 
outperform their matched non-earnout FT counterfactuals by roughly 2.20%, among alternative 
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matching estimations. Regarding the effects of earnout-financing in non-FT deals, subsequent 
international expansions in a new country are illustrated to yield gains to acquirers that are 
indistinguishable from those of domestic deals. In contrast, subsequent international expansions 
in countries where the acquiring firm has already engaged in an M&A deal in the past yield 
significantly lower gains to acquirers than domestic deals. As for their relative performance, non-
initial earnout-financed deals in either a new country, or not, are illustrated to yield statistically 
equal gains. We also employ PSM and RB within the portfolio of non-initial cross-border deals 
in a new country. Our results depict our treated earnout-financed deals yielding equal gains to 
acquirers as their matched non-earnout-financed counterparts.  
Overall, the papers included in this doctoral thesis make significant contributions to current 
M&A literature. Specifically, we complement earlier studies suggesting that the efficient design 
of earnouts presents a crucial condition under which their successful implementation is more 
feasible. In so doing, we illustrate that the latter is enhanced when acquirers consult financial 
advisors. We, therefore, also extend evidence from earlier studies analysing the role of financial 
advisors in M&A outcomes and support the view that the involvement of top-tier (reputable) 
consulting firms is not associated with higher acquirer gains in deals involving unlisted targets 
(Golubov et al., 2012). In turn, we show that the involvement of less reputable financial advisors 
in deals including unlisted targets and financed with earnouts enhances their expected outcome. 
In so doing, we extend the findings recorded by earlier UK studies and illustrate that the value-
increasing interaction between earnout-financing and unlisted targets is highly likely to be 
sourcing from deals in which acquirers are being counselled. Thus, our results indicate the 
presence of a complementarity effect between earnouts and financial advisors in small, yet risky, 
deals leading, in turn, to greater acquirer value gains.  
Furthermore, we contribute to current literature by illustrating that information 
asymmetry over the acquiring firm matters in shaping the market’s reaction to the announcement 
of an earnout-financed deal. Specifically, we show that the well-documented superior acquirer 
gains in deals financed with earnouts, relative to deals financed with single up-front payments, 
do not persist under increased idiosyncratic volatility in the acquiring firm’s equity value. In so 
doing, we extend Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) and report a relative undervaluation of earnout 
acquirers’ market value of equity, when compared to acquirers using single up-front payments. 
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Moreover, we extend Moeller et al. (2004) and illustrate the limited exposure of earnout-
financed deals to a size effect. Thus, the prevalence of the release of acquirer-specific 
information when small acquirers announce earnout-financed acquisitions appears to induce an 
upward reassessment of their equity value as the market infers that it may be undervalued. In 
contrast, the risk-mitigating properties of this contingent payment method when selected by big 
firms with low information asymmetry send a strong signal for value creation that also prevents 
market participants from imposing a size-related discount at the announcement of the deal.   
Lastly, we complement and extend the findings of Mantecon (2009) and Barbopoulos and 
Sudarsanam (2012), which suggest that earnout-financed cross-border deals yield insignificant 
short-run equity gains to acquirers. Specifically, we distinguish the latter between those of FT 
and non-FT deals, and illustrate the value-increasing choice to employ earnouts in FT deals, 
relative to (a) all domestic deals, (b) FT deals not financed with earnouts and (c) all non-FT 
cross-border deals regardless of payment method. In so doing we also extend evidence recorded 
in previous studies illustrating cross-border deals as less value enhancing than domestic M&As 
(Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). All the more so, having accounted for potential selection 
bias considerations within the FT portfolio, our results suggest that when firms wish to join a 
multinational network through the acquisition of a foreign company financing the deal with an 
earnout offers a major value creating opportunity. In addition, in line with Doukas (1995), we 
illustrate the usefulness of this uncertainty reduction payment strategy in initial international 
expansions in less developed countries, which exhibit a higher level of investment risk. 
The remainder of this thesis consists of a general literature review (chapter 2) discussing the 
factors known to influence the outcome of an announced corporate takeover, followed by the 
aforementioned three empirical chapters (chapters 3 to 5). Accompanying tables and appendices 
follow each of the three included papers, which also incorporate their own conclusion section. 
Subsequently, several concluding remarks are included (chapter 6) discussing the ramifications 
of the findings reported in this thesis for the shareholders of acquiring firms and outside 
investors. Finally, a detailed list of references is presented.  
  
18 
   
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
A rich array of studies in finance literature focus on the reaction of the stock market during the 
announcement of an M&A deal, as an accurate proxy of market participants’ synergy 
expectations regarding the transaction. In brief, these studies have identified a variety of 
characteristics that influence significantly the announcement period wealth effects of corporate 
takeovers. Along these lines, this chapter reviews, in great detail, the salient literature on the 
determinants of acquirers’ announcement period abnormal returns. Findings related to issues that 
are investigated within each of the empirical chapters are discussed within the framework of each 
chapter separately. Given the inter-disciplinary nature of this thesis, this allows the avoidance of 
overlapping discussions and helps the reader further understand its contributions to current 
literature. As a result, the wealth effects of contingent earnouts, as an M&A deal’s payment 
method, are discussed within the relevant empirical chapters (chapters 3, 4 and 5). Similarly, the 
wealth effects of cross-border M&As are discussed in the relevant chapter (chapter 5) separately.  
2.2. Gains from Domestic Acquisitions 
This section reviews existing evidence on the impact of various crucial factors on the abnormal 
returns accrued to the acquiring firm’s shareholders during the announcement of domestic M&A 
deals. Such factors include the listing status of the target firm, the method of payment used, the 
size of the acquiring firm, the relative size of the deal, the acquiring firm’s growth prospects and 
the extent of asymmetric information surrounding the acquiring firm.  
2.2.1. Target Firm Listing Status 
The vast majority of studies on the short-run wealth effects of corporate takeovers points to the 
ambiguity characterizing the gains accrued to the shareholders of acquiring firms.
5
 In contrast, 
                                                          
5 Studies documenting the positive gains to target firms' shareholders for the US market include Dodd and Ruback (1977), 
Langetieg (1978), Bradley (1980), Dennis and McConnell (1986), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), 
Lang, Stuiz and Walking (1989), Frank, Harris and Titman (1991), Servaes (1991), Bannerjee and Owers (1992), Conrad and 
Niden (1992) , Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), Kaplan and Weisback (1992), Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) , Smith and 
Kim (1994), Schwert (1996), Laughran and Vijh (1997), Maquieira, Megginson and Nail (1998), Leeth and Borg (2000), 
Mulherin and Boone (2000), Mulherin (2000), DeLong (2001), Houtson et al. (2001), and Billet, King and Mauer (2003), for 
Hong Kong, Cheung and Shum (1993). Draper and Paudyal (1999 and 2006) further verify the above for the UK market, while 
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the shareholders of target firms (when the target firm is a publicly listed company) are 
consistently illustrated to enjoy positive and significant abnormal returns during the 
announcement period. To this end, a wide array of studies suggests that acquirers’ gains are 
largely dependent on the listing status of the target firm. Specifically, acquirers of publicly traded 
targets appear to, at best, break even (experience negative and significant, or insignificant 
abnormal returns) in the short-run.
6
 On the other hand, the vast majority of studies illustrates that 
acquirers of unlisted targets (private or subsidiary firms) enjoy positive and statistically 
significant gains.
7
 In the following discussion, seminal papers illustrating the impact of the 
listing status of the target firm on the market’s reception of an announced corporate takeover are 
presented in detail.  
2.2.1.1. Acquirer Gains from Deals Involving Publicly Listed Targets  
Following the seminal work of Jensen and Ruback (1983), almost four decades of research on 
the wealth effects of M&As illustrate that the shareholders of firms acquiring public targets 
either experience significant losses, or break even (i.e. deliver the required rate of return to their 
shareholders) at the announcement of the deal. Moreover, while analyzing if the aforementioned 
market reaction varies according to whether the deal is a merger or a tender offer, Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) claim that the gains from corporate takeover announcements appear to stem from 
other sources than market power. In addition, the authors suggest that M&A announcements 
mostly create value for target firms’ shareholders, while also stressing the difficulty in 
identifying managerial actions that destroy the wealth of acquirers’ shareholders.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) also do so for Canada and Beitel et al. (2002), and Goergen and Ronneboog (2004) for other 
European countries. 
6 Studies illustrating the poor performance of US acquirers in public target deals include Jensen and Ruback (1983), Ascquith 
(1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1987), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988), Jarrell and Poulsen 
(1989), Acquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983), Servaes (1991), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), Hansen and Lott (1996), Chang 
(1998), Mulherin and Boone (2000), Schwert (2000), Ang and Kohers (2001), and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002). UK 
studies include Firth (1980), Barnes (1984), Dodds and Quek (1985), Franks and Harris (1989), Limmack (1991), Sudarsanam, 
Holl and Salami (1996), Gregory (1997), Holl and Kyriazis (1997), Higson and Elliott (1998), Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), 
Draper and Paudyal (1999 and 2006), Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2005), Doukas and Petmezas (2007), and Antonlou, 
Petmezas and Zhao (2007). For the rest of the world, studies include Eckbo (1986), Pettway and Yamaha (1986), Eckbo, 
Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990a), Gregory and Westheider (1992) and Da Silva Rosa, Limmack, Supriadi, and Woodliff (2001). 
7 Studies illustrating the positive performance of US acquirers in private target deals include Chang (1998), Ang and Kohers 
(2001), Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), while for the UK market studies include Hansen and Lott (1996), Draper and 
Paudyal (2006), Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2005) and Alexandridis, Antoniou, and Zhao (2008). For evidence from other 
countries (Australia) see for example: Da Silva Rosa, Limmack, Supriadi, and Woodliff (2001). Studies illustrating the positive 
performance of acquirers of subsidiary targets include Fuller et al. (2002), Faccio and Masulis (2005) and Antoniou et al. (2007). 
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Consistent with Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) examine the 
market’s reaction to tender offer announcements for two event windows (-10 to +5 and -10 to 
+20, time 0 being the day of the announcement of the deal) within a sample ranging between the 
1960s and 1980s. The authors report that while the gains to bidders remain positive and 
significant for the 1960s and 1970s, they appear to reverse during the 1980s. Similarly, Bradley, 
Desai and Kim (1988) illustrate that acquirers’ wealth gains vary significantly across different 
decades as acquisitions during the 1960s yielded positive and significant returns. In contrast, 
those that took place during the 1970s and 1980s resulted in insignificant gains and significant 
losses, respectively. Moreover, the authors identify large positive gains for the target’s 
shareholders during tender offer announcements.  
Along these lines, Servaes (1991) analyses whether friendly or hostile deals lead to 
acquirers’ shareholders experiencing divergent wealth effects. His results suggest that, in 
contrast to targets who enjoy the highest gains from hostile deals (31.77% versus 21.89%), 
acquirers suffer the most from hostile transactions (-4.71% versus -0.16%). Similarly, Healy, 
Palepu and Ruback (1992) examine the 50 largest US M&A announcements during the period 
from 1970 to 1984 and identify a positive and statistically significant wealth gain accrued to 
acquirers’ shareholders. In addition, the authors identify a significant relation between acquirers’ 
announcement period abnormal returns and post-merger cash-flow improvements. Thus, in line 
with the efficient market hypothesis, the information conveyed in the market reaction of an 
M&A announcement can predict post-concentration performance. In contrast, Kaplan and 
Weisbach (1992) analyze a sample of large acquisitions (with a deal value of at least $100 
million) completed between 1971 and 1982. Their results suggest that, on average, acquirers’ 
shareholders experience significant losses, whereas targets’ shareholders enjoy significant gains.  
Evidence on the inferior gains yielded to the shareholders of firms acquiring public 
companies can also be found in studies analyzing the wealth effects of a broader range of 
corporate takeovers, including all different types of target listing statuses (i.e. public, private and 
subsidiary).  Specifically, Hansen and Lott (1996) illustrate that bidders experience significant 
losses of 0.98% when acquiring listed targets. Similarly, Chang (1998) indicates that 
shareholders of firms acquiring public companies suffer a loss, on average, though the gains 
appear to vary significantly with the method of payment used to finance the deal. Similarly, Ang 
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and Kohers (2001) examine 5,302 deals involving listed targets between 1984 and 1996 and 
Fuller et al. (2002) examine 456 public target deals involving frequent acquirers (firms that 
engaged in more than one M&A deals within three years) between 1990 and 2000. Both studies 
further verify previous findings in literature. Lastly, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2007) 
aim to examine the short-run wealth effects of information asymmetry and diversity of opinion 
regarding the acquiring firm.  The authors find no difference in abnormal returns between cash 
offers for public firms, equity offers for public firms, and equity offers for private firms once 
proxying for information asymmetry. 
While the above studies focus on the performance of deals occurring in the US, a 
substantial branch of finance literature also investigates the performance of M&A deals in the 
UK. Specifically, Firth (1980) analyses the announcement month wealth effects of corporate 
takeovers occurring in the UK from 1969 to 1975. His results suggest that acquirers’ 
shareholders experience a significant average loss of -6.30% for successfully completed deals 
and of -6% for unsuccessful ones. In contrast, targets’ shareholders appear to reap significant 
gains of 28.10% and 31.20%, respectively. Similarly, Barnes (1984) illustrates that acquirers of 
public firms experienced a significant loss during the period between 1974 and 1976.  The same 
conclusions are also drawn by Dodds and Quek (1985) for the same time period. In one of the 
first sufficiently broad studies, Franks and Harris (1989) investigate the wealth effects of 1,898 
deals for the period between 1955 and 1985. They illustrate that bidders’ shareholders earn small 
positive abnormal returns of 1%, whereas targets’ shareholders reap significantly positive gains 
of around 23%.  
Limmack (1991) applies three different methodologies in order to estimate the wealth 
effects of 448 successful and 81 unsuccessful bids that were announced between 1977 and 1986. 
These include OLS estimations of the market model, estimations using a model with adjusted 
betas and estimations using index relative models. His results provide further support for 
previous findings as bidders’ shareholders are illustrated to suffer significant losses while 
targets’ shareholders earn significant gains. Similarly, Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) 
apply market model estimations with Dimson Thin Trading Adjustment aiming to identify the 
effect of synergies in the overall wealth effect of M&A announcements. Their results confirm 
that synergies create value for acquirers, targets, or both. Nevertheless, on average, bidders 
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experience significant losses during the announcement period, while targets earn significant 
wealth benefits.  
Aiming to better assess the wealth effects of UK M&A announcements, Gregory (1997) 
points to the limited reliability of ‘event-study’ methodologies. Specifically, the author follows a 
series of published papers that point to the conclusion that the choice of the appropriate asset-
pricing model can significantly affect the derivation of the calculated abnormal returns. In light 
of the above, six different methodologies are employed within a sample of 420 successful M&As 
between 1984 and 1992. These include the basic Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the 
Dimson-Marsh (1986) risk- and size- adjusted model (DM), the simple size control portfolio 
(SS), the multi-index model with equally-weighted smaller decile minus large decile returns 
(SML), the value-weighted multi-index model using the Hoare-Govett Index as a measure of 
small firm performance and the Fama-French (1996) value-weighted three factor model. All 
methodologies are illustrated to be consistent. However, none of them suggests significant gains 
accrued to acquirers’ shareholders during the announcement month. Similarly, Holl and Kyriazis 
(1997) study the impact of bid resistance on the wealth effects of takeover announcements of 
public targets in the UK between 1979 and 1989. Their results illustrate that acquirers’ 
shareholders experience a significant loss of -1.70% during the announcement month, while 
target firms’ shareholders enjoy positive and significant gains of 21.61%.  
Consistent with the previous studies, Higson and Elliott (1998) examine 830 deals 
between 1975 and 1990, while also controlling for the acquiring firm’s size, and find 
insignificant gains for acquirers’ shareholders. In contrast, targets’ shareholders are illustrated to 
enjoy significant gains, irrespective of their size. Nevertheless, it is shown that altering the 
measurement period of abnormal returns, either by extending it from the beginning of the 
announcement month to the end of the completion month, or by focusing on each month 
separately, leads to significantly different results. Within the same context, Draper and Paudyal 
(1999) examine both the total returns and the excess returns during the event period. The latter 
are estimated using three different methodologies including the mean-adjusted excess return 
method, the market-adjusted excess return method and the market model excess return method. 
Their results confirm previous studies by reporting significant losses for acquirers’ shareholders, 
while targets’ shareholders appear to earn a significant wealth gain. Similarly, Sudarsanam and 
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Mahate (2003) examine the announcement period and post-merger performance of corporate 
takeovers. The former is estimated using four different methodologies including the mean-
adjusted model, the market-adjusted model, the size-adjusted model and the market-to-book 
value adjusted model, while the latter is estimated using the BHAR method (Buy and Hold 
Abnormal Returns). Evidence on the performance of acquirers at the announcement of 
acquisitions of public targets suggests significant losses to their shareholders. In light of the 
above, Doukas and Petmezas (2007) examine the impact of managerial overconfidence on the 
wealth effects of corporate takeovers in the UK. Their results confirm previous studies and 
indicate that bidders experience significant losses of -0.90% during the announcement period.  
Lastly, the aforementioned dynamics characterizing the wealth effects of deals involving 
public targets are further examined while expanding the analysis to M&A markets beyond the 
US and the UK. Specifically, Eckbo (1986) examines the wealth effects of takeover 
announcements by listed Canadian firms between 1964 and 1983. Despite extant evidence 
suggesting zero or negative gains to acquirers of listed targets, his results indicate significant 
gains attributed to both bidder and target firms. Thus, it is concluded that the Canadian market 
for corporate control offers a more optimal resource allocation. Moreover, Pettway and Yamada 
(1986) analyze the Japanese market over the period between 1977 and 1984. Their results, 
despite being illustrated to be highly sensitive to the relative size of the deal (=deal 
size/acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement), indicate positive, yet 
statistically insignificant, announcement period abnormal equity gains for acquirers’ 
shareholders. On the other hand, targets’ shareholders are illustrated to reap significant gains.  
2.2.1.2. Acquirer Gains from Deals Involving Private Targets  
Acquisitions involving privately held targets dominate the frequency of takeover activity in the 
markets for corporate control of the US and UK.
8
 Consequently, a wide array of studies aims to 
investigate whether such deals create value for the shareholders of acquiring firms. In contrast to 
acquisitions of public targets, private target deals have been illustrated to generate significant 
announcement period wealth gains accrued to acquirers’ shareholders. Nevertheless, the latter 
                                                          
8  For the US, Moeller et al. (2007) illustrate that 47% of targets are privately held. For the UK, Draper and Paudyal (2006) show 
that almost 87% of M&A deals involved privately held targets.  
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have been shown to vary significantly depending to the method of payment used to finance the 
deal.  
Along these lines Hansen and Lott (1996) aim to investigate, both theoretically and 
empirically, the wealth effects of M&A deals involving private targets in a sample ranging from 
1985 to 1990. Their results suggest that acquirers’ shareholders experience significantly lower 
announcement period equity gains of about 2% when buying a public, relative to a private firm. 
Thus, the authors argue that in public-to-public deals well-diversified shareholders will be 
indifferent towards the allocation of the gains from the concentration as they may hold shares in 
both acquirer and target firms. In the latter case, they could even benefit from the well-observed 
appreciation in the target’s equity value. In the case of acquisitions of private firms, however, 
acquirers’ shareholders will capture part of the associated gains, assuming the deal is value 
increasing.  
Chang (1998) offers one of the most seminal studies on the wealth effects generated by 
acquisitions of private firms, as well on their relative performance to deals involving public 
targets, in a sample ranging from 1991 to 1998. The author identifies a significant variation in 
acquirers’ abnormal returns according to the listing status of the target firm and the method of 
payment used to finance the deal. Consistent with Asquith et al. (1983) and Servaes (1991), his 
results illustrate acquirers enjoying significant gains when acquiring private targets with equity 
as the financing method. In contrast, stock-financed acquisitions of public targets result in 
significant losses. Aiming to explain the aforementioned dynamics, the author develops the 
information hypothesis, closely related to Myers and Majluf (1984) and Travlos (1987), the 
limited competition hypothesis and the monitoring hypothesis. According to the information 
hypothesis, in the case of stock-financing, as private firms are closely owned, their managers 
have an incentive to examine thoroughly potential overvaluation considerations. Therefore, aside 
from the deal’s synergy potential, stock-financed acquisitions of private targets also convey the 
positive information that the acquirer’s stock is not likely to be overvalued. Moreover, the 
limited competition hypothesis suggests that the M&A market for public targets is highly 
competitive and, therefore, the likelihood of overpayment is significant, ultimately leading to 
zero abnormal returns. On the other hand, due to high search costs for information, there is 
limited competition in the market for private targets. Therefore, the likelihood of overpayment is 
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reduced, ultimately leading to higher abnormal returns for acquirers’ shareholders. Lastly, the 
monitoring hypothesis suggests that by using stock to acquire private targets firms are effectively 
creating outside blockholders who can be efficient monitors of managerial decision-making. 
Thus, positive Net Present Value (NPV) projects are more likely to be undertaken in the future, 
leading to a positive market reaction.  
Similarly, Ang and Kohers (2001) examine the wealth effects of M&A deals involving 
private and public targets in a sample ranging from 1988 to 1996. Their results suggest that 
bidders enjoy significant announcement period gains when the target is a private firm, 
irrespective of the method of payment. In contrast, in deals involving public targets the method 
of payment matters in shaping acquirers’ announcement period abnormal equity gains. In 
addition, the authors illustrate that the premiums paid to private targets are higher than those paid 
to public targets. The above are argued to reflect the increased bargaining power of private 
targets’ owners who can choose not to sell, or reject an offer and wait for a future bid. In 
addition, Fuller et al. (2002) study 3,135 M&A deals of all types of target listing statuses made 
by frequent acquirers (firms that engaged in at least five deal within three years) during the 
period between 1990 and 2000. Bidders are illustrated to experience positive and significant 
gains when acquiring private and subsidiary targets, in contrast to when acquiring public targets 
in which case they suffer significant losses. Nevertheless, the authors illustrate that the method of 
payment constitutes a crucial determinant of acquirers’ gains. Specifically, in public target deals, 
bidders are reported to experience insignificant gains and losses when using cash and mixed 
payments, respectively. In contrast, bidders experience significant losses when using equity. On 
the other hand, in deals involving unlisted (private and subsidiary) targets, bidders enjoy 
significant gains, irrespective of payment method.  
Within the UK market for corporate control, Draper and Paudyal (2006) examine the 
wealth effects of corporate takeovers within a sample period between 1981 and 2001. Their 
results verify the aforementioned observed dynamics of the US market. Aiming to explain the 
divergent wealth effects of deals involving private and public targets, the authors propose the 
managerial motive, liquidity and bargaining power hypotheses. The first suggests that the higher 
gains generated by private target deals can be attributed to the lower premiums paid when 
acquiring private targets. The second suggests that since information is more (less) available for 
26 
   
public (private) firms, competition is higher (lower) for public (private) firms, thus leading to 
lower (higher) short-run acquirer abnormal returns. Lastly, the third hypothesis suggests that due 
to the concentrated ownership structure of private targets, their managers possess substantial 
bargaining power during takeover negotiations, thus minimizing any potential agency costs. 
Similarly, Antoniou, Petmezas and Zhao (2007) investigate the wealth effects of deals involving 
serial acquirers and all types of targets within a period between 1987 and 2004. The authors 
conclude that, in the short-run, acquirers of listed targets break-even (deliver the required rate of 
return to their shareholders), whereas when acquiring private or subsidiary targets they 
experience significant gains.  
Departing from the UK market, Faccio, McConnell and Stolin (2006) investigate the 
short-run acquirer wealth effects of deals occurring in 17 European countries over the period 
between 1996 and 2001. Their results suggest that bidders enjoy significant gains when acquiring 
unlisted targets and suffer significant losses when acquiring public targets. Moreover, the authors 
report that the effect of the listing status of the target firm appears to hold across time as well as 
across countries. Nevertheless, using a global M&A data set, Alexandridis, Petmezas and 
Travlos (2010) provide evidence suggesting that the degree of competition in the market for 
corporate control is a robust determinant of shareholder gains and takeover premia after 
controlling for deal, firm characteristics, and other differences across countries. 
2.2.1.3. Acquirer Gains from Deals Involving Subsidiary Targets  
A small number of studies investigate the short-run wealth effects of deals involving subsidiary 
targets. Fuller et al. (2002) illustrate that in such deals, bidders enjoy significant gains, 
irrespective of payment method. The authors suggest that the main reason for these superior 
gains is the preference for cash of sellers who want to accomplish their asset and financial 
restructuring goals. Consistent with the above, Moeller et al. (2004) document similar wealth 
effects accrued to the shareholders of firms acquiring subsidiary targets, while further controlling 
for the method of payment and the acquiring firm’s size. Similarly, in a European study over the 
period between 1997 and 2000, Faccio and Masulis (2005) confirm the superior gains accrued to 
the shareholders of firms acquiring subsidiary targets. The latter are further illustrated to be more 
likely to prefer cash, rather than stock, payments given the liquid and more concentrated nature 
27 
   
of their portfolio holdings. Specifically, corporations are more likely to sell subsidiary firms due 
to financial distress, or due to strategic operational restructuring reasons, thus resulting in the 
likely selection of cash as the transaction medium. 
In line with previous studies, Conn et al. (2005) examine the short-run wealth effects of 
acquisitions of subsidiary targets in the UK market for corporate control within the period 
between 1984 and 1998. The authors report superior gains earned by acquirers of subsidiary 
targets, which appear to further increase when the deal is international. Faccio et al. (2005) 
examine the short-run market impact of deals involving subsidiary targets for 17 EU countries 
over the period between 1996 and 2001. The authors report positive and significant gains for 
acquisitions of unlisted targets (private and subsidiary). In contrast, deals involving listed targets 
are illustrated to generate statistically insignificant gains. Lastly, Antoniou et al. (2007) 
investigate the performance of deals involving UK frequent acquirers over the period between 
1987 and 2004. Once controlling for several deal- and firm- specific factors the authors report 
positive and significant gains accrued to the shareholders of firms acquiring subsidiary targets, 
consistent with previous evidence in literature. 
2.2.2. Acquirer Gains and the Method of Payment 
A wide array of studies focusing on the short-run market reaction to M&A announcements point 
to the crucial role played by the method of payment as a major determinant of the likelihood of 
success of the deal.
9
 Specifically, the presence of information asymmetry in financial markets, 
ownership structure considerations, as well as tax-related considerations have been illustrated to 
affect the choice of transaction medium in corporate takeovers and, ultimately, the market’s 
reaction during the announcement of the deal.
10
 
In general, extant literature suggests positive and significant gains accrued to acquirers’ 
shareholders when using cash as the payment method. In contrast, the gains generated by stock-
financed deals are negative and significantly lower than those generated when cash is used. 
Nevertheless, the vast majority of studies confirm that the method of payment significantly 
                                                          
9
 The main methods of payment available to acquirers consist of cash, stock, combinations of the former and mixed payments 
including cash, stock and/or other payment types. Contingent payments (earnouts) constitute a type of other means of payment.  
10
 In the absence of such market imperfections, Modigliani and Miller (1958) postulate the capital structure irrelevance theorem 
suggesting that the method of financing of an investment should have no impact on the market value of the firm 
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interacts with the listing status of the target firm in shaping acquirers’ short-run abnormal equity 
gains.
11
 Moreover, in their UK study, Conn et al. (2005) report that the aforementioned 
interaction becomes more pronounced when comparing the gains of domestic to those of 
international deals. Specifically, the authors illustrate that when firms acquire domestic listed 
targets with cash, their shareholders reap insignificant abnormal equity gains at the 
announcement of the deal and insignificant losses if the target resides beyond UK borders. On 
the contrary, firms acquiring domestic listed targets with non-cash payments experience 
significant abnormal equity losses at the announcement of the deal, whereas in case the latter is 
international acquirers earn positive, yet statistically insignificant, gains. In the case of domestic 
private targets, however, acquirers are illustrated to experience significant abnormal short-run 
equity gains, irrespective of payment method. In contrast, the acquirers’ gains from foreign deals 
involving private targets are illustrated to be significantly lower than those from domestic deals. 
Lastly, the choice of transaction medium is also influenced by country-specific factors. 
Specifically, Faccio and Masulis (2005) examine the wealth effects of corporate takeovers across 
several European countries within the period between 1997 and 2000. The authors report that 
divergent corporate governance mechanisms and debt financing constraints that exist across 
countries are the main determinants of the choice of method of payment. Consistent with 
previous evidence, they further illustrate the significant relation between the method of payment 
used and the listing status of the target firm and, particularly, the preference for cash payments 
when acquiring subsidiary targets.  
2.2.2.1. Information Asymmetry and the Choice of Method of Payment 
Under the presence of information asymmetry in financial markets, managers of listed firms and 
market participants possess different information sets and, hence, different expectations 
regarding the firm’s future performance. Specifically, in their seminal paper, Myers and Majluf 
(1984) suggest that information asymmetries arise due to the fact that managers of firms hold 
superior information regarding the companies they control, relative to outside investors. 
Consequently, in case the stock of the firm they manage is overvalued, they have an incentive to 
                                                          
11 Such studies include Desai and Kim (1982); Limmack (1991); Servaes (1991); Hansen and Lott (1996); Sudarsanam, Holl and 
Salami (1996); Gregory (1997); Chang (1998); Draper and Paudyal (1999 and 2006); Muiherin and Boone (2000); Da Silva 
Rosa, Limmack, Supriadi, and Woodiiff (2001); Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002); Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003); Conn, 
Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2005). 
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prefer its use as the transaction medium, aiming to acquire the target at a discount. Outside 
investors, nevertheless, acknowledge this misvaluation and correct downwards their assessment 
of the acquirer’s stock price during the announcement of an equity-financed M&A deal. In 
addition, targets’ managers are also likely to acknowledge this lemons problem in the equity they 
are being offered and may request a higher premium. Evidently, the above constitute a plausible 
explanation for the negative performance of stock-financed deals, particularly when the target is 
a listed firm.  
Similarly, Travlos (1987) offers the first empirical study on the impact of the method of 
payment on the short-run market reaction of an announced M&A deal over the period between 
1972 and 1981. His results depict significant differences in the wealth effects of cash- and stock- 
financed deals. Specifically, acquirers are illustrated to experience significant gains when using 
cash as the transaction medium and significant losses when using stock. Extending and further 
confirming the findings of Travlos (1987), Hansen (1987), Stulz (1988) and Fishman (1989) 
suggest that bidders will prefer the use of cash under increased information asymmetry regarding 
the acquiring firm’s value. In contrast, the same model predictions suggest that the use of stock 
should be further motivated under increased information asymmetry regarding the target firm’s 
value. The above suggest that cash-financed deals send a message to market participants 
implying that the acquiring firm’s stock is undervalued, thus resulting in a short-run price 
appreciation. Accordingly, Berkovich and Narayanan (1990) and Brown and Ryngaert (1991) 
further verify the greater gains accrued to shareholders of acquirers in cash-financed deals. 
Lastly, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2007) further extend the above and illustrate that the 
greater the level of information asymmetry in a cash-financed deal the greater the short-run 
abnormal equity gains accrued to acquirers’ shareholders.  
2.2.2.2. Ownership Structure and the Choice of Method of Payment 
A wide array of studies on the choice of payment method in corporate takeovers and its wealth 
effects suggests that the latter are significantly affected by the managerial ownership structure of 
the involved parties in the transaction. Within this context, several studies illustrate that the 
greater the proportion of the management’s ownership, in either acquiring or target firms, the 
greater the probability of cash-financing. Specifically, Stulz (1988) examines the effects of 
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managerial ownership on the selection of financing method. His results depict that as the 
ownership percentage held by the acquiring firm’s management increases the less likely it is for 
the deal to be financed with common equity as a result of acquirers’ reluctance to dilute the 
existing ownership structure.  
Similarly, Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990) examine the wealth effects of 209 US 
corporate takeovers with a period between 1981 and 1983. Their results suggest that the lower 
gains accrued to acquirers involved in stock-financed deals are mainly attributed to deals 
exhibiting low managerial ownership. Moreover, the authors illustrate that as managers’ 
shareholdings in the acquiring firm increase, the latter will prefer the use of cash in fear of losing 
significant control of the firm post-merger. Thus, under the above circumstances the use of stock 
would not be necessarily signaling low value creation. Lastly, Faccio and Masulis (2005) 
illustrate the suitability of cash-financing as a means of post-merger control preservation. Thus, 
under a concentrated ownership structure cash payments are more likely to be selected. On the 
contrary, under supermajority voting rights by a shareholder of the acquiring firm, his control 
would not be threatened by engaging in a stock-financed M&A deal, thus increasing the 
likelihood of common equity-financing.  
2.2.2.3. Tax Implications and the Choice of Method of Payment 
A significant amount of studies on the choice and wealth effects of the payment method in 
corporate takeovers points to the effect of potential tax considerations. Specifically, Carleton 
(1983) aims to explain the high frequency of cash-financed deals suggesting that the increased 
use of cash may be understood by looking at the divergent tax- and accounting- related effects of 
cash- and stock- financing, respectively. Consequently, due to the existence of different tax 
implications between cash and stock payments, the acquirer must pay a higher premium in cash 
deals in order to accommodate the increased tax burden of the target’s shareholders. On the 
contrary, as stock exchanges are treated as tax-free transactions, the premium paid to targets in 
stock-financed deals should be lower. Along these lines, Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) 
conclude that targets’ returns are higher in cash- than in stock-financed deals. On the contrary, 
Harris, Franks and Mayer (1988) do not find evidence supporting the above and illustrate that tax 
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considerations do not exert a significant influence in shaping the short-run market reaction to the 
announcement of a cash-financed deal. 
2.2.3. Acquirer Gains and the Size of the Acquiring Firm 
A very important factor determining the short-run wealth gains accrued to the shareholders of 
firms engaged in M&A deals has been identified by Moeller et al. (2004) and relates to the size 
(market capitalization usually measured 20 trading days prior to the announcement of the deal) 
of the acquiring firm. The authors use a near exhaustive sample of roughly 12,000 completed 
M&A deals in the US, announced over the period between 1980 and 2001. Their findings 
suggest that small acquiring firms, when engaged in corporate takeovers, generate significantly 
greater announcement period abnormal returns for their shareholders, relative to large acquiring 
firms, by roughly 2%. This differential is illustrated to be due to the fact that small acquirers 
enjoy significant gains at the announcement of an M&A deal, in contrast to large acquirers 
whose gains are illustrated to not significantly differ from zero. The authors proceed to further 
examine the wealth implications of the identified size effect, while also controlling for the 
impact of the method of payment and the listing status of the target firm. Consistent with Chang 
(1998) and Fuller et al. (2002), their results suggest that in public target deals, large acquirers 
suffer significant losses whereas small acquirers experience significant gains, irrespective of 
payment method. Thus, acquisitions of public targets are illustrated to not necessarily constitute 
negative NPV investments. Therefore, the above imply that the wealth effects of the listing status 
of the target firm and the deal’s financing method are, to a large extent, shaped by the size of the 
acquiring firm.  
Moeller et al. (2004), as well as several follow-up studies, aim to explain the observed 
size effect on acquirers’ short-run abnormal equity gains. One of the proposed reasons relates to 
managerial hubris (Roll, 1986). Similarly, Malmendier and Tate (2005) contend that managerial 
decision-making is more likely to be affected by hubris in large firms and that this is further 
supported by the increased media exposure and available resources of managers of large 
reputable firms. Similarly, Billet and Qian (2007) show that large firms are more likely to engage 
in value-destroying M&A deals as a result of poor managerial decision-making. Another 
proposed reason draws from the conclusions of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggesting that small 
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acquirers are more likely to have less dispersed ownership and, thus, better alignment between 
the incentives of managers and shareholders. Moreover, the observed size effect could be 
explained by the tendency of large firms to acquire large public targets, in contrast to small firms 
who tend to acquire private targets, which have been illustrated to lead to a positive market 
reaction. In addition, large acquirers are more likely to be overvalued, thus inducing a market 
correction when announcing a corporate takeover. Within this context, arbitrageurs are expected 
to be less likely to place equity holdings in small acquiring firms, thus further allowing its share 
price to appreciate at the announcement of an M&A deal. Lastly, as the size of the transaction 
consideration relative to the market capitalization of the acquiring firm (i.e. the deal’s relative 
size) is expected to be greater when small firms become acquirers, the size effect could be 
attributed to the positive wealth implications of relatively large M&A deals (Fuller et al., 2002). 
2.2.4. Acquirer Gains and the Relative Size of the Deal 
In their seminal work, Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest that when M&A deals create value for 
the acquiring firm, the shareholders should enjoy greater announcement period abnormal returns 
as the size of the target firm increases. Similarly, Asquith et al. (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen 
(1989) and Kang (1993) identify a positive relationship between the relative deal size 
(=transaction value/acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement) and 
acquirers’ short-run abnormal equity gains. Thus, the greater the acquirer’s structural change 
post-merger, as a result of the concentration, the greater the gains accrued to the firm’s 
shareholders. Nevertheless, Loderer and Martin (1990) claim that large firms tend to overpay for 
companies they purchase. This increases the relative size of the deal and can ultimately induce a 
negative effect on market participants’ short-run reaction. Similarly, Myers and Majluf (1984) 
and DeAngelo et al. (1984) illustrate that the larger the size of the acquiring firm the more likely 
it is for stock to be selected as the acquisition’s transaction medium leading, in turn, to lower 
abnormal equity gains, despite potentially increasing the relative size of the deal. The market 
perception of stock-financed deals, however, is illustrated by subsequent studies to differ 
depending on the listing status of the target firm.  
Aiming to further examine the effect of the relative size of the deal in international deals, 
Cakici, Hessel and Tandon (1996) employ cross-sectional regressions, while also controlling 
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simultaneously for other factors expected to influence acquirers’ short-run abnormal returns. The 
authors identify a negative, yet statistically insignificant, relation between the relative size of 
international M&As and acquirers’ short run abnormal equity gains. Nevertheless, Brooks et al. 
(2000) examine the wealth effects of domestic and international M&As and identify a positive 
effect on acquirers’ gains, induced by the relative size of the deal. Moreover, once controlling for 
the latter in their cross-sectional regressions, the authors find no significant difference in 
acquirers’ announcement period abnormal returns between domestic and cross-border M&As.  
Faced with the opacity of the aforementioned conclusions regarding the wealth effect of 
the relative size of the deal, Fuller et al. (2002) examine its impact through the scope of the 
listing status of the target firm. The authors report that as the relative size of deals involving 
public targets increases, acquirers enjoy greater gains when paying with cash, lower gains when 
paying with stock, whereas there is no identified effect when paying with mixed payments. In 
contrast, as the relative size of deals involving unlisted (private or subsidiary) targets increases, 
acquirers enjoy greater gains when paying with stock, lower gains when paying with cash, 
whereas its effect for mixed payments remains insignificant. The authors contend that since 
unlisted firms cannot be acquired or sold easily, there is a liquidity effect, ultimately leading to 
bidders receiving a better price and enjoying greater abnormal returns at the announcement of the 
deal. Regarding the positive wealth effects of the use of stock when acquiring unlisted targets, 
the authors explain the identified value-increasing interactions as a result of tax considerations 
and improvements in managerial monitoring post-merger.   
2.2.5. Acquirer Gains and Growth Opportunities 
Numerous studies examining the factors influencing the short-run wealth effects of corporate 
takeovers point to the importance of market participants’ assessment of the acquirer’s growth 
prospects at the time of the deal’s announcement. Accordingly, empirical evidence illustrates the 
significance of the information conveyed in the acquiring firm’s market-to-book value (MTBV- 
measured as the market value of the acquiring firm 20 trading days prior to the deal’s 
announcement over the book value of the acquiring firm during the same period) in explaining 
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the distribution of acquirers’ announcement period abnormal returns.12 Specifically, in their US-
based study, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) show that value acquirers (with low MTBV) earn 
significantly greater gains at the announcement of an M&A deal than glamour (with high 
MTBV) acquirers. The authors suggest that the managers of glamour firms over-extrapolate past 
performance when assessing the desirability of an M&A deal. In contrast, as value acquirers are 
also likely to be undervalued they have greater potential for value creation post-merger, 
ultimately leading to greater gains. Similarly, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) for the UK 
illustrate the relative underperformance of deals involving glamour acquirers to deals involving 
value acquirers. The authors further illustrate that glamour acquirers are more likely to finance a 
deal with stock, thus also potentially benefiting from likely overvaluation effects, in contrast to 
value acquirers who are more likely to use cash as the acquisition’s transaction medium. 
Consistent with the above, Conn et al. (2005) further illustrate that glamour acquirers earn 
significantly lower gains from public target deals, relative to private target deals.  
Within a similar context, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) build on the predictions 
of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and develop a decomposition method for acquirers’ market-to-
book ratios. Their method is illustrated to break the acquiring firm’s MTBV into three individual 
components. These consist of the firm-specific pricing deviation from short-run industry pricing, 
the industry-wide short-run deviation from the firm’s long-run pricing and the long-run pricing 
deviation from the firm’s book value. In so doing, the authors aim to explain the aggregate M&A 
activity as well as the choice of method of payment using firm- and industry-specific 
misvaluations in the acquiring firm’s stock price as well as its long-run growth opportunities. 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) further proceed to provide empirical evidence 
and illustrate that firms with low long-run growth opportunities acquire firms with high long-run 
growth opportunities, while cash acquirers are less overvalued than stock acquirers.  
Interestingly, the authors show that the component of the decomposition capturing acquirers’ 
growth opportunities has no effect or is negatively correlated with merger activity over time. 
Nevertheless, the above also suggest that the relative underperformance of glamour acquirers 
relative to value acquirers at the announcement of M&A deals could be due to the former’s 
increased firm-specific misvaluation component.  
                                                          
12 The conclusions of these studies are illustrated to also be robust to the choice of the acquiring firm’s price-to-earnings ratio as 
an alternative to its market-to-book ratio.  
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2.2.6. Acquirer Gains and Information Asymmetry  
Recent evidence from empirical studies suggests that the extent of asymmetric information 
surrounding the acquiring firm significantly influences the abnormal equity gains accrued to its 
shareholders in the short-run. Specifically, Moeller et al. (2004) suggest that the announcement 
period wealth effects of corporate takeovers should represent ‘the economic benefit of the 
acquisition for the shareholders of the acquiring firm together with the stock-price impact of 
other information released or inferred by investors when firms make acquisition announcements” 
(p. 202). Along these lines, Draper and Paudyal (2008) examine the performance of serial 
acquirers aiming to investigate whether information asymmetry regarding the acquiring firm is 
mitigated after consecutive deal announcements. The authors use several alternative proxies for 
asymmetric information between acquirers’ managers and outside investors. These include 
analyst coverage, firm size, volume of trade and number of trade. The findings illustrate 
acquirers with greater information asymmetry experiencing significantly greater announcement 
period abnormal returns than those with lower information asymmetry. Moreover, the gains are 
illustrated to increase further in case the acquirer is also undervalued. Therefore, the authors 
suggest that the cross-variation of acquirers’ abnormal returns at the time of the announcement of 
the deal reflects information dissemination regarding the acquirer, revelation of expected synergy 
gains, or both. Thus, these findings support the view that managers of firms that are undervalued 
and have higher information asymmetry may be motivated to announce takeover bids to draw the 
attention of market participants, increase the transparency of their firm and, ultimately, enable 
investors to reappraise and revalue the firm. 
Similarly, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2007) aim to examine the appropriateness 
of information asymmetry models, diversity of opinion models and resolution of uncertainty 
models regarding the acquirer in explaining the short-run wealth effects of corporate takeovers. 
As in Dierkens (1991) the proxies for information asymmetry consist of the standard deviation of 
acquirers’ earnings announcement abnormal returns and acquirers’ pre-merger idiosyncratic 
stock return volatility. The results suggest that information asymmetry models offer a more 
complete account. Specifically, it is illustrated that acquirer abnormal returns are negatively 
related to information asymmetry for equity offers, but not for cash offers. Moreover, the authors 
find no difference in abnormal returns between cash offers for public firms, equity offers for 
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public firms, and equity offers for private firms after controlling for one of these proxies, the 
acquiring firm’s pre-merger idiosyncratic volatility. More recently, Alexandridis, Antoniou and 
Zhao (2008) test Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion premium hypothesis on UK acquirers’ 
short-run abnormal equity gains. Once accounting for various deal- and firm- specific factors, the 
authors contend that belief asymmetry positively influences the market’s reaction of an 
announced takeover. 
Lastly, Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) employ the age of the acquiring firm 
(measured by the number of days between the first trading record of the firm’s stock and the 
deal’s announcement day) as a proxy for information asymmetry. Barry and Brown (1985) 
document that markets tend to hold more information for firms with long trading histories. 
Specifically, mature firms tend to have a wider customer and supplier base as well as operate 
within multiple industries. Similarly, Baum (1989) notes that young firms may enjoy limited 
support from the relevant organizations, while Carter and Manaster (1990) and Podolny (1993) 
suggest the presence of segmentations within the market for inter-organizational relationships. In 
line with the above, the results indicate a negative and significant impact of age on acquirers’ 
gains. This suggests that as the age of the acquirer increases (decreases) and, thus, the related 
information asymmetry decreases (increases), the shareholders experience lower (greater) 
announcement period abnormal returns.  
2.3. Conclusion 
Overall, the literature discussed above suggests that the short-run wealth effects of corporate 
takeovers are, to a large extent, dependent on several firm- and deal- specific characteristics. In 
brief, the listing status of the target firm, the method of payment, the size of the acquiring firm, 
the relative size of the deal, the acquirer’s growth prospects and the extent of pre-merger 
information asymmetry surrounding the acquiring firm constitute important factors that influence 
the market’s assessment of the likelihood of success of the deal. Accordingly, this thesis aims to 
further investigate the determinants of value creation in a particular set of small, yet risky, deals 
involving mostly unlisted targets and financed with deferred payments (earnouts). In so doing the 
impact of the aforementioned firm- and deal- specific features is taken into consideration in order 
to draw safe conclusions regarding the predictions of the relevant testable hypotheses. 
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Specifically, chapter 3 examines the role and short-run wealth effects of financial advisors 
counseling the acquiring firm in earnout-financed deals. Chapter 4 proceeds to investigate the 
effects of asymmetric information over the acquiring firm on the market’s reception of earnout-
financed M&A announcements. Lastly, chapter 5 focuses on international changes of corporate 
control and analyzes the wealth effects of earnout-financing in relation to the extent of the 
acquiring firm’s multinational network. 
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Chapter 3 
Do Financial Advisors Improve the Design of Earnouts? 
 
Abstract 
In this article we investigate the short-run wealth effects of contingent payments (earnouts) in 
M&As in which financial advisors are counselling the acquirers. Our results illustrate that 
acquirers enjoy higher abnormal returns when using earnouts to finance M&As, relative to using 
non-earnout payments, only when consulting financial advisors. Moreover, by relying on the 
Propensity Score Matching method we show that advised earnout-financed deals significantly 
outperform their counterfactual (matched) deals that are financed with: (a) earnouts without the 
involvement of financial advisors and (b) non-earnouts with or without the involvement of 
financial advisors. We contend that our findings reflect the ability of financial advisors to 
efficiently address the inherent complexities involved in the design of earnouts, ultimately 
leading to greater acquirer gains. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Asymmetric information between the involved firms in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) often 
results to substantial valuation disagreements over the deal’s outcome. Such disagreements may 
become more severe in valuation-complex M&As involving unlisted targets that operate in 
intangible-rich sectors. For that reason, earnout-provisions (EPs) are regularly employed aiming 
to offer a solution and ‘bridge the gap’ in the implied merger outcome disaccords (Kohers and 
Ang, 2000).
13
 Under EP-financing, the delivery of the transaction’s consideration is divided into 
two parts: an up-front payment in the form of cash, stock, or mixture of cash and stock, and a 
future (deferred) payment, often in the form of cash (Eckbo, 2009), that is conditional upon the 
target firm achieving certain pre-agreed performance-related goals.
14
 Despite their risk-
mitigating properties, the design of EPs involves significant complexities that small acquirers, to 
which EPs mostly appeal, may lack the necessary technology to properly address. Consequently, 
financial advisors (FAs) are regularly involved in the deal process, assisting the acquirer in: (a) 
valuing the target, (b) assessing the deal from economic, strategic and financial perspectives, (c) 
recommending ways to finance the deal and (d) negotiating with the target, or its representatives, 
the terms of the deal and the offer price (Sudarsanam, 1995; Fleuriet, 2008). As a result, our 
narrow understanding on the workings of EPs, particularly in the presence of FAs counselling 
the acquiring firms in the deal process, warrants a profound investigation and motivates the focus 
of this study. Moreover, the limited frequency of FAs counselling targets that are suitable for the 
use of EPs, potentially due to insufficient resources, limits our focus on the impact of acquirer-
side FA-presence on the short-run abnormal returns earned by acquirers.
15
 
Existing evidence illustrates the ability of reputable FAs, advising acquirers in large public-
to-public deals, to increase their likelihood of success via the identification and, in most cases, 
extraction of valuable synergies (Bowers and Miller, 1990). The above are, in turn, illustrated to 
                                                          
13
 The managers of merging firms may have access to superior information about the valuations of the firms they manage, which 
gives rise to adverse selection. The (unobserved) efforts of the merging firms’ managers towards the maximization of the 
outcome of the merger give rise to moral hazard. 
14 Such goals relate to cash flows, sales, pre-tax income, gross profits and net income that ensure the delivery of the deferred 
payment, which accounts for approximately 33% of the total transaction consideration, while the time period between the two 
payments lasts between 3 to 5 years (Cain, Denis and Denis, 2011). 
15 This is confirmed within our sample as the greater frequency of small private target deals, relative to large public-to-public 
deals, becomes more pronounced within EP-financed deals, prohibiting the regular involvement of target-side FAs. 
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lead to greater acquirer gains (Bao and Edmans, 2011; Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2012).
16
 
Nevertheless, Golubov et al. (2012) contend that FA-reputation is not value-enhancing in deals 
involving unlisted targets. To this end, the impact of less-reputable FAs on the success of 
smaller, yet risky, unlisted target deals that appeal to EP-financing remains to be investigated.
17
 
Similarly, the contribution of FAs towards the efficient design of EPs, which is required for the 
realisation of their designated advantages (Cain at al., 2011), is yet to be explored. Consequently, 
the inclusion of both EPs and FAs in a particular class of deals (involving unlisted targets) raises 
the following question: is the presence of FAs in such deals valuable to the shareholders of 
acquirers that are financing M&As with multidimensional instruments, such as EPs, relative to: 
(a) deals that are financed with EPs without the presence of FAs and (b) deals that are financed 
with single up-front payments, irrespective of the presence of FAs? The answer to this question 
is important for several reasons. 
First, it offers valuable insights on the source of the well-documented superior abnormal 
returns gained by acquirers in EP-financed deals, relative to deals financed with single up-front 
payments. Second, it allows us to investigate the wealth effects of FA-presence in complex 
M&As, such as those that are financed with EPs and involve small acquirers and small unlisted 
targets. Despite their small transaction size, such deals give rise to substantial valuation risk. 
Therefore, the outcome of this relation offers a unique contribution to our existing knowledge on 
the workings of earnouts, as well as extends earlier studies’ recommendations that the efficient 
design of EPs presents a critical element that influences their likelihood of success (Cain et al., 
2011). Specifically, Cain et al. (2011) argue that ‘evidence shows that earnouts are complex, 
multidimensional contracts exhibiting substantial heterogeneity in the size of the potential 
earnout payment, the performance measure on which the earnout is based, the interval over 
which performance is measured, the performance thresholds that must be achieved in order to 
receive the earnout payment and the form of the earnout payment’ (p. 152). Similarly, Lukas, 
                                                          
16 Provided that earlier studies portray the efficient design of EPs as a major determinant of their success, we focus solely on FAs, 
rather than legal advisors, as it is the former who participate in the financing and valuation process of the deal, while the latter 
mainly ensure the regulatory/legal compliance of the deal. Krishnan and Masulis (2013) further discuss the distinctive duties of 
financial and legal advisors, confirming the above. 
17 Bowers and Miller (1990) establish that the presence of FAs imposes substantial wealth implications while no distinction is 
made between listed and unlisted target deals as is the case in Hunter and Walker (1990), Servaes and Zenner (1996) and Michel, 
Shaked and Lee (1991). Furthermore, McLaughlin (1992), Hunter and Jagtiani (2003), and Allen, Jagtiani, Peristiani and 
Saunders (2004) solely focus on deals involving listed targets. Limited evidence can be found in Golubov et al. (2012) who 
illustrate that FA reputation does not significantly influence the likelihood of success of unlisted target deals, while Agrawal 
Cooper, Lian and Wang (2013) study, among others, the effect of common advisors in subsidiary target deals. 
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Reuer and Welling (2012) claim that EPs constitute intricate payments with substantial 
heterogeneity in their terms and structure among different deals. Therefore, any incremental 
economic value added in EP-financed deals from FA-presence should be achieved due to the 
influence of FAs towards the more efficient design of EPs.
18
 This also allows us to investigate 
the potential presence of a complementarity effect between EP-financing and FA-presence on the 
abnormal returns earned by acquirers. Ultimately, this will improve our understanding on: (a) the 
extent to which EPs lessen valuation uncertainty compared to single up-front payments and (b) 
whether FAs contribute to the reduction of valuation errors by enhancing the design of EPs.
19
 
The UK market for corporate control offers a useful laboratory allowing us to gain insights 
into the workings of EPs. Specifically, the choice of the UK market enables us to draw robust 
conclusions provided that EPs appear in the financing process of more than 27%. This sets the 
UK M&A market as the most earnout-active market worldwide (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 
2012).
20
 The relatively high earnout-activity in the UK is perhaps due to the fact that 80% of its 
total M&A activity involves private targets (Draper and Paudyal, 2006), or that 90% of its total 
M&A activity involves unlisted (private and subsidiary) targets (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). 
In the methodological front, we employ a three-stage approach. The first stage comprises a 
standard univariate analysis of the abnormal returns gained by acquirers. To deal with selection-
bias concerns that may reduce the reliability of our conclusions, or the vulnerability of our results 
to the problem of causal interpretation, our second methodological stage comprises the 
utilization of the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method, as in Siming (2014). PSM allows 
for an unbiased causal inference by pairing treated M&As (advised EP-financed M&As, or 
EPFA) to untreated ones, based on a propensity score that is estimated at deal level using 
observable pre-treatment features, and then comparing acquirers’ abnormal returns between the 
two groups of M&As (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). We argue that this offers an intuitive and 
easily-calculable approach enabling us to measure the contribution of each of the ‘treatments’ 
                                                          
18 Consultants are also portrayed by the financial press as able to ‘assess relative intangibles such as corporate culture, 
management retention, technological compatibilities and the likelihood that potential synergies can be realized’ (WSJ, 1997, 
‘After-Merger Advice Busies The Consultants’. Source: Factiva). More recently, a ‘tilt towards seeking advice from specialist 
M&A advisors’ is identified as ‘advice and human capital have become a more wanted quantity’ (FT, 2014, ‘Small proves 
beautiful at boutique banks’. Source: Factiva). 
19 Our analysis conveys that FA-involvement is more common in relatively riskier/complex EP-financed deals. 
20 The rate of earnout use in our study (UK based) is much higher than 3.9% in Cain et al. (2011), 4.1% in Datar et al. (2001) and 
5.6% in Kohers and Ang (2000), which are all US based. 
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within the EPFA portfolio (EP-financing, FA-presence) to the abnormal returns gained by 
EPFA-acquirers, as well as the wealth effect of their joint presence, relative to their joint 
absence.
21
 Moreover, in order to ensure that our propensity score estimators (i.e. the logit 
models) produce estimates that are free of hidden-bias, perhaps due to omitted covariates, which 
are likely to affect the quality of our PSM sequences and, hence, conclusions, the Rosenbaum-
bounds (RB) sensitivity analysis is also employed. This alows us to identify the extent to which 
the accuracy of each of our matching sequences is affected by the impact of omitted covariates 
(Rosenbaum, 2002). Lastly, following the approach adopted by Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam 
(2012), we further classify FA-involvement within EP-financed deals, EP-financing within FA-
present deals, as well as the joint presence of both EP-financing and FA-presence, relative to 
their joint absence, as ‘optimal’ and further examine the effect of such ‘optimality’ on acquirers’ 
gains. Our third and final methodological stage consists of a multiple regression analysis, which 
allows us to control for the simultaneous impact of several deal- and merging firm- specific 
features on acquirers’ gains. 
Our main findings show that the use of EPs in the financing process of the deal, along with 
FA-presence counselling the acquirer (i.e. EPFA-deals), lead to significantly higher acquirer 
announcement period abnormal returns than the use of EPs without FA-presence, or the use of 
single up-front payments with or without FA-presence.
22
 Furthermore, we find that EPFA-deals 
significantly outperform their counterfactual (matched) deals, as identified via the PSM method. 
These include: (a) non-advised -NFA- earnout-financed -EP- deals (EPNFA), (b) advised -FA- 
non-earnout -NEP- financed deals (FANEP) and, (c) non-advised -NFA- non-earnout -NEP- 
financed deals (NFANEP). Similarly, ‘optimal’ EP-use, ‘optimal’ FA-presence and ‘optimal’ 
EPFA-occurrence are illustrated to offer significant acquirer value gains. Lastly, when 
examining the joint impact of EPFA-financing and other deal- and merging firm- specific 
features, we find that EP-financed unlisted target deals yield significant gains to acquirers only 
when the latter consult FAs. 
                                                          
21 We employ PSM in three exercises. In each exercise the treated portfolio is represented by EPFA-deals and the control one 
consists of deals which are: (a) financed with EPs but do not receive advice from FAs, hence the decomposed impact of FAs on 
acquirers’ gains is identified; (b) financed with single up-front payments and receive advice from FAs, hence the decomposed 
impact of EPs on acquirers’ gains is identified; and (c) financed with single up-front payments and do not receive advice from 
FAs, hence the joint impact of EPs and FAs on acquirers’ gains is identified. 
22 In unreported results (yet available upon request from the authors) we further investigate the impact of acquirer/target legal 
advisor presence on acquirers’ abnormal returns and confirm their insignificant role in enhancing acquirers’ gains in EP-financed 
deals, consistent with earlier discussions in this study. 
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Our findings contribute to existing earnout literature by suggesting that the well-documented 
superior acquirer gains generated by EP-financing, relative to single up-front payments, are 
mainly attributable to the presence of FAs on the acquiring side of the deal. In turn, in the 
absence of FAs, the well documented positive impact of EPs becomes negligible. We therefore 
argue that our results indicate the possibility that FAs can efficiently address the inherent 
complexities of the design of EPs in valuation-complex deals. Thus, the above demonstrate the 
presence of a complementarity effect between EPs and FAs in small, yet risky, M&As. We also 
extend evidence from earlier studies analysing the role of FAs in M&A outcomes and support 
the view that the involvement of top-tier (reputable) FAs is not associated with higher acquirer 
gains in unlisted target deals.
23
 In turn, we show that the involvement of smaller and less 
reputable FAs in EP-financed unlisted target deals enhances their expected outcome. In such 
deals there is more scope for negotiation and, hence, the advice offered to the acquiring firm by 
FAs appears to be very valuable. In so doing, we extend the findings recorded by earlier UK 
studies, suggesting that EP-financed M&As of unlisted targets do not yield significant gains to 
acquirers, by identifying substantial wealth gains when the latter consult FAs. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the salient literature on EP-financing and FA-
involvement, as well as presents our testable hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the methodology 
used to conduct our empirical analysis. Section 4 provides a description of the data employed in 
this article and discusses our main findings. Finally, Section 5 provides a conclusion. 
3.2. Related Literature and Testable Hypotheses 
In an M&A deal the managers of the merging firms face valuation risk when negotiating the 
premium and payment currency of the transaction.
24
 As a means of mitigating this risk, 
contingent payments methods such as stock (Hansen, 1987; Officer, Poulsen and Stegemoller, 
2009), or EPs (Kohers and Ang, 2000) are often selected. Under EP-financing, part of the 
consideration is contingent upon the post-merger performance of the target, under its existing 
management, over a pre-determined period. EP-financing is often employed in deals involving 
                                                          
23 Golubov et al. (2012) find ‘no effect of financial advisor reputation on bidder returns in acquisitions of unlisted firms’ (p. 273). 
In unreported results, the presence of top-tier FAs in EP-financed deals, the vast majority of which includes unlisted targets, 
yields insignificant wealth effects. 
24 Valuation risk in M&As is predominately influenced by asymmetric information between the merging firms, which is likely to 
be more severe when private, or unlisted, targets are involved in the deal (Chang, 1998). 
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targets that are subject to high valuation complexity, i.e. unlisted firms operating in intangible-
rich sectors, such as the hi-tech, or other service-based ones. In such deals the value of the target 
often depends on the skill, creativity and flair of key personnel. To this end, EP-financing offers 
a solution when the merging firms ‘agree to disagree’ over the outcome of the merger, often due 
to their dichotomous expectations about the implied synergies. Specifically, it allows them to 
continue to disagree and, still, manage to reach an agreement. The above originate from the 
ability of EPs to promote information sharing ex-ante, leading to a reduction of adverse 
selection, and enhance managerial commitment ex-post, leading to a reduction of moral hazard 
considerations. The above effectively ‘bridge the gap’ in valuation disagreements between the 
merging firms (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Cadman, Carrizosa and Faurel, 2014). Along with the 
commitment of the target’s owners to remain part of the combined entity in the post-merger 
period, EP-financing sends a strong signal to market participants regarding the high synergies 
that are likely to be extracted. 
Evidence presented in earlier studies confirms that EP-financed deals, especially those 
exposed to high valuation risk, yield higher short- and long- run abnormal returns to acquirers, 
relative to deals financed with conventional single up-front payments (Kohers and Ang, 2000; 
Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012). Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) further show that 
when EP-financing is used as the ‘correct’ payment currency, as classified via a logit model that 
predicts ‘correct’ earnout use, bidders’ shareholders enjoy even higher short- and long- run 
abnormal returns. Lastly, Mantecon (2009) investigates alternative methods of valuation 
uncertainty avoidance in foreign deals and shows that the use of EPs benefits predominantly 
bidders of domestic targets. 
Moreover, recent studies argue that the efficient design of EPs presents an important 
condition under which their successful implementation is more likely to be accomplished. 
Specifically, Cain et al. (2011) and Lukas et al. (2012) illustrate the multidimensional nature of 
the structure of EPs, involving significant intricacies during the deal process. A failure to 
properly account for the inherent complexities of an EP can ultimately offset its implied benefits. 
Nevertheless, the channels through which merging firms engaging in EP-financed deals can 
enhance the efficiency of their design are yet to be identified. 
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To this end, a wide array of studies illustrates the greater set of skills and expertise 
characterizing FAs, particularly investment banks, when involved in M&A deals. Specifically, 
Hunter and Walker (1990) argue that FAs may possess specialized knowledge about firms with 
particular characteristics, including information on financial, or product market potential, which 
would-be acquirers may not have. Similarly, Bowers and Miller (1990) portray FAs as better 
able to identify firms with which an acquisition would lead to greater economic benefits, while 
Servaes and Zenner (1996) identify transaction costs and, in part, contracting costs and 
information asymmetry as major determinants of their involvement. They also argue that the 
probability of FA-inclusion increases when the acquisition is complex, when acquirers have 
limited M&A experience and when targets operate in an unrelated industry.
25
 
FAs are also portrayed for the specific contributions that they can make towards the efficient 
design of an M&A deal. Specifically, Sudarsanam (1995) indicates that FAs, counselling the 
acquirer, provide, among others, a ‘fair value’26 for the target firm, devise the appropriate 
financing structure and advise the acquiring firm on negotiating tactics. The above are illustrated 
to affect the market’s perception of an announced takeover. Bowers and Miller (1990) identify 
superior gains enjoyed by the acquiring firms’ shareholders when the latter consult FAs. More 
recently, Bao and Edmans (2011) illustrate the presence of a positive investment bank fixed 
effect in the distribution of acquirers’ announcement period abnormal returns. Similarly, 
Golubov et al. (2012) illustrate the ability of top-tier (reputable) FAs to generate superior 
acquirer gains in public-to-public deals.
27
 
While top-tier FAs are less likely to be involved in EP-financed deals, given their small 
transaction size relative to counterparts financed with single up-front payments such as stock, the 
complexity involved in the estimation of synergies is still likely to invite non-reputable FAs. To 
                                                          
25 Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) also suggest that the advisor’s quality and the number of advisors that are involved in a deal are 
important in determining the probability of its completion, as well as the time required for the latter. Within our sample of EP-
financed deals, we observe that the involvement of multiple FAs is very limited, potentially due to their small size and the 
acquiring firms’ constrained resources, yielding insignificant effects in unreported estimations. 
26 Evidence suggests that the advisor’s valuation of the target is unaffected by its past provision of financial advisory services to 
the target (Calomiris and Hitscherich, 2007). 
27 Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) also focus on a measure of the relative reputation of the merging parties’ FAs in the US and report 
that the absolute wealth gain, as well as the share of the total takeover wealth gain accruing to the acquirer increase as the 
reputation of the acquiring firm’s advisor increases, relative to that of the target firm’s. Despite the limited frequency of target-
side FA-presence within our sample of UK M&As, for deals exhibiting target-side FA-presence we construct an FA reputation 
scale, based on both aggregate deal value and number of deals completed, and investigate in unreported estimations the effect of 
the relative FA reputation in EP-financed deals. Our results yield insignificant effects. 
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this end, Golubov et al. (2012) further illustrate that the positive effect of FA reputation does not 
persist in acquisitions of unlisted targets. This is also linked to the findings of McLaughlin 
(1992) who demonstrates that acquiring firms consulting less-reputable FAs, yet in public target 
deals, offer significantly smaller premia and enjoy higher abnormal returns.
28
 Along these lines, 
Siming (2014) shows that the offered premia in mainly large deals involving private equity 
acquirers consulting FAs are affected by a network effect which exists if a former employee of 
the financial advisory firm is among those private equity professionals who constitute the deal 
team. Specifically, the exchange of information flow between the two firms is illustrated to lead 
to lower premia and better post-merger target performance.
29
 
Overall, the aforementioned studies portray FAs as able to reduce the uncertainty over the 
outcome of the concentration and identify substantial synergies in cases that are characterized by 
significant valuation risk. Moreover, they are illustrated to actively engage in the design of a 
deal, while the presence of their advice sends a positive signal to market participants regarding 
its outcome. Evidently, such advice should be more valuable in valuation-complex deals, such as 
deals including unlisted targets that appeal to the use of EPs, in which there is more scope for 
negotiation. This is further supported by current evidence indicating that FA-involvement is 
positively related to the complexity of the deal, which is also one of the major determinants of 
the choice to employ an EP. Consequently, despite the risky idiosyncratic nature of the assets 
being exchanged and the intricate structure of this contingent payment mechanism, the 
involvement of FAs is expected to contribute to its efficient design. This is expected to increase 
the deal’ likelihood of success sending, in turn, a strong signal for value creation to the market. 
Therefore, our first hypothesis (H1) is stated as follows: M&As involving an EP and FA-
presence advising the acquirer (EPFA) yield higher gains to acquirers’ shareholders than deals 
involving an EP without FA-presence. 
                                                          
28 Agrawal, Cooper, Lian and Wang (2013) also suggest that conflict of interest issues are more likely to arise when firms 
engaging in an M&A consult the same advisory firm as a result of the latter’s incentives towards deal completion, rather than 
deal quality. While this is possibly true for larger deals, our earnout-specific analysis is less likely to be exposed to such 
concerns. Specifically, the frequency of common FA-deals appears to be almost negligible within our sample of EP-deals as, in 
unreported statistics, only 2 of 1,505 EP-deals (331 of which include FAs) exhibit the same advisory firm between the merging 
parties. 
29 This partly supports the well known findings of Bargeron, Schlingermann, Stulz and Zutter (2008) illustrating private equity 
bidders offering lower premia than public and private bidders. Our study excludes deals involving firms from the Financial 
Services sector, which limits the exposure of our results to such considerations. 
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If true, the above suggest that the involvement of (less reputable) FAs in small, yet risky, 
deals involving unlisted targets and financed with complex instruments, such as EPs, is value-
enhancing. However, it would be imperative to also investigate the impact of EP-financing on 
the gains associated with EPFA-deals. Taking into consideration the increased potential for 
synergy realization characterizing EP-financing, relative to single up-front payment methods, our 
second hypothesis (H2) is stated as follows: M&As involving an EP  and FA-presence advising 
the acquirer (EPFA) yield higher value gains to acquirers’ shareholders than deals involving 
FA-presence without an EP. 
The above hypotheses, if verified, portray a strong interaction between EP-financing and 
FA-presence that increases the likelihood of success of valuation-complex deals. Thus, they 
suggest the existence of a complementarity effect between EPs and FAs that is sourcing from: (a) 
the properties of earnouts in addressing disagreements over the intrinsic value of the deal and 
setting the incentives towards the realization of the implied synergies and, (b) the contribution of 
FAs towards the efficient design and structure of earnouts. 
3.3. Methods 
3.3.1. Measurement of Short-Run Abnormal Returns 
The commonly used methods to estimate abnormal returns in response to an M&A that is 
announced by an acquiring firm 𝑖 requires a long time-series, or a window of returns of the 
acquiring firm 𝑖, which needs to be free of the effect of other (similar) events announced from 
the same firm 𝑖 within the estimation period. Nevertheless, our sample is composed of many 
M&As that are announced frequently by the same acquirers within small periods. Therefore, 
standard asset pricing methods cannot be applied. Alternatively, in line with numerous previous 
studies accommodating similar concerns (Fuller et al., 2002; Faccio, McConnell and Stolin, 
2006). the short-run abnormal returns for an acquiring firm 𝑖, in response to an M&A 
announcement, are estimated using the market-adjusted model (as shown in Equation 1): 
  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 (1) 
48 
   
Where:  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡, is the abnormal return gained by acquirer 𝑖 at day 𝑡, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the stock return of 
acquirer 𝑖 at day 𝑡, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the value-weighted market return index (FTSE All Share) at day 𝑡. 
The announcement period Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for acquirer 𝑖 is the sum of the 
abnormal returns in a 5-day window (𝑡 − 2 to 𝑡 + 2) surrounding the deal’s announcement day, 
𝑡 = 0, as shown in Equation (2): 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+2
𝑡−2
 (2) 
 
3.3.2. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Rosenbaum-Bounds (RB) 
Extant literature is concerned with the understanding of motives and consequences of several 
deal characteristics in M&As, some of which are considered as ‘treatments’ to certain issues (i.e. 
asymmetric information). Within the M&A context, the impact of such treatments on the success 
of the deal is, therefore, investigated by analyzing the acquiring firm’s short-run abnormal 
returns as the response random variable (i.e. the outcome variable). In this paper we investigate 
the impact of two treatments on the deal’s likelihood of success: EP-financing and FA-presence. 
Both ‘treatments’ have been illustrated to lead to positive acquirer short-run abnormal returns. 
Therefore, concerns are raised regarding the potential presence of selection-bias that could 
reduce the strength of our derived conclusions regarding the impact of each treatment on 
acquirers’ value gains, or mislead them. 
Specifically, selection-bias may occur when the analysis of an outcome is conditional on the 
choice of a variable/treatment that is endogenous to the outcome. Within the context of our 
study, we argue that M&As can be initiated by either an acquirer, or the FA who either seeks 
buyers for firms wishing to be sold, or proposes potential targets to upcoming acquiring firms, 
either because she was instructed to by the to-be acquirer, or under her own initiative. Moreover, 
when a deal is not initiated by FAs (although FAs could appear later) an EP-payment could be 
the financing mechanism that the merging firms have already agreed upon, or endorsed by the 
FAs who might acknowledge its suitability. As a result, considerable selection-bias concerns 
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regarding EP-financing and FA-presence are raised that need to be addressed appropriately in 
order to ensure the robustness of our conclusions. The PSM method, augmented with the 
Rosenbaum-bounds (RB) method, allows for an unbiased causal inference and addresses such 
selection-bias concerns (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). 
This is achieved by matching treated to untreated (or control) M&As based on a single 
propensity score that is estimated at deal level using observable merging firm- and deal- specific 
pre-treatment characteristics. Specifically, we model the probability of choice of the treatment, 
which consists of EP-financing accompanied by FA-presence (EPFA) via a logit model and 
estimate each treated and control deal’s propensity score of choosing the treatment. 
Subsequently, we match treated deals to their closest, in terms of propensity score, control ones 
and observe the difference in the outcome variable (CAR). We employ 1-to-1 nearest neighbor 
matching with replacement within 1% of Absolute Probability Difference (APD). Moreover, as 
PSM is based on matching relative to each deal’s propensity score to exhibit the treatment, and 
not on each deal’s separate covariate’s effect on the probability of its occurrence, we test for 
covariate balance between ‘treated’ and ‘control’ deals once matching is complete, as a 
robustness check. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) illustrates that a two sample t-test among the 
distribution of covariates between the ‘treated’ and ‘control’ groups constitutes a sufficient 
diagnostic to determine covariate balance.
30
 
Accordingly, in order to address the above concerns regarding the wealth effects of FA-
presence in EP-financed deals, we employ a three-Exercise procedure. Each Exercise involves 
matching our EPFA-deals to different groups of counterfactual deals, thus enabling us to robustly 
estimate the treatment effect of: (a) the impact of FA-presence on EP-financed deals, (b) the 
impact of EP-financing on deals advised by FAs and, (c) the impact of the joint presence of FAs 
and EPs (EPFA) on acquirers’ short-run abnormal returns, relative to counterfactuals that do not 
exhibit neither the presence of FAs nor EPs. Specifically, Exercise 1 involves the selection of 
counterfactuals from a control portfolio that exhibits only the presence of EPs, but not FAs 
(EPNFA). This procedure is enabling us to identify the impact of FA-presence within the treated 
group (EPFA), or to decompose the impact of FAs from EPFA-deals (i.e. FA = EPFA – EP). 
                                                          
30 An analytic representation of the PSM method can be found in Rosenbaum (2009), Chapter 3, and Chapters 7 to 13. 
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Exercise 2 involves the selection of counterfactuals from a control portfolio that exhibits only the 
presence of FAs, but not EPs (FANEP). This procedure is enabling us to identify the impact of 
EP-financing within the treated group (EPFA), or to decompose the impact of EPs from EPFA-
deals (i.e. EP = EPFA – FA). Finally, Exercise 3 involves the selection of counterfactuals from a 
control portfolio that exhibits neither the presence of FAs nor EPs (NFANEP). This procedure is 
enabling us to identify the aggregate impact of the simultaneous presence of both FAs and EPs 
(EPFA) on acquirers’ short-run wealth gains. 
Moreover, based on the estimated propensity scores (via each matching exercise’s logit 
model) we further identify the ‘optimal’ choice of the treatment within each exercise. The 
proportion of treated deals in each exercise constitutes the ‘a priori’ probability (threshold or cut-
off point) of a deal belonging to the treated group and allows the classification of each treated 
observation (EP-financing, FA-presence, EPFA-occurrence) as ‘optimal’, relative to its 
propensity score. A treatment (EP-financing, FA-presence, EPFA-occurrence) is classified as 
‘optimal’ if the propensity score, at deal level, exceeds the a-priori probability of treatment-
involvement within each matching exercise, separately. Subsequently, we investigate whether 
the ‘optimal’ choice of: (a) FAs within EP-deals (Exercise 1), (b) EPs within FA-deals (Exercise 
2) and (c) both EPs and FAs (=EPFA) based on Exercise 3, yield significant wealth effects to 
acquirers’ shareholders. 
Nevertheless, matching based on observed covariates may leave out potentially unobserved 
covariates and, hence, treated and control groups would not be necessarily comparable (i.e. PSM 
fails to accurately identify a ‘control’ deal that corresponds to a ‘treated’ one). This criticism can 
be dismissed in a randomized experiment as randomization tends to balance unobserved 
covariates, but it cannot be dismissed in an observational study. In order to accommodate such 
arguments, one needs a way of determining the degree to which deals that seem comparable are, 
in fact, not comparable (Rosenbaum-bounds method; Rosenbaum, 1987). The RB sensitivity 
method allows us to examine the sensitivity of our conclusions, derived from matching, to the 
impact of an unobserved covariate from our propensity score estimator (logit model) and enables 
us to measure how influential a confounding (unobserved) covariate needs to be in order to 
invalidate the effect of the treatment. Specifically, the RB method measures the degree of 
departure from random assignment of the treatment, which allows us to gain confidence 
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regarding the strength of our derived conclusions from the PSM analysis. To this end, RB is used 
as a robustness check to ensure that our logit models produce estimates that are likely to be free 
of hidden-bias, or to ensure that our estimates are not likely to be sensitive (or how sensitive they 
are) to hidden-bias, caused by omitted covariates from our logistic models (Rosenbaum, 2002). 
The RB sensitivity analysis illustrates that two deals may in fact not be comparable, due to 
the unobserved impact of one or more influential covariates but, nevertheless, such non-
comparison can be measured, or controlled, by the size of a parameter 𝛤, where 𝛤 ≥ 1. 
Specifically, two deals, 𝑖 and 𝑗, with the same observed covariates, 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗, have odds of 
treatment 𝜋𝑖 (1 − 𝜋𝑖)⁄  and 𝜋𝑗 (1 − 𝜋𝑗)⁄  that differ, at most, by a multiplier of 𝛤 regarding their 
probability of receiving the treatment: 
 1
𝛤
≤
𝜋𝑖 (1 − 𝜋𝑖)⁄
𝜋𝑗 (1 − 𝜋𝑗)⁄
≤ 𝛤  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗 (3) 
When 𝛤 = 1 in (3) it can be asserted that two matched deals are indeed comparable, while 
values of 𝛤 ≥ 1 indicate the presence of some bias due to failure to control for one or more 
influential covariates. Increasing 𝛤 and testing whether the treatment effect (the difference in the 
outcome variable i.e. the acquiring firms’ announcement period CAR between ‘treated’ and 
‘control’ groups) becomes insignificant provides an adequate process to test for the existence and 
severity of potential omitted variable bias. This enables us to deduce the range of possible p-
values for a specified 𝛤 and estimate the cut-off point of the RB method beyond which the p-
values and, hence, the treatment effects, become negligible. Evidently, to ensure that our logit 
models’ estimates and, thus, the estimation of propensities are less likely to be exposed to 
omitted variable bias, or hidden bias, the RB sensitivity method is utilized, proposing the 
selection of the least exposed to hidden bias model.
31
 
                                                          
31
 An alternative method to assess the extent of selection bias within our results would be to conduct a Heckman two-stage 
correction method (Heckman, 1979). Nevertheless, our sample of M&A deals is composed, to a large extent, of deals involving 
private targets for which public information on observed lagged variables, which are frequently used as instruments in such 
methods, is very limited. Thus the use of the PSM technique is preferred. Moreover, to account for the potential effect of 
unobserved covariates, the Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis is implemented.  
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3.3.3. Univariate and Multiple Regression Analysis 
At first, the short-run abnormal returns of UK acquirers are analyzed by the method of payment 
used (cash, stock, mixed, and earnout) and the target firm’s listing status (private, public, and 
subsidiary). The analysis is further conducted within sub-categories related to FA-presence, or 
FA-absence. Subsequently, we examine the impact of FA-presence and EP-financing within a 
multivariate framework where the effects of several factors that influence the abnormal returns 
gained by the acquirers are controlled simultaneously. Dummy variables are also included so as 
to enable the exploration of interaction effects. In particular, the following equation is estimated 
in a nested (reduced) form: 
 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝑎 + ∑ 𝑋𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝜖𝑖 (4) 
Where: the intercept, 𝑎, accounts for the abnormal returns accrued to acquirers after accounting 
for the effects of all the explanatory variables 𝑋𝑖. The dependent variable, CAR, is the five-day 
short-run cumulative abnormal return of the acquiring firm. The set of explanatory variables, 𝑋𝑖, 
includes a number of factors that are known to affect acquirers’ abnormal returns. These include: 
Earnout as a payment mechanism (EPs): Previous research indicates that acquisitions of 
difficult to value targets, such as unlisted targets operating in intangible-rich sectors, yield higher 
acquirer short-run abnormal returns when earnout appears in their financing process (Kohers and 
Ang, 2000). Therefore, to account for the potential implications of EP-financing on acquirers’ 
short-run value gains, a binary variable that is assigned the value of 1 when an earnout provision 
is included in the financing process of the deal, and 0 otherwise, is included in Equation (4). 
Acquirer’s age (AGE): Information asymmetry between the merging firms influences the 
announcement period returns accrued to acquirers’ shareholders. Draper and Paudyal (2008) and 
Zhang (2006) argue that investors tend to have more information on firms with longer trading 
history which results in lower information asymmetry. Therefore, the age of the acquirer 
(measured by the number of days between the announcement day and the first record of the 
acquirer on Datastream) is included in Equation (4). 
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Relative size of the deal (RS): Extant literature (Fuller et al., 2002) depicts that acquirers’ 
value gains are positively related to the relative size of the deal (measured as the deal value 
divided by the market value of the acquirer). Therefore, the impact of the relative size of the deal 
is included in Equation (4). 
Diversification (DVSD): Extant literature (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012) shows that if 
target and acquiring firms belong to the same industrial sector, the integration of the two firms 
should be easier and the synergy gains higher. On the other hand, firms acquiring targets 
operating in unrelated sectors may also gain from diversification. Therefore, to control for the 
potential effect of corporate diversification a dummy variable that is assigned the value of 1 for 
cross-industry deals (i.e. merging firms do not share the same 2-digit SIC code), and 0 otherwise, 
is included in Equation (4). 
Target firm’s domicile (CBA): Domestic and international deals have been proven to be 
affecting the acquiring firms’ value gains (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). Domestic 
acquisitions can be perceived as less risky than cross-border deals as there is higher information 
asymmetry regarding the target firm in the latter, especially in those cases where the acquired 
company is unlisted. Therefore, in order to control for the effect of international deals and how 
they affect acquirers’ abnormal returns, a dummy variable that is assigned the value of 1 when 
the target resides beyond UK borders, and 0 otherwise, is included in Equation (4). 
Target firm’s operating legal system (COMMON): Extant literature (Bris and Cabolis, 2008; 
Barbopoulos, Paudyal and Pescetto, 2012) depicts that the target firm’s operating legal system 
interacts with the acquiring firms’ short-run abnormal returns as the legal tradition of the 
acquired firm’s domicile interacts with its listing status and the deal’s method of payment in 
shaping the net gains of acquirers. Therefore, a dummy variable that is assigned the value of 1 
when the target company operates in a Common Law legal system, and 0 otherwise, is included 
in Equation (4). 
Additional indicator variables: Other factors are included in our analysis, aiming to explain 
the wealth effects accruing to the acquiring firms’ shareholders. The main variable under 
examination consists of FA-presence on the acquiring side of the deal process. Therefore, as in 
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Bao and Edmans (2011) and Golubov et al. (2012), we rely on the output of SDC in order to 
identify FA-presence.
32
 Specifically, a dummy variable is assigned the value of 1 when the 
acquirer is consulting at least one financial advisory firm, and 0 otherwise, and is included in 
Equation (4). Furthermore, the target’s listing status has been illustrated by earlier studies to be 
influencing acquirers’ abnormal returns (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002). A dummy variable is 
created taking the value of 1 for deals where the acquired firm is unlisted (UNL), and zero 
otherwise, and included in Equation (4). Finally, key financial ratios of the acquiring firm such 
as its market-to-book value (MTBV), the ratio of total cash and cash equivalents to its total 
assets (CASH_RATIO) and the ratio of total debt to common equity (DEBT) capture 
information about the acquiring firm’s growth opportunities, liquidity, and leverage status and 
are included in Equation (4). A detailed description of all factors used in our analysis is offered 
in Appendix 3.1. 
3.4. Data and Results 
3.4.1. The Sample 
Our sample consists of M&As announced by UK listed firms between 01/01/1986 and 
31/12/2010 and recorded by the Security Data Corporation (SDC). SDC records 31,658 M&As 
involving UK acquirers within our sample period. In order for a deal to remain in our sample it 
must satisfy the following criteria: first, the acquirer is a UK listed company in the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) and has a market value of at least $1m, measured four weeks prior to the 
announcement of the deal. To avoid the insignificant effects of very small deals, only deals with 
deal value of at least $1m, excluding fees, remain in the sample. To ensure that the acquirer 
enjoys control of the target, only deals in which the acquirer aims to acquire at least 50 percent 
of the target’s equity are included in the sample. Targets of all listings (public, private and 
subsidiary) and domiciles (UK or non-UK) are included in the sample. To avoid the confounding 
effects of multiple deals, deals that are announced within five days by the same acquirer are 
                                                          
32 As in Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003), we further account for the possibility that SDC may misreport FA-presence. According to 
‘The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers’ which administers the ‘City Code on Takeovers and Mergers’ 
(http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/), deals exhibiting a relative deal size smaller than 25% (RS<0.25) do not requisite the issue 
of proxy statements, used by SDC for such information gathering. Nevertheless, the advisors’ opinion is required to be disclosed 
in the deals’ offer documents, which are available on Nexis UK. We group all our NFA deals with RS<0.25 and crosscheck with 
Nexis UK concluding that 2.8% were falsely reported as NFA. In alternative estimations, including the falsely reported NFA 
deals to the FA group does not alter our results. 
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excluded from the sample. Furthermore, the daily stock price and market value of the acquirer 
need to be available from Datastream. Buy-backs, recapitalisations, spin-offs and repurchases are 
excluded from the sample. Cases where either acquiring or target firms belong to a regulated or 
utility sector (Healthcare, Financials, Energy and Power), or are government organizations, are 
excluded from the sample. The above criteria are satisfied by 6,432 deals. 1,505 deals constitute 
EPs, 2,053 deals involve FAs and 331 deals involve jointly EPs and FAs. 
3.4.2. Sample Characteristics 
Table 1 records the annual distribution of M&As according to the target firm’s domicile, its 
listing status, the merging firms’ industry classification, the deal’s method of payment and FA-
presence. Consistent with Faccio and Masulis (2005) and Draper and Paudyal (2006), Panel A 
shows that the vast majority of UK M&As involve unlisted firms (private and subsidiary target 
M&As represent 59.56% and 30.91% of the sample, respectively), while cash and mixed 
payments dominate the acquisitions’ financing currencies (44.37% and 48.94%, respectively). 
Regarding the presence of FAs, almost 1 in 3 deals in our sample involve acquirers that are 
advised by at least one financial advisory firm. 
(Insert Table 3.1 about here) 
EP-financed deals account for 23.40% of our sample, consistent with the recent study of 
Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012). More statistics reveal that the use of earnouts has 
increased substantially since the late 80’s reaching 31.73% and 33.72% of total M&A activity in 
the years 2006 and 2007, respectively, compared to only 14.05% in 1987. The vast majority of 
EP-financed deals involve unlisted target firms, mainly private ones (85.12%), followed by 
subsidiary firms (13.75%). Compared to all deals, EP-deals are depicted to be involving more 
targets operating in intangible-rich sectors (59.27% in EP-deals compared to 43.78% in all-
deals). Considering the involvement of FAs, 331 EP-financed deals are advised by FAs. As with 
all EP-financed concentrations, the frequency of FA-occurrence in EP-deals increases 
significantly during the decade between 1991 and 2001 and subsequently drops, in the aftermath 
of the dot-com bubble. It once again increases, during the years 2004-2007, only to start 
dropping again during the credit crunch crisis in 2008. 
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Table 2 (Panel A) presents summary statistics on deal values and acquirers’ market 
capitalizations for our full sample, as well as for sub-samples reflecting the target firm’s listing 
status, the deal’s method of payment and FA-presence. Deals financed with single up-front 
payments are, on average, much larger than those financed with deferred payments ($168m vs. 
$23m). The highest average deal value is observed for the portfolio of deals financed with mixed 
payments ($313m), followed by common equity financing ($209m). Moreover, acquirers 
financing M&As with single up-front payments in cash are much larger ($1,076m) than those 
paying in mixed payments ($674m), or stock ($467m), while those utilizing EPs in the deal’s 
financing process appear to be much smaller ($296m). Both statistics on deal size and acquirer 
size hold irrespective of the target firm’s listing status. 
(Insert Table 3.2 about here) 
Consistent with McLaughlin (1990), our full sample statistics indicate that FA-presence is 
associated with larger deals and larger acquirers, relative to non-FA deals. However, in private 
target deals, as well as in EP-financed deals involving private targets, the presence of FAs is 
associated with larger deals, yet smaller acquirers. This is perhaps driven by the limited 
resources and high risk-aversion of small acquirers, particularly when engaged in negotiation-
intense M&As involving relatively large private targets that operate in intangible-rich sectors. 
Specifically, as private target deals are subject to considerable valuation uncertainty, small 
acquirers, possibly due to their lack of management technology, may request assistance from 
FAs in order to better account for the implied valuation uncertainty. Moreover, as such M&As 
are relatively small, they may not satisfy the involvement criteria of reputable FAs (such as top-
tier investment banks) that mostly engage in large public target deals involving acquiring firms 
of substantial market capitalizations (Golubov at al., 2012). Evidently, the inclusion of non-top-
tier
33
 FAs in EP-financed deals offers a robust feedback to the latter. To this end, the expertise of 
FAs in identifying synergies, reducing valuation errors and providing an efficient design can 
                                                          
33 Appendix 3.2 provides a list of all FAs involved in at least 10 deals throughout our sample. As in Golubov et al. (2012), FAs 
are ranked by aggregate deal value for all of our sampled deals. It is illustrated that out of the FAs occupying the top ten places in 
terms of aggregate deal value for all acquisitions, only half of them (Warburg, Hoare Govett; Lazard; Merrill Lynch; Schroders) 
are observed in the relevant aggregate deal value ranking for EP-financed deals. Similarly, in unreported results, when ranking 
FAs for the full sample in terms of number of completed deals, only half of the top ten firms observed for all acquisitions are 
observed in EP-financed deals (Hoare Govett; KPMG; Schroders; UBS; PWC). We thank James Ang for extending our 
discussion regarding the wealth effects of FA-quality on EP-financing. 
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address the acquiring firm’s limited managerial technology to account for the intricacies of the 
deal. 
Panel B (Table 2) shows that EPFA-deals exhibit a larger relative deal size compared to EP-
deals without FAs (0.88 vs. 0.27). This indicates that the increased exposure of acquirers to 
valuation risk is addressed via the simultaneous involvement in the deal of EPs and FAs. 
Nevertheless, EPFA-deals illustrate similar acquirer size and greater deal value than non-FA EP-
financed (EPNFA) deals. Therefore, the higher relative deal size of EPFA-deals might also 
reflect the documented positive influence of FA-presence on the deal’s transaction value 
(McLaughlin, 1990). Nevertheless, the relative size of the earnout component has been 
illustrated to proxy for the riskiness of an EP-deal (Cain et al., 2011; Lukas et al., 2012) and is 
greater, on average, within EPFA-deals, relative to EPNFA-deals. This provides further evidence 
suggesting that it is, indeed, increased risk faced by acquirers in such deals that invites both EPs 
and FAs for its accommodation. Lastly, more statistics reveal that acquirers in EPFA-deals 
exhibit lower growth opportunities (MTBV=3.89), than EPNFA acquirers (=4.77). Interestingly, 
acquirers in EPFA-deals also exhibit the greatest cash-ratio and the lowest debt-to-equity ratio, 
on average, indicating the absence of potential liquidity issues, or increased leverage. 
Overall, the above demonstrate that the vast majority of EPFA-deals involve domestic 
unlisted targets that operate in intangible-rich industries. This indicates the likely exposure of 
acquirers to high valuation risk. Considering the involvement of FAs, their presence is exhibited 
in 22% of EP-deals and in almost one third of all deals. Moreover, FA-presence seems to be 
further associated with larger deals and, also, larger acquirers. However, in deals involving 
private targets, FA-presence is associated with smaller acquirers, yet marginally larger deals. As 
this is expected to lead to the involvement of less-reputable FAs, it can also be associated to 
Golubov et al. (2012) and their findings regarding the impersistence of the positive effects of 
FA-reputation in M&As involving non-public targets. 
3.4.3. Univariate Analysis of Acquirers’ Announcement Period Abnormal Returns 
In Table 3 the findings from our univariate analysis are presented according to the method of 
payment and the target firm’s listing status for all deals (Panel A), deals under FA-presence 
(Panel B) and deals under FA-absence (Panel C). Consistent with earlier studies (Kohers and 
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Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012), Panel A illustrates that acquirers in deals 
financed with EPs enjoy higher abnormal returns, relative to acquirers in deals financed with 
single up-front payments. 
(Insert Table 3.3 about here) 
Panels B and C further demonstrate that the higher performance of EP-financed deals is 
likely to be sourcing from deals involving FAs advising the acquirer. Consistent with our 
hypothesis H2, EPFA-deals significantly outperform deals that are not financed with earnouts, 
yet involve FAs, by 1.01%. This effect is perhaps driven by the highly significant differential 
between stock-financing and EPFA-deals (2.04%). In turn, the low performance of the stock-
financed portfolio (0.44%) appears to be driven by public target deals (–0.90%), which account 
for more than half of its composition and have been depicted to negatively affect acquirer gains 
(Travlos, 1987). Noticeably, in the absence of FAs (Panel C) the aforementioned differential 
(stock vs. EPs) becomes insignificant. Moreover, in contrast to FA-presence (Panel B), in the 
absence of FAs (Panel C), EP-financed private target deals yield 0.71% higher gains relative to 
their cash-financed counterparts. 
Panel D records the differentials in the abnormal returns gained by acquirers from deals 
including FAs, versus deals not including FAs. Overall, FA-presence results in significantly 
higher acquirer gains by 0.48%. Moreover, in deals involving unlisted targets, FA-presence leads 
to 1.10% higher gains to acquirers. This confirms the positive valuation effects of non-reputable 
FAs on the success of unlisted target M&As, as well as extends the findings of Golubov et al. 
(2012). Consistent with the predictions of our hypothesis H1, within EP-financed deals FA-
presence leads to 1.00% higher acquirer gains. However, in non-EP deals, the presence of FAs 
increases the abnormal returns gained by acquirers by only 0.44%. Such differentials (1.00% 
versus 0.44%) indicate a potential complementarity effect between EP-financing and FA-
presence in valuation-complex M&As. Specifically, in deals that appeal to EP-financing, FAs are 
likely to enhance the efficient design of EPs aiming to tie the dichotomous pre-merger 
expectations to the realized monetary synergies. Therefore, any frictions involved when 
structuring and negotiating the terms of EPs are likely to be efficiently managed due to the 
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ability of FAs to address valuation complexities and contracting costs (Servaes and Zenner, 
1996). 
Overall, as the majority of EP-deals do not involve top-tier (or reputable) investment banks, 
our findings extend those of Golubov et al. (2012) indicating that top-tier FAs are not associated 
with higher bidder gains in unlisted target deals. Similarly, McLaughlin (1990, 1992) 
demonstrates that significant agency costs are likely to be present in public-to-public deals 
involving top-tier (prestigious) FAs. The author further illustrates that acquirers consulting less-
reputable FAs offer significantly lower premia and enjoy higher short-run abnormal returns. 
Therefore, our results suggest that the presence of less-reputable FAs is value-enhancing in EP-
financed deals that mainly involve unlisted targets, in which there is more scope for negotiation. 
As a result, the risk-mitigating properties and applicability of EPs in valuation-complex deals 
appear to be complemented by the presence of FAs, which improves their design. 
3.4.4. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Rosenbaum-Bounds (RB)  
In drawing inferences about the causal impact of the decisions to implement EPs, consult FAs, or 
include both EPs and FAs in the deal (treatments) on a performance measure (outcome), 
considerable selection-bias concerns may be raised. As in Siming (2014), we use the PSM 
method and address such concerns by comparing treated to untreated sample units that share 
similar pre-treatment characteristics. 
3.4.4.1. Logistic Regression Outputs and Matching Exercises 
Table 4 (Panel A) presents the outputs of our logistic regressions, estimated for the purpose of 
execution of our three matching exercises, as outlined in Section 3.2.
34
 Exercise 1 aims to 
identify the wealth effects attributed to FA-presence within the EPFA-portfolio (CARFA = 
CAREPFA – CAREPNFA). Initially, we investigate the determinants of FA-presence in EP-financed 
deals (Model 1) and subsequently we match, via PSM, EPFA-deals to non-advised EP-financed 
deals (EPNFA). Consistent with previous literature suggesting that FA-presence is associated 
with the deal’s riskiness (Servaes and Zenner, 1996), Model 1 shows that FA-involvement is 
                                                          
34 Due to data unavailability, the full sample has been reduced as in Table 2, Panel B. As a result, we use 5,921 M&As, 1,223 of 
which are EP-financed, 1,719 include FAs and 274 deals exhibit the simultaneous presence of both EP-financing and FA-
presence. Our univariate results persist in the reduced sample. 
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positively correlated with the relative size of the deal. Relatively large EP-deals expose acquirers 
to considerable valuation risk and post-merger integration difficulties (Fuller et al., 2002). The 
above, in turn, influence the presence of FAs within EP-deals so as to enhance their efficient 
design and execution. Panel B (Model 1) records the valuation effects (contribution) of FA-
presence in EP-financed deals. Evidently, FA-involvement yields, on average, 1.48% higher 
abnormal returns to acquirers engaged in EP-financed deals (consistent with our hypothesis H1). 
Lastly, Panel C presents the results from the Rosenbaum-bounds (RB) sensitivity analysis, which 
allows us to investigate the exposure of our derived conclusions to the effect of missing 
covariates from our propensity score estimator (logit model). Specifically, it allows us to 
measure how influential a confounding (unobserved) covariate needs to be in order to invalidate 
the effect of the treatment. Our estimates confirm that the effect of the treatment on acquirers’ 
gains would be rendered negligible if an unobserved covariate caused the odds of treatment 
assignment to change by at least 27%. Hence, our results suggest that our matching exercise 
offers results that are less likely to be sensitive to the impact of a missing covariate.
35
 
(Insert Table 3.4 about here) 
Exercise 2 aims to identify the wealth effects attributed to EP-financing within the EPFA-
portfolio (CAREP = CAREPFA – CARFANEP). Initially, we investigate the determinants of the choice 
of EP-financing within FA-present deals (Model 2) and subsequently we match, via PSM, 
EPFA-deals to advised non-EP financed deals (FANEP). Earlier studies on the determinants of 
EP-financing (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012) show that EPs are 
more likely to appear in deals involving unlisted target firms operating in intangible-rich sectors, 
such as private firms belonging to the high-tech and services industries. Earlier studies also 
indicate a lower probability of EP-financing in foreign target deals. Evidently, our estimates 
based on Model 2 further confirm the impact of the above factors on the choice of EPs in the 
financing process of advised deals. Contrary to extant studies, our findings depict the trivial 
impact of the relative size of the deal on the choice of EPs in FA-present deals. This potentially 
indicates the likely complementarity between EP-financing and FA-presence as this covariate 
does not appear to impact differently our treated and control groups. In contrast, in Model 1, FA-
                                                          
35 We argue that as the RB critical value of Γ at p=0.10 (=27%) exceeds the percentage of the treatment’s involvement 
(22.4%=274/1,223) in a deal, which constitutes the a-priori probability of a deal to be included in the treated group, we gain 
extra confidence regarding the quality and reliability of our PSM sequence and, thus, outcome. 
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presence appeared as more likely to be determined by the relative size of the deal. Panel B 
(Model 2) records that implementing EPs yields, on average, 1.10% higher gains within deals 
involving the presence of FAs (consistent with our hypothesis H2). Moreover, Panel C (Model 2) 
illustrates that the effect of the treatment on acquirers’ gains would be rendered negligible if an 
unobserved covariate caused the odds of treatment involvement to change by at least 7%. 
Lastly, Exercise 3 aims to identify the combined wealth effect of EPs and FAs in EPFA-
deals, relative to the joint absence of these two treatments (NFANEP). Initially, we investigate 
the determinants of the choice to engage in an EPFA-deal, relative to a non-advised non-EP 
financed deal (Model 3), and subsequently we match, via PSM, EPFA-deals to NFANEP-deals. 
The reported estimates indicate that the probability of observing an EPFA-deal increases when 
dealing with private targets operating in intangible-rich sectors under a Common Law legal 
framework, while it significantly decreases when the target operates beyond UK borders. 
Moreover, acquiring firms are more likely to engage in an EPFA-deal when they possess 
substantial growth opportunities and less likely to do so as their leverage status increases. 
Similarly to Model 1 and in contrast to Model 2, the relative size of the deal is positive and 
significant indicating that the implied valuation risk is likely to involve EPs and FAs jointly. As 
Panel B (Model 3) records, the aggregate impact of the joint presence of EPs and FAs relative to 
their joint absence yields, on average, 1.35% higher gains. Finally, Panel C (Model 3) illustrates 
that the effect of the treatment on acquirers’ gains would be rendered negligible if an unobserved 
covariate caused the odds of treatment assignment to change by at least 22%. 
Our results presented above indicate that EP-financed deals accompanied by FA-presence 
(i.e. EPFA-deals) significantly outperform their EP-financed non-advised matched counterparts 
(EPNFA-Exercise 1), their non-EP advised matched counterparts (FANEP-Exercise 2) and, also, 
their non-EP non-advised matched counterparts (NEPNFA-Exercise 3). Overall, having 
addressed potential selection bias our findings provide further support for our hypotheses H1 and 
H2, as well as indicate the presence of a complementarily effect between EP-financing and FA-
presence on the abnormal returns gained by acquirers’ shareholders. We come to this conclusion 
by identifying the crucial role of (a) FAs in enhancing the likelihood of success of EP-financed 
deals and (b) of EP-financing in enhancing the likelihood of success of FA-present deals. 
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Nevertheless, as Section 3.2 outlines, the main purpose of the PSM method is to identify a 
counterfactual sample unit 𝑗 that does not receive the treatment, yet, it exhibits the same 
probability to receive the treatment as a treated sample unit 𝑖. The identification of the 
counterfactual sample unit 𝑗 is conditional on a propensity score that is determined by all 
covariates included in the propensity score estimator (logit model), and not on each ex-ante 
characteristic, or covariate, ‘X’. Consequently, an important robustness check in each of our 
matching sequences involves the comparison of the distributions of each of the models’ 
covariates between the treated and control groups. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) illustrate that 
the two-sample t-test for comparing the distributions of covariates’ means is appropriate. As we 
observe in Table 5 (Panels A to C), the distribution of covariates among all three Exercises does 
not yield any significant differences between the treated and untreated groups, hence confirming 
efficient matching.
36
 
(Insert Table 3.5 about here) 
3.4.4.2. Classification of Optimal Treatment Use, Classification Matrices and Acquirers’ Gains 
The classification matrices enable us to investigate potential misalignments between actual and 
predicted treatment-use. Using the three matrices we identify deals in which the ‘model-
predicted’ use of treatment coincides with the actual use of treatment. Table 6 reports that our 
models ‘correctly’ classify 63.1% of FA-deals in Exercise 1 (Panel A), 78.1% of EP-deals in 
Exercise 2 (Panel B) and 75.2% of EPFA-deals in Exercise 3 (Panel C). In Exercise 3, the overall 
classification accuracy reaches 73.3%. All exercises indicate strong ‘model prediction’ which 
leads to precise matching. 
(Insert Table 3.6 about here) 
Moreover, in order for a treatment within each exercise to be classified as ‘optimal’ at deal 
level, based on the relevant logistic model, first, it needs to exhibit the treatment and, second, the 
estimated probability of predicted treatment-use must be equal to, or greater than, the a-priori 
probability of actual treatment-involvement. The a-priori probability of treatment-involvement in 
                                                          
36 The balanced distribution of RS in the matched sample (Table 5, Panels A to C) confirms that once controlling for the 
documented wealth effect of the relative size of the transaction (Table 4, Panel A), the impact of the treatment (FA, EP, EPFA) 
persists (Table 4, Panel B). We thank James Ang for raising this issue at an earlier version of the paper. 
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each matching exercise is equal to each matching sample’s proportion of treatment-involvement: 
(a) 22.4% in Exercise 1 (proportion of FA-deals in EP-financed deals; 0.2240 = 274/1,223); (b) 
15.9% in Exercise 2 (proportion of EPs in FA-deals; 0.1593 = 274/1,719); and (c) 9.5% in 
Exercise 3 (proportion of EPFA-deals relative to non-EP non-FA deals (NFANEP); 0.0945 = 
274/2,897). Accordingly, three dummy variables are formed within each matching exercise’s 
sub-sample (OFA, OEP, OEPFA) and assume the value of 1 if the probability of ‘predicted’ 
treatment-use is greater than, or equal to, the prior probability of actual treatment-use, and 0 
otherwise respectively. Table 7 presents the distribution of deals in each exercise by actual and 
‘optimal’ treatment-use according to target- and deal- specific features, such as the target firm’s 
listing status and its industry classification. ‘Optimal’ use of FAs (OFA) in EP-deals, ‘optimal’ 
use of EPs (OEP) in FA-deals and ‘optimal’ use of EPFA (OEPFA) relative to deals exhibiting 
neither EPs nor FAs, are illustrated to be vastly composed of deals involving private targets, 
operating in intangible-rich sectors. Cross-industry deals are following in terms of ‘optimal’ 
treatment-use, accounting for about one third of actual treatment-use in all three matching 
exercises. 
(Insert Table 3.7 about here) 
We therefore investigate the wealth effects of actual and ‘optimal’ treatment-use. Table 8 
(Panel A) records that acquirers in deals in which the presence of FAs is ‘optimal’ (OFA), as 
classified by Model 1 (Table 4), enjoy 1.69% higher abnormal returns, relative to non-advised 
EP-financed deals (EPNFA). Our findings further show that the ‘optimal’ use of EPs (OEP) 
yields 0.78% higher abnormal returns, relative to advised non-EP-financed deals (FANEP) 
(Panel B).
37
 Moreover, Panel C records that acquirers in ‘optimal’ EPFA-deals (OEPFA) earn 
1.86% higher gains relative to non-advised non-EP-financed deals (NFANEP). The above 
findings provide compelling evidence suggesting that the ‘optimal’ use of each of the treatments, 
either independently (OFA and OEP), or jointly (OEPFA), leads to substantial gains to acquirers. 
(Insert Table 3.8 about here) 
                                                          
37 The statistical insignificance of the calculated differential is possibly driven form the established positive wealth effect of stock 
financed private target deals (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002), which is further enhanced under FA-presence. 
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3.4.5. Multiple Regression Analysis of Acquirers’ Short-Run Abnormal Returns 
Table 9 reports the results of our multiple regression analysis. This allows us to assess the impact 
of the presence of EPs and FAs, jointly and individually, on the abnormal returns earned by 
acquirers, while also accounting for common factors influencing the latter simultaneously. The 
estimates recorded in Models 1 to 9 aim to investigate the wealth effects of: (a) FA-presence 
within all deals (Model 1), as well as within EP-financed deals (Model 2), (b) EP-financing 
within all deals (Model 4), as well as within FA-present deals (Model 5), and (c) the joint 
presence of EPs and FAs within all deals (Model 7), as well as relative to deals that do not 
include neither EPs, nor FAs (Model 8). Finally, in Models 3, 6 and 9 we assess the impact on 
acquirers’ abnormal returns of the ‘optimal’ use of FAs (OFA) in EP-financed deals, EPs (OEP) 
in FA-present deals and EPFA (OEPFA), relative to NEPNFA-deals, respectively. 
(Insert Table 3.9 about here) 
Our estimates show that larger acquirers (Models 1 to 3) destroy value, as in Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), while relatively large deals (Models 4 to 9) add more value, as 
in Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) and Fuller et al. (2002). Highly liquid acquirers add value 
(Models 1, 4 and 7), yet not within EP-financed deals (Models 2 and 3) and advised deals 
(Models 5 and 6), while unreported estimates suggest that low growth acquirers, highly 
leveraged acquirers and mature acquirers break even in the short-run. Moreover, unlisted targets 
add value to acquirers’ shareholders, consistent with Draper and Paudyal (2006), yet in the 
presence of EPs the effect of UNL becomes negligible (Model 4) as in Barbopoulos and 
Sudarsanam (2012). Likewise, acquirers break even in unlisted target deals under FA-presence 
(Model 1).
38
 Estimates in Model 1 also indicate that FAs do not significantly enhance acquirers’ 
gains in diversified or foreign deals. 
Within EP-financed deals, FA-presence (Model 2), as well as ‘optimal’ FA-presence (OFA) 
(Model 3), are illustrated to offer significant gains to acquirers of unlisted targets. This finding 
extends earlier UK-based evidence (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012) advocating that 
acquirers of unlisted targets break even in EP-financed deals, as well as provides support for our 
                                                          
38 Following documented evidence regarding the strong relationship between FA-presence and deal value, we include in Models 
1 to 3 the acquirer’s market value rather than the relative size of the deal. Performing the same estimations including the deal’s 
relative size yields qualitatively similar results. 
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hypothesis H1 illustrating the superior gains earned by acquirers in advised, relative to non-
advised, EP-financed deals. Model 2 also shows that acquirers involved in relatively riskier EP-
deals (proxied by the Relative Earnout Value - REAV) break even in the presence of FAs.
39
 
Overall, our estimates suggest that the more efficient design of EPs, which is possibly offered via 
the involvement of FAs in the deal, leads to higher abnormal returns to acquirers’ shareholders. 
Model 5 records that EP-financing yields significant value gains to the shareholders of 
advised acquirers in unlisted target deals. Moreover, under FA-presence, valuation risk concerns 
in EP-financed deals, as approximated by the relative size of the deal, seem to be effectively 
mitigated resulting in significant abnormal returns in the short-run. The above provides further 
support for our hypothesis H2 predicting superior gains to acquirers’ shareholders from advised 
EP-financed deals, relative to advised non-EP-financed deals. The aforementioned effect persists 
in Model 6, in which the impact of ‘optimal’ EP-presence (OEP) in advised M&As is 
investigated. Model 6 also suggests a minor wealth gain of OEP in diversifying FA-present 
deals.
40
 Consequently, the above suggest that the implied risk of a given deal, despite being 
effectively addressed via the presence of FAs in the deal process, appears to be further mitigated 
via EP-financing. 
Model 7 confirms that acquirers enjoy significant gains from the joint presence of EPs and 
FAs in the deal. Specifically, EPFA-deals yield significant abnormal returns to acquirers when 
involving unlisted targets, when incorporating substantial valuation risk, as well as when they 
constitute diversifying concentrations.
41
 The above persist when we study the effect of EPFA-
financing, relative to deals exhibiting the joint absence of EPs and FAs (NFANEP), for both 
actual and ‘optimal’ EPFA-classified (OEPFA) occurrences (Models 8 and 9, respectively). 
Evidently, our findings confirm the presence of a complementarily effect between the two 
treatments (EPs and FAs). This leads to acquirers reaping the highest abnormal returns, relative 
to deals in which only one of the two treatments is present, or relative to deals in which both 
treatments are absent. 
                                                          
39 In unreported estimations, including REAV in the model, without interacting it with FA, results in a significant wealth loss. 
40 As OEP-deals involve solely private targets (Table 7), we do not include any interaction between OEP and UNL.  
41 Acquirers in EPFA-deals appear to break even when engaging in cross-border deals. A potential explanation for this finding 
relates to the fact that the vast majority of our EP-financed cross-border deals consist of UK-based FAs. Wang and Xie (2011) 
illustrate that acquirers’ shareholders in valuation complex cross-border deals enjoy a significant wealth gain when employing 
advisors that are indigenous to the target country. 
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Lastly, in Model 10 to 12 we aim to address potential selection bias considerations within our 
multivariate analysis. Specifically, we conduct estimations within sub-samples involving treated 
EPFA-deals and control EPNFA (Model 10), NEPFA (Model 11) and NEPNFA (Model 12) 
counterfactuals, respectively, as identified in our PSM sequence (secion 4.4). Model 10 
illustrates the positive effect of FA-involvement in deals financed with EPs. Accordingly, in 
Model 11, we estimate the contribution of EP-financing in deals involving FAs. In order to 
account for the positive effect of FA-involvement on acquirers’ returns, we conduct interaction 
effects with deal-specific characteristics that are more likely to appeal to the use of EPs. 
Consistent with our results above (Model 4), the positive effect of EP-financing in risky deals 
involving unlisted targets persists. Lastly, Model 12 illustrates that acquirers earn significant 
gains when engaging in EPFA-deals, relative to their matched non-advised non-earnout financed 
deals, while accounting for firm- and deal- specific characteristics simultaneously.  
Overall, our multiple regression analysis provides compelling evidence suggesting that the 
presence of FAs within EP-financed deals constitutes an important source of value creation. We 
argue that the identified effects originate from the ability of FAs to address valuation 
complexities and accommodate asymmetric information issues more efficiently during the design 
of EP-financed deals. To this end, the positive implications of FA-inclusion in EP-financed deals 
become more pronounced when the latter involve unlisted targets and, hence, there is greater 
valuation complexity, as well as more scope for negotiation. As a result, this further augments 
our complementarity argument regarding the impact of the simultaneous presence of FAs and 
EPs on the likelihood of success of small, yet risky M&As, consistent with our hypotheses H1 
and H2. 
3.5. Conclusion 
In this article we analyze the abnormal returns gained by acquirers consulting FAs in deals that 
are financed with contingent payments (EPs), relative to conventional single up-front payments. 
We complement earlier earnout studies suggesting that EPs are designed to reduce asymmetric 
information issues and that their efficient design presents a crucial condition under which their 
successful implementation is more feasible. As target-side FA-involvement in EP-financed deals 
67 
   
appears to be very limited, we argue that such likelihood is increasing in the presence of FAs 
counselling the acquiring firms. 
We present compelling evidence suggesting that EPFA-deals outperform: (a) EP-financed 
deals without the presence of FAs, (b) non-earnout financed deals with the presence of FAs and, 
(c) non-earnout financed deals without the presence of FAs. In order to reduce the exposure of 
our findings to potential selection-bias concerns, or to the problem of causal interpretation, the 
PSM method is utilised. In so doing, we identify the representatives of counterfactuals of treated 
(EPFA) M&As based on deal- and merging firm- specific characteristics and verify our derived 
conclusions. In order to ensure that the estimation of propensities, based on which our PSM 
exercise is executed, is not exposed to any form of omitted variable bias we also employ the 
Rosenbaum-bounds sensitivity analysis method. Moreover, we illustrate that ‘optimal’ EP-use in 
FA-deals, FA-presence in EP-deals and EPFA-occurrence, relative to deals involving neither EPs 
nor FAs, add significant acquirer gains. Lastly, our multiple regression analysis confirms the 
persistence of the interaction of EP-financing and FA-presence in generating significantly higher 
abnormal returns to acquirers. Specifically, we extend the findings of earlier studies indicating 
that unlisted target deals financed with EPs break even (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012) by 
showing that the presence of FAs, counselling the acquirers, leads to significant value gains. 
Overall, the presence of FAs in valuation-complex negotiation-intense deals involving 
unlisted targets and financed with EPs leads to substantial value gains to acquirers’ shareholders. 
In contrast, in the absence of FAs, the well-documented positive effect of EPs on the value gains 
of acquirers becomes negligible. Therefore, this article demonstrates the importance of the 
participation of FAs in EP-financed deals. The above provide evidence supporting the presence 
of a complementarity effect between EPs and FAs in small, yet risky M&As. We argue that the 
higher abnormal returns earned by acquirers in EPFA-deals are likely to be sourced from the 
ability of FAs to address the inherent complexities of the design of EPs more efficiently and, 
hence, enhance the their risk-mitigating properties – an unexplored, yet very interesting issue in 
M&A literature regarding the impact of contingent payments on M&A outcomes. 
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3.6. Tables Chapter 3 
 
Table 3.1: Annual distribution of UK M&A activity 
 
Year 
Panel A: All M&As Panel B: All Earnout (EP)-Financed M&As 
ALL DVSD CBA INT FA PRV PUB SUB CASH STOCK MIXED ALL DVSD CBA INT FA PRV PUB SUB 
1986 39 14 20 10 24 19 11 9 21 11 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1987 121 23 68 33 47 60 30 31 50 30 41 17 1 8 8 1 14 0 3 
1988 286 62 178 93 62 175 43 68 128 23 135 81 11 49 35 13 66 6 9 
1989 351 89 205 121 89 185 42 123 173 31 147 76 13 47 37 13 60 3 13 
1990 215 56 124 70 76 97 20 98 110 15 90 43 7 26 24 9 32 1 10 
1991 138 23 82 37 54 58 20 60 57 16 65 28 6 23 9 6 20 1 7 
1992 145 32 93 37 45 69 5 71 64 11 70 22 2 15 3 4 15 0 7 
1993 217 49 132 62 81 101 15 101 97 16 104 31 4 18 10 11 19 1 11 
1994 272 61 142 83 88 148 20 104 124 24 124 42 10 26 16 12 38 1 3 
1995 288 79 177 100 80 167 20 101 114 17 157 67 13 40 34 11 57 1 9 
1996 324 81 179 114 91 206 26 91 142 22 160 70 13 40 29 16 63 0 7 
1997 398 121 225 149 105 252 31 115 159 23 216 88 20 49 48 22 70 0 18 
1998 423 130 199 158 150 228 43 152 222 19 182 67 15 31 32 15 57 0 10 
1999 437 137 184 188 192 233 66 137 200 23 214 74 17 34 45 25 61 1 12 
2000 418 139 182 230 168 237 42 138 160 37 221 95 16 50 70 23 78 0 17 
2001 304 96 136 172 124 192 24 88 106 18 180 95 21 45 71 32 85 0 10 
2002 224 55 105 121 74 145 15 64 115 12 97 57 13 29 47 17 46 1 10 
2003 191 67 68 111 53 110 17 64 93 7 91 47 12 21 32 13 40 0 7 
2004 223 66 93 116 60 154 9 60 88 12 123 68 13 29 39 9 59 0 9 
2005 300 82 120 173 89 213 27 60 131 13 156 89 20 28 68 20 85 1 3 
2006 312 102 125 190 81 223 18 70 132 9 171 99 22 43 73 12 89 0 10 
2007 347 115 140 188 102 249 26 71 135 13 199 117 27 47 76 24 106 0 11 
2008 188 73 77 109 41 143 9 36 90 9 89 59 17 23 39 10 56 0 3 
2009 100 33 40 60 31 61 16 22 45 12 43 26 6 11 20 6 23 0 3 
2010 171 68 78 91 46 106 11 54 98 7 66 47 16 19 27 7 42 0 5 
Total 6,432 1,853 3,172 2,816 2,053 3,831 606 1,988 2,854 430 3,148 1,505 315 751 892 331 1,281 17 207 
% of Total - 28.81 49.32 43.78 31.92 59.56 9.42 30.91 44.37 6.69 48.94 23.40 20.93 49.90 59.27 21.99 85.12 1.13 13.75 
 
Note: Panel A refers to all M&As within our sample; Panel B refers to only M&As that are financed with an earnout provision. ALL refers to the entire M&A activity; DVSD refers 
to diversifying deals in which acquirer and target operate in different industries, i.e. they do not share the same two-digit SIC code; CBA refers to cross-border deals in which the 
acquirer and target are based in different countries; INT refers to deals in which the target operates in an intangible-rich industry such as Media and Entertainment, Consumer 
Products and Services, High Technology; CASH refers to deals fully financed with cash; STOCK refers to deals fully financed with stock; MIXED refers to deals financed with a 
combination of cash, stock and/or other payments excluding earnout; EP refers to deals financed with an earnout provision; FA refers to deals in which at least one financial 
advisor is counselling the acquiring firm; PRV refers to deals in which the target is a private firm; PUB refers to deals in which the target is a public firm; SUB refers to deals in 
which the target is a subsidiary firm. More information on the definition of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Mean Acquirer Size and Deal Value 
    ALL EP NEP CASH STOCK MIXED FA NFA EPFA EPNFA FANEP NFANEP 
ALL 
N 6,432 1,505 4,927 2,854 430 1,644 2,053 4,379 331 1,174 1,722 3,205 
% of All - 23.40% 76.60% 44.37% 6.69% 25.56% 31.92% 68.08% 5.15% 18.25% 26.77% 49.83% 
Mean MV 750.27 295.91 889.06 1,076.24 466.97 674.04 1,147.81 563.89 264.97 304.64 1,317.51 658.86 
Mean DV 134.16 22.50 168.27 78.56 209.11 313.24 375.07 21.22 51.19 14.40 437.32 23.72 
Private 
N 3,831 1,281 2,550 1,299 195 1,056 866 2,965 265 1,016 601 1,949 
% of All 59.56% 19.92% 39.65% 20.20% 3.03% 16.42% 13.46% 46.10% 4.12% 15.80% 9.34% 30.30% 
Mean MV 433.56 274.75 513.34 701.17 457.54 292.60 429.06 434.88 203.31 293.38 528.61 508.64 
Mean DV 26.41 18.67 30.30 24.82 34.32 36.30 64.59 15.26 35.93 14.17 77.24 15.82 
Subsidiary 
N 1,995 207 1,788 1,290 77 422 662 1,333 58 149 604 1,184 
% of All 31.02% 3.22% 27.80% 20.06% 1.20% 6.56% 10.29% 20.72% 0.90% 2.32% 9.39% 18.41% 
Mean MV 1,062.37 411.37 1,760.78 1,213.50 179.95 1,078.47 1,532.46 828.91 537.13 362.41 1,628.04 887.62 
Mean DV 102.37 36.49 110 84.50 45.59 199.44 248.18 29.96 90.81 15.35 263.29 31.80 
Public 
N 606 17 589 265 158 166 525 81 8 9 517 72 
% of All 9.42% 0.26% 9.16% 4.12% 2.46% 2.58% 8.16% 1.26% 0.12% 0.14% 8.04% 1.12% 
Mean MV 1,724.97 484.54 1,137.74 2,246.66 618.47 2,072.38 1,848.37 925.16 334.09 618.27 1,871.81 963.52 
Mean DV 920.01 140.16 942.52 313.06 504.52 2,364.26 1,047.20 95.60 269.61 25.10 1,059.23 104.41 
Panel B: Acquirer- and Deal- Specific Statistics 
 
N Deal Value Market Value Relative Size N Earnout Value 
Relative Earnout 
Value 
N Market-to-Book Cash ratio 
Debt-to-Equity 
Ratio 
 
- Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median - Mean Median Mean  Median - Mean Median Mean  Median Mean Median 
All 6,432 134.16 10.97 750.27 113.38 0.50 0.11 1,505 5.97 2.84 0.38 0.33 5,921 4.45 2.13 0.12 0.08 103.85 50.14 
Domestic 4,579 66.39 9.00 412.20 74.20 0.50 0.13 1,190 5.31 2.62 0.41 0.37 3,729 4.02 1.95 0.11 0.06 101.32 47.83 
Cross-border 1,853 301.63 18.88 1,585.68 334.47 0.48 0.07 315 8.45 4.00 0.28 0.25 1,562 5.49 2.57 0.13 0.10 109.88 56.33 
Focused 3,260 187.57 11.68 749.64 103.93 0.44 0.12 754 5.96 3.01 0.39 0.35 2,647 5.38 2.13 0.12 0.07 121.44 50.77 
Diversified 3,172 79.27 10.43 750.91 119.52 0.55 0.10 751 5.97 2.70 0.38 0.33 2,644 3.53 2.14 0.11 0.08 86.24 49.82 
EPs 1,505 22.49 8.85 295.91 66.37 0.40 0.13 - - - - - 1,223 4.57 2.28 0.13 0.09 78.34 41.35 
NEP 4,927 168.27 12.11 889.06 133.70 0.52 0.10 - - - - - 4,068 4.42 2.10 0.11 0.07 111.52 52.64 
FAs 2,053 375.07 36.17 1,147.81 148.10 0.91 0.27 - - - - - 1,719 4.40 2.03 0.12 0.08 125.73 55.06 
NFA 4,379 21.22 7.04 563.89 97.44 0.30 0.08 - - - - - 3,572 4.48 2.18 0.11 0.08 93.32 47.98 
EPFA 331 51.19 17.13 264.97 56.91 0.88 0.26 331 9.22 4.77 0.32 0.28 274 3.89 1.97 0.14 0.10 62.08 40.28 
FANEP 1,722 437.32 43.67 1,317.51 179.61 0.91 0.27 - - - - - 1,445 4.50 2.04 0.12 0.07 137.80 59.51 
EPNFA 1,174 14.40 7.30 304.64 67.63 0.27 0.11 1,174 5.05 2.46 0.40 0.35 949 4.77 2.34 0.13 0.09 83.03 41.74 
NFANEP 3,205 23.72 6.92 658.86 114.97 0.32 0.07 - - - - - 2,623 4.37 2.12 0.11 0.07 97.04 49.86 
Private 3,831 26.41 7.95 433.56 85.57 0.47 0.10 1,281 5.86 2.93 0.40 0.35 3,100 4.76 2.24 0.12 0.08 94.48 47.02 
Subsidiary 1,995 102.37 13.83 1,062.37 153.93 0.43 0.10 207 5.76 2.03 0.31 0.25 1,696 3.76 1.95 0.11 0.07 97.65 53.59 
Public 606 920.01 83.45 1,724.97 279.42 0.88 0.37 17 16.27 4.78 0.36 0.22 495 4.94 2.03 0.12 0.07 183.80 60.98 
 
Continued 
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Table 3.2 (Continued) 
 
Note: Panel A presents the mean transaction value of M&A deals within our sample and the mean market value of the involved acquiring firms by different deal characteristics and 
listing status of the target firm; Panel B presents mean and median values of acquirers’ market value (measured by the company’s market capitalization 20 days prior to the M&A 
announcement), market-to-book ratio (measured by the acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement over the acquirer’s book value at the end of the last 
quarter prior to the deal’s announcement), cash-ratio ratio (measured by the acquirer’s ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the 
deal’s announcement) and debt-to-equity ratio (measured by the acquirer’s ratio of total debt to common equity at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement), as 
well as the mean and median deal value, relative deal size (=deal value/acquirer’s market value), earnout value and relative earnout value (=earnout value/deal value). ALL refers to 
the entire M&A activity of our sample, or within each group of deals; N refers to the number of observations; EP refers to deals financed with an earnout provision; NEP refers to 
non-earnout-financed deals whose financing method consists of single payments in cash, stock, or mixed payments in cash, stock and/or other payments excluding earnout 
provisions; CASH refers to deals fully financed with cash; STOCK refers to deals fully financed with stock; MIXED refers to deals financed with a combination of cash, stock 
and/or other payments excluding earnouts; FA refers to deals in which at least one financial advisor is counselling the acquirer; NFA refers to deals in which no financial advisor is 
counselling the acquirer; EPFA refers to deals in which at least one financial advisor is counselling the acquirer and are financed with an earnout provision; EPNFA refers to deals 
in which the financing process involves an earnout provision and no financial advisor is counselling the acquirer; FANEP refers to deals in which at least one financial advisor is 
counselling the acquirer and the financing process involves non-earnout single payments in cash, stock, or mixed payments in cash, stock and/or other payments excluding 
earnouts; NFANEP refers to deals in which no financial advisor is counseling the acquirer and the financing process involves non-earnout single payments in cash, stock, or mixed 
payments in cash, stock and/or other payments excluding earnouts; Domestic refers to deals in which the acquirer and target are based in the same country; Cross-border refers to 
deals in which the acquirer and target are based in different countries; Focused refers to deals in which the acquirer and target operate in the same industry, i.e. they share the same 
two-digit SIC code; Diversified refers to deals in which the acquirer and target operate in different industries, i.e. they do not share the same two-digit SIC code; Private refers to 
deals in which the target is a private firm; Public refers to deals in which the target is a public firm; Subsidiary refers to deals in which the target is a subsidiary firm. More 
information on the definition of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
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Table 3.3: Univariate Analysis 
 
Panel A: All M&As 
    ALL EPs NEP CASH STOCK MIXED 
NEP 
vs EPs 
CASH 
vs EPs 
STOCK 
vs EPs 
MIXED 
vs EPs 
All 
Mean 1.30a 1.70a 1.18a 1.08a 0.73c 1.47a -0.52a -0.62a -0.97b -0.23 
N 6,432 1,505 4,927 2,853 430 1,644         
Private (PRV) 
Mean 1.40a 1.61a 1.30a 0.85a 1.26b 1.86a -0.31 -0.76a -0.35 0.26 
N 3,830 1,280 2,550 1,299 195 1,056         
Subsidiary (SUB) 
Mean 1.56a 2.25a 1.48a 1.38a 3.09a 1.47a -0.78 -0.87c 0.84 -0.78 
N 1,995 207 1,788 1,289 77 422         
Unlisted (UNL) 
Mean 1.46a 1.70a 1.37a 1.11a 1.78a 1.75a -0.32 -0.58a 0.08 0.06 
N 5,825 1,487 4,338 2,588 272 1,478         
Public (PUB) 
Mean -0.16 2.04 -0.23 0.80c -1.08c -1.06c -2.27 -1.24 -3.11c -3.10c 
N 606 17 589 265 158 166         
Panel B: Deals with FA Presence (FA) 
All 
Mean 1.63a 2.48a 1.47a 1.55a 0.44 1.72a -1.01b -0.93b -2.04a -0.76 
N 2,053 331 1,722 870 225 627         
Private (PRV) 
Mean 2.18a 2.16a 2.19a 1.24a 2.74b 2.90a 0.03 -0.92 0.58 0.73 
N 866 265 601 251 58 292         
Subsidiary (SUB) 
Mean 2.39a 4.41a 2.19a 2.16a 2.38 2.23a -2.22b -2.25b -2.02 -2.18c 
N 662 58 604 388 28 188         
Unlisted (UNL) 
Mean 2.27a 2.57a 2.19a 1.80a 2.62b 2.63a -0.37 -0.77 0.06 0.07 
N 1,528 323 1,205 639 86 480         
Public (PUB) 
Mean -0.23 -0.92 -0.22 0.87c -0.90 -1.28b 0.70 1.79 0.01 -0.36 
N 525 8 517 231 139 147         
Panel C: Deals without FA Presence (NFA) 
All 
Mean 1.15a 1.48a 1.03a 0.88a 1.04c 1.32a -0.45b -0.60a -0.44 -0.16 
N 4,378 1,173 3,205 1,983 205 1,017         
Private (PRV) 
Mean 1.10a 1.46a 1.03a 0.75a 0.63 1.47a -0.43c -0.71a -0.83 0.01 
N 2,964 1,015 1,949 1,048 137 764         
Subsidiary (SUB) 
Mean 1.15a 1.42a 1.12a 1.04a 3.49a 0.87b -0.30 -0.37 2.08c -0.55 
N 1,333 149 1,184 901 49 234         
Unlisted (UNL) 
Mean 1.17a 1.45a 1.06a 0.89a 1.39b 1.33a -0.39b -0.57a -0.07 -0.12 
N 4,297 1,164 3,133 1,949 186 998         
Public (PUB) 
Mean 0.26 4.66c -0.29 0.34 -2.34 0.65 -4.95b -4.33c -7.00b -4.02 
N 81 9 72 34 19 19         
Panel D: FA vs NFA 
All Mean 0.48
a 1.00b 0.44b 0.67a -0.60 0.40     
Private (PRV) Mean 1.08a 0.70 1.16a 0.49 2.10 1.43a     
Subsidiary (SUB) Mean 1.24a 2.99a 1.08a 1.12a -1.11 1.36b     
Unlisted (UNL) Mean 1.10a 1.11a 1.13a 0.91a 1.24 1.31a     
Public (PUB) Mean -0.49 -5.58c 0.07 0.53 1.43 -1.93     
 
Note: Panel A presents mean announcement period 5-day (t-2, t+2) cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for all M&As within our sample 
as well as differentials between deals financed with earnout provisions and deals financed with non-earnout single up-front payments; 
Panel B presents mean announcement period 5-day CARs for only deals in which at least one financial advisor is counseling the acquirer 
as well as differentials between deals financed with earnout provisions and deals financed with non-earnout single up-front payments; 
Panel C presents mean announcement period 5-day CARs for deals in which no financial advisor is counseling the acquirer as well as 
differentials between deals financed with earnout provisions and deals financed with non-earnout single up-front payments; Panel D 
records differentials between deals that do (Panel B) and do not (Panel C) include at least one financial advisor counseling the acquirer. 
ALL refers to the entire M&A activity of each panel/group of deals; N refers to the number of observations in each group; PRV refers to 
deals in which the target is a private firm; PUB refers to deals in which the target is a public firm; SUB refers to deals in which the target 
is a subsidiary firm; UNL refers to deals in which the target is an unlisted firm (private or subsidiary); EP refers to deals financed with an 
earnout provision; NEP refers to non-earnout-financed deals whose financing method consists of single payments in cash, stock, or mixed 
payments in cash, stock and/or other payments excluding earnout provisions; CASH refers to deals fully financed with cash; STOCK 
refers to deals fully financed with stock; MIXED refers to deals financed with a combination of cash, stock and/or other payments 
excluding earnouts. The statistical significance of differences in returns between groups of acquirers is tested using the t-test for equality 
of means. a, b, and c indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. More information on the definition of each variable can be 
found in Appendix 3.1. 
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Table 3.4: PSM Approach and Treatment Effects 
 
Panel A: Logistic Regression Output 
  Model 1* Model 2** Model 3*** 
Treated Sample; Y = 1: EPFA EPFA EPFA 
Control Sample; Y = 0: EPNFA FANEP NFANEP 
Intercept -0.038 -2.996
a -2.003a 
Relative size of the deal (RS) 0.519a 0.052 0.719a 
Unlisted target (UNL) -0.243 
  Private target (PRV) 
 
1.916a 0.918a 
Target operates in intangible-rich industry (INT) -0.029 
 
0.526a 
Target operates in High-Tech industry (THT) 
 
0.699a 
 Target operates in Consumer Products and Services industry (TCPAS) 
 
0.608a 
 Target operates in an unaffiliated industry (DVSD) 0.033 0.055 0.230 
Target resides beyond UK borders (CBA) 
 
-0.276c -0.150c 
Target operates under Common Law legal framework (COMMON) 
  
0.445c 
Acquirer’s Number of Recorded Trading Days (AGE) 
  
0.033 
Acquirer’s Market-to-Book ratio (MTBV) 0.059 0.032 0.365a 
Acquirer’s Cash-ratio (CASH RATIO) 0.477 
  Acquirer’s Debt-to-Equity ratio (DEBT) 
  
-0.095b 
Year Fixed Effects (YFE) YES YES YES 
Pseudo (McFadden) R-Squared (in %) 7.31 14.8 16.47 
H-L Goodness of Fit test 7.10 6.03 12.17 
HL Goodness-of-fit Test [Pr > Chi-Squared]  0.52 0.64 0.14 
Mean VIF 1.094 1.107 1.318 
Max VIF 1.186 1.221 1.923 
Min VIF 1.029 1.030 1.025 
N 1,223 1,719 2,897 
Panel B: Differentials Treated VS Control M&As 
Mean CAR Treated (in %) 2.61a 2.61a 2.61a 
Median CAR treated (in %) 1.39a 1.39a 1.39a 
N 274 274 274 
Mean CAR Control (in %) 1.13a 1.51a 1.26a 
Median CAR Control (in %) 0.64a 0.62a 0.52a 
N 274 274 274 
Mean (in %) Difference (Treated VS Control) 1.48b 1.10c 1.35b 
Median (in %) Difference (Treated VS Control) 1.57a 0.89c 1.22a 
Panel C: Rosenbaum-Bounds 
RB: p-value of estimated difference at Γ=1 0.0019 0.0443 0.0031 
RB: critical value of Γ at cut-off p=0.05 1.20 1.01 1.17 
RB: critical value of Γ at cut-off p=0.10 1.27 1.07 1.24 
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
 
* In Model 1, the treated portfolio (y=1) consists of earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is advised by at least one 
financial advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) consists of earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is not advised by 
any financial advisor (EPNFA). 
** In Model 2, the treated portfolio (y=1) consists of earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is advised by at least one 
financial advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) consists of deals that are not financed with an earnout provision but the 
acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor (FANEP). 
*** In Model 3, the treated portfolio (y=1) consists of earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is advised by at least one 
financial advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) consists of deals that are not financed with an earnout provision and the 
acquirer is not advised by any financial advisor (NFANEP). 
 
Note: Panel A presents the output of the logistic regression models that were used in the PSM technique; Panel B reports mean 
and median 5-day (t-2, t+2) announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for treated and control deals in all three 
samples corresponding to each PSM sequence, respectively; Panel C reports the output of the Rosenbaum-Bounds test. RS 
corresponds to the deal’s relative size (=deal value/acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); UNL refers 
to deals in which the target is an unlisted firm (private or subsidiary); PRV refers to deals in which the target is a private firm; INT 
refers to deals in which the target operates in an intangible-rich industry such as Media and Entertainment, Consumer Products 
and Services, High Technology; THT refers to deals in which the target operates in the High Technology industry; TCPAS refers 
to deals in which the target operates in the Consumer Products and Services industry; DVSD refers to deals in which the acquirer 
and target operate in different industries, i.e. they do not share the same two-digit SIC code; CBA refers to cross-border deals in 
which the acquirer and target are based in different countries; COMMON refers to deals in which the target operates within a 
Common Law legal framework; AGE corresponds to the number of days between the acquirer’s first recorded day on Datastream 
and the deal’s announcement day; MTBV corresponds to the acquirer’s market-to-book ratio (measured by the acquirer’s market 
value 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement over the acquirer’s book value at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s 
announcement); CASH RATIO corresponds to the acquirer’ s ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets at the end of the last 
quarter prior to the deal’s announcement; DEBT corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of total debt to common equity at the end of 
the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement; YFE corresponds to year fixed effects. The PSM technique employs 1-to-1 
nearest neighbor matching allowing for replacement. Pseudo R-Squared is a likelihood-based measure. HL Goodness-of-Fit refers 
to the Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) goodness-of-fit test on the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the observed 
and predicted values of the depended variable (i.e. there is no lack of fit). VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor, which quantifies 
the severity of multicollinearity. Variance inflation is the reciprocal of tolerance. The statistical significance of differences in 
mean returns between the two groups is tested using the t-test for equality of means and the statistical significance for differences 
in median returns is tested using the Wilcoxon rank sum test. a, b, and c indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively of 
the mean for each covariate presented. More information on the definition of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1.  
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Table 3.5: Covariate Balance of PSM Output 
 
Panel A: Financial advisors within earnout-financed deals* 
 
Covariate FA treated EPNFA control 
Diff. treated (FAs)  
vs control (EPNFA) 
N 274 274 - 
Unlisted (UNL) 267 267 - 
Intangible (INT) 161 159 - 
Diversified (DVSD) 137 139 - 
Relative size of the deal (RS) -1.447a -1.453a 0.006 
Market-to-book ratio (MTBV) 0.815a 0.889a -0.075 
Liquidity (CASH RATIO) 0.144a 0.131a 0.013 
 
Panel B: Earnouts within advised-deals** 
 
Covariate  EP treated FANEP control 
Diff. treated (EPs) 
vs control (FANEP) 
N 274 274 - 
Private (PRV) 214 214 - 
High Tech (THT) 59 46 - 
Consumer prod. Serv. (TCPAS) 64 74 - 
Diversified (DVSD) 137 133 - 
Cross-border (CBA) 75 65 - 
Relative size of the deal (RS) -1.447a -1.330a -0.117 
Market-to-book ratio (MTBV) 0.815a 0.797a 0.018 
 
Panel C: EPFA relative to joint absence of EPs and FAs*** 
 
Covariate EPFA treated NFANEP control 
Diff. treated (EPFA) 
vs control (NFANEP) 
N 274 274 - 
Private (PRV) 214 213 - 
Intangible (INT) 161 156 - 
Diversified (DVSD) 137 140 - 
Cross-border (CBA) 75 70 - 
Common Law (COMMON) 50 49 - 
Relative size of the deal (RS) -1.447a -1.474a 0.027 
Market-to-book ratio (MTBV) 0.815a 0.859a -0.044 
Age of acquirer (AGE) 7.910a 8.000a -0.094 
Debt-to-equity ratio (DEBT) 3.434a 3.339a 0.096 
 
 
Continued 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
 
* Panel A refers to the output of Model 1 (Table 4). The treated portfolio (y=1) consists of earnout-financed deals in which the 
acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) consists of earnout-financed deals in 
which the acquirer is not advised by any financial advisor (EPNFA). 
** Panel B refers to the output of Model 2 (Table 4). The treated portfolio (y=1) consists of earnout-financed deals in which the 
acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) consists of deals that are not financed 
with an earnout provision but the acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor (FANEP). 
*** Panel C refers to the output of Model 3 (Table 4). The treated portfolio (y=1) consists of earnout-financed deals in which the 
acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) consists of deals that are not financed 
with an earnout provision and the acquirer is not advised by any financial advisor (NFANEP). 
 
Note: Panel A presents descriptive statistics of the covariates used in the model predicting the involvement of financial advisors in 
earnout-financed deals only; Panel B presents descriptive statistics of the covariates used in the model predicting the use of 
earnout provisions in deals in which at least one financial advisor in counseling the acquirer; Panel C presents descriptive 
statistics of the covariates used in the model predicting the simultaneous presence of both earnout provisions and financial 
advisors, relative to deals that include neither earnouts, nor financial advisors. N refers to the number of observations in each 
group; UNL refers to deals in which the target is an unlisted firm (private or subsidiary); INT refers to deals in which the target 
operates in an intangible-rich industry such as Media and Entertainment, Consumer Products and Services, High Technology; 
DVSD refers to deals in which the acquirer and target operate in different industries, i.e. they do not share the same two-digit SIC 
code; RS corresponds to the deal’s relative size (=deal value/acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); 
MTBV corresponds to the acquirer’s market-to-book ratio (measured by the acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the deal’s 
announcement over the acquirer’s book value at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement); CASH RATIO 
corresponds to the acquirer’ s ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s 
announcement; PRV refers to deals in which the target is a private firm; THT refers to deals in which the target operates in the 
High Technology industry; TCPAS refers to deals in which the target operates in the Consumer Products and Services industry; 
DVSD refers to deals in which the acquirer and target operate in different industries, i.e. they do not share the same two-digit SIC 
code; CBA refers to cross-border deals in which the acquirer and target are based in different countries; COMMON refers to deals 
in which the target operates within a Common Law legal framework; AGE corresponds to the number of days between the 
acquirer’s first recorded day on Datastream and the deal’s announcement day; DEBT corresponds to the acquirer’s debt-to-equity 
ratio at the time of the deal’s announcement The matching sequence employs 1-to-1 nearest-neighbor matching with replacement. 
a, b, and c indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of the mean difference for each covariate presented. More 
information on the definition of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
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Table 3.6: Classification Matrix Based on Logistic Models of PSM Method 
 
Panel A: Financial advisors within earnout-financed deals* 
 
Predicted by Model 
    FA NFA All Sensitivity 
  FA 173 101 274 63.14%=173/274 
Actual NFA 359 590 949 62.17%=590/949 
  All 532 691 1,223 62.39%=(173+590)/1,223 
  Misclassification 67.48%=359/532 14.62%=101/691     
 
Panel B: Earnouts within advised-deals** 
 
Predicted by Model 
    EP NEP All Sensitivity 
  EP 214 60 274 78.10%=214/274 
Actual NEP 482 963 1,445 66.64%=963/1445 
  All 696 1,023 1,719 68.47%=(214+963)/1,719 
  Misclassification 69.25%=482/696 5.86%=60/1,023     
 
Panel C: EPFA relative to joint absence of EPs and FAs*** 
 
 Predicted by Model  
    EPFA NFANEP All Sensitivity 
  EPFA 206 68 274 75.18%=206/274 
Actual NFANEP 707 1,916 2,623 73.05%=1,916/2,623 
  All 913 1,984 2,897 73.25%=(206+1,916)/2,897 
  Misclassification 77.44%=707/913 3.42%=68/1,984     
 
* Panel A refers to the sample used to estimate Model 1 (Table 4). In the estimation, the treated portfolio (y=1) consists of 
earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) 
consists of earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is not advised by any financial advisor (EPNFA). 
** Panel B refers to the sample used to estimate Model 2 (Table 4). In the estimation, the treated portfolio (y=1) consists of 
earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) 
consists of deals that are not financed with an earnout provision but the acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor 
(FANEP). 
*** Panel C refers to the sample used to estimate Model 3 (Table 4). In the estimation, the treated portfolio (y=1) consists of 
earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) 
consists of deals that are not financed with an earnout provision and the acquirer is not advised by any financial advisor 
(NFANEP). 
 
Note: Panel A presents the predictions of the logistic regression models regarding the presence of financial advisors in earnout-financed deals; 
Panel B presents the predictions of the logistic regression models regarding the use of earnouts in deals in which at least one financial advisor is 
counseling the acquirer ; Panel C presents the predictions of the logistic regression models regarding the presence of both earnout provisions and 
financial advisors relative to deals that include neither earnouts, not financial advisors. ALL refers to the entire M&A activity of each panel/group 
of deals; EP refers to deals financed with an earnout provision; NEP refers to non-earnout-financed deals whose financing method consists of 
single payments in cash, stock, or mixed payments in cash, stock and/or other payments excluding earnout provisions; FA refers to deals in which 
at least one financial advisor is counselling the acquirer; NFA refers to deals in which no financial advisor is counselling the acquirer; EPFA 
refers to deals in which at least one financial advisor is counselling the acquirer and are financed with an earnout provision; NFANEP refers to 
deals in which no financial advisor is counseling the acquirer and the financing process involves non-earnout single payments in cash, stock, or 
mixed payments in cash, stock and/or other payments excluding earnouts. The results are presented in a matrix form where the columns indicate 
the predicted number of occurrences whereas the rows indicate the actual number of occurrences. The matrix is based on the a priori probability 
of a sample observation belonging to each sample’s examination group. This is the same as the proportion of actual occurrences in each sample. 
Sensitivity is a measure of classification accuracy, i.e. the model predicted group is the same as the actual group of a sample deal. 
Misclassification rate is referred as ‘false positive’, i.e. non-actual observations being classified as predicted and as ‘false negative’, i.e. actual 
observations being classified as predicted. More information on the definition of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
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Table 3.7: Descriptive Statistics of Classification Output 
 
  Panel A* 
FAs within EP-deals 
Panel B** 
EPs within FA-deals 
Panel C*** 
EPFA relative to joint 
absence of EPs and FAs 
  FAs OFA EPs OEP EPFA OEPFA 
All 
N 274 173 274 214 274 206 
% of all actual - 63.14% - 78.10% - 75.18% 
Private (PRV) 
N 216 137 216 214 216 180 
% of all actual 78.83% 50.00% 78.83% 78.10% 78.83% 65.69% 
Subsidiary (SUB) 
N 53 31 53 0 53 22 
% of all actual 19.34% 11.31% 19.34% 0.00% 19.34% 8.03% 
Public (PUB) 
N 5 5 5 0 5 4 
% of all actual 1.82% 1.82% 1.82% 0.00% 1.82% 1.46% 
Diversified (DVSD) 
N 137 83 137 108 137 104 
% of all actual 50.00% 30.29% 50.00% 39.42% 50.00% 37.96% 
Intangible (INT) 
N 162 109 162 135 162 141 
% of all actual 59.12% 39.78% 59.12% 49.27% 59.12% 51.46% 
 
* Panel A refers to the sample used to estimate Model 1 (Table 4). In the estimation, the treated portfolio (y=1) consists of 
earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) 
consists of earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is not advised by any financial advisor (EPNFA). 
** Panel B refers to the sample used to estimate Model 2 (Table 4). In the estimation, the treated portfolio (y=1) consists of 
earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) 
consists of deals that are not financed with an earnout provision but the acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor 
(FANEP). 
*** Panel C refers to the sample used to estimate Model 3 (Table 4). In the estimation, the treated portfolio (y=1) consists of 
earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) 
consists of deals that are not financed with an earnout provision and the acquirer is not advised by any financial advisor 
(NFANEP). 
 
Note: Panel A presents the distribution of actual and optimal occurrences of deals in which at least one financial advisor is 
counseling the acquirer; Panel B presents the distribution of actual and optimal occurrences of deals that are financed with an 
earnout provision; Panel C presents the distribution of actual and optimal occurrences of deals exhibiting the simultaneous 
presence of earnout provisions and at least one financial advisor counseling the acquirer. ALL refers to the entire M&A activity of 
each panel/group of deals; N corresponds to the number of observations; PRV refers to deals in which the target is a private firm; 
SUB refers to deals in which the target is a subsidiary firm; PUB refers to deals in which the target is a public firm; DVSD refers 
to deals in which the acquirer and target operate in different industries, i.e. they do not share the same two-digit SIC code; INT 
refers to deals in which the target operates in an intangible-rich industry such as Media and Entertainment, Consumer Products 
and Services, High Technology. More information on the definition of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
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Table 3.8: Acquirer Wealth Gains According to PSM Classifications 
 
 
* Panel A refers to the sample used to estimate Model 1 (Table 4). In the estimation, the treated portfolio (y=1) consists of 
earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) 
consists of earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is not advised by any financial advisor (EPNFA). 
** Panel B refers to the sample used to estimate Model 2 (Table 4). In the estimation, the treated portfolio (y=1) consists of 
earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) 
consists of deals that are not financed with an earnout provision but the acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor 
(FANEP). 
*** Panel C refers to the sample used to estimate Model 3 (Table 4). In the estimation, the treated portfolio (y=1) consists of 
earnout-financed deals in which the acquirer is advised by at least one financial advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) 
consists of deals that are not financed with an earnout provision and the acquirer is not advised by any financial advisor 
(NFANEP). 
 
Note: Panel A presents 5-day (-2, +2) average announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (in percent) for optimal 
financial advisor presence and for all non-advised earnout-financed deals, as well as differentials in performance between the two; 
Panel B presents 5-day (-2, +2) average announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (in percent) for optimal earnout 
presence and for all non-earnout-financed deals in which at least one financial advisor is counseling the acquirer, as well as 
differentials in performance between the two; Panel C presents 5-day (-2, +2) average announcement period cumulative abnormal 
returns (in percent) for optimal simultaneous presence of earnout provisions and financial advisors and for all non-advised non-
earnout-financed deals, as well as differentials in performance between the two. N refers to the number of observations in each 
group. Statistical significance of mean differences in gains between the two groups of acquirers is tested using the t-test of 
equality of means. a, b, and c indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. More information on the definition of each 
variable can be found in Appendix 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Treated: EPFA-deals; Control: EPNFA-deals* 
  OFA Non-advised EPs (1)-(2) 
   (1) (2) 
Mean 3.20a 1.51a 1.69a 
N 173 949   
Panel B: Treated: EPFA-deals; Control: FANEP-deals** 
  OEP Non-earnout FAs (1)-(2) 
  (1) (2)   
Mean 2.33a 1.55a 0.78 
N 214 1,445   
Panel C: Treated: EPFA-deals; Control: NFANEP-deals*** 
  OEPFA NFANEP (1)-(2) 
  (1) (2)   
Mean 2.95a 1.08a 1.86a 
N 206 2,623   
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Table 3.9: Multivariate Analysis 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 
All EP EP All FA FA All PSM ex. 3* PSM ex. 3* EPNFA NEPFA NEPNFA 
Intercept 0.022b 0.079a 0.078a 0.006 -0.009 0.017 0.008 0.003 0.003 -0.048c -0.048c -0.093a 
Market Value (MV) -0.004a -0.006a -0.005a                
Relative Size (RS)       0.005a 0.004a 0.003b 0.005a 0.004a 0.004a 0.034 0.034 0.008a 
Cash Ratio 0.021a 0.022 0.021 0.021a 0.018 0.018 0.020a 0.024b 0.025b -0.001 -0.001 0.021 
Unlisted (UNL) 0.008 -0.034 -0.034 0.021a 0.025a   0.021a 0.018b 0.019b 0.043a 0.043a 0.081a 
Diversified (DVSD) -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.010 
Cross-Border (CBA) 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.001 
Financial Adv. (FA) -0.002 -0.096a               0.012b   
Rel. Earn. Val. (REAV)   -0.002 -0.002                
Earnout Prov. (EP)       0.020 -0.032b          -0.017  
EPFA             -0.036a -0.037b     0.012b 
OFA     -0.099a                
OEP           0.012          
OEPFA                 -0.035c    
FA × UNL 0.013 0.093a                  
FA × DVSD 0.002 0.014                  
FA × CBA -0.001 -0.012                  
FA × REAV   -0.006                  
OFA × UNL     0.098a                
OFA × DVSD     0.007                
OFA × CBA     0.004                
OFA × REAV     -0.006                
EP × UNL       -0.015 0.043a          0.031c  
EP × DVSD       0.002 0.015          0.014  
EP × CBA       -0.001 -0.006          0.001  
EP × RS       0.002 0.009b          0.009c  
OEP × DVSD           0.019c          
OEP × CBA           -0.015          
OEP × RS           0.008c          
EPFA × UNL             0.048a 0.052a      
EPFA × DVSD             0.016c 0.016c      
EPFA × CBA             -0.008 -0.007      
EPFA × RS             0.008b 0.008b      
OEPFA × UNL                 0.052a    
OEPFA × DVSD         0.018c    
OEPFA × CBA                 -0.006    
OEPFA × RS                 0.012b    
YFE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no 
Adj. R-sq. (%) 2.22 2.51 2.27 2.28 3.25 0.75 2.47 2.77 2.75 1.47 3.51 4.09 
F-Stat 11.01 3.23 3.03 10.46 5.43 2.17 11.31 7.33 7.29 2.10 2.45 3.62 
N 5,291 1,223 1,223 5,291 1,719 1,719 5,291 2,897 2,897 586 480 493 
Continued 
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Table 3.9 (Continued) 
 
* Models 8 and 9 refer to the EPFA+NFANEP sample used to estimate Model 3 in our PSM Exercise 3(Table 4). In the 
estimation, the treated portfolio (y=1) consists of EP-financed deals in which the acquirer is advised by at least one financial 
advisor (EPFA) and the control portfolio (y=0) consists of deals that are not financed with an earnout provision and the acquirer 
is not advised by any financial advisor (NFANEP). 
 
Note: The table illustrates linear and interaction effects of FA (OFA), EP (OEP) and EPFA (OEPFA). Models 1, 4 and 7 refer to 
estimations for the whole sample, while Models 2, 5 and 8 refer to estimations within EP-financed deals, FA-present deals and 
EPFA+NFANEP deals as in PSM Exercise 3, respectively. Models 3, 6 and 9 refer to estimations within the same sample ranges 
as Models 2, 5 and 8, though including linear and interaction terms for our optimal FA-, EP- and EPFA- occurrences, 
respectively. ALL refers to the entire M&A activity of each panel/group of deals; N corresponds to the number of observations; 
EP refers to deals financed with an earnout provision; OEP refers to optimal occurrences of deals that are financed with an 
earnout provision as classified using the output of the logit model of PSM ex. 2; NEP refers to non-earnout-financed deals whose 
financing method consists of single payments in cash, stock, or mixed payments in cash, stock and/or other payments excluding 
earnout provisions; FA refers to deals in which at least one financial advisor is counselling the acquirer; OFA refers to optimal 
occurrences of deals in which at least one financial advisor is counseling the acquirer as classified using the output of the logit 
model of PSM ex.1; NFA refers to deals in which no financial advisor is counselling the acquirer; EPFA refers to deals in which 
at least one financial advisor is counselling the acquirer and are financed with an earnout provision; OEPFA refers to optimal 
occurrences of deals in which at least one financial advisor is counselling the acquirer and are financed with an earnout provision 
as classified using the output of the logit model of PSM ex. 3; NFANEP refers to deals in which no financial advisor is 
counseling the acquirer and the financing process involves non-earnout single payments in cash, stock, or mixed payments in 
cash, stock and/or other payments excluding earnouts; MV corresponds to the acquirer’s market value of equity 20 days prior to 
deal’s announcement; RS corresponds the deal’s relative deal size (=deal value/acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the deal’s 
announcement); CASH RATIO corresponds to the acquirer’ s ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets at the end of the 
last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement; UNL refers to deals in which the target is an unlisted firm (private or subsidiary); 
DVSD refers to deals in which the acquirer and target operate in different industries, i.e. they do not share the same two-digit SIC 
code; CBA refers to cross-border deals in which the acquirer and target are based in different countries; REAV corresponds to the 
deal’s relative earnout value =(earnout value/deal value); YFE corresponds to year fixed effects. The dependent variable consists 
of the announcement period market adjusted 5-day (t-2, t+2) returns of acquirers regressed against a set of explanatory variables. 
Regression outputs are estimated using ordinary least squares with the standard errors of coefficients adjusted for possible 
heteroscedasticity using White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. a, b, and c indicate significance at 1, 5, and 
10 percent, respectively. More information on the definition of each variable can be found in Appendix 3.1.  
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Appendix 3.1: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Type/Name Description Source 
ALL Refers to the entire sample analysed in this paper. SDC 
Acquirer’s Age (AGE) 
Number of days between the acquirer’s first recorded day on 
Datastream and the deal’s announcement day. 
Datastream 
Crossborder (CBA) 
Dummy = 1 when the target is a non-UK based firm, and = 0 
when both acquirer and target are UK institutions 
(=Domestic). 
SDC 
CASH Dummy = 1 when payment is 100% cash, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
COMMON 
Dummy = 1 when the acquisition is cross-border and the 
target's nation follows the English Common Law legal 
system, and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
CASH_RATIO 
Acquirer's total cash and cash equivalents to its total assets 
during the quarter prior to the deal’s announcement. 
Datastream 
Crossindustry (DVSD) 
Dummy = 1 when acquirer and target do not share the same 
two-digit SIC code and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Deal Value (DV) Deal’s transaction value, in million dollars. SDC 
Domestic (DOM) 
Dummy = 1 when acquirer and target are UK based, and = 0 
when target is not a UK company. 
SDC 
DEBT 
Acquirer's total debt to common equity during the quarter 
prior to the deal’s announcement. 
Datastream 
Earnout Value (EAV) 
Value of earnout, in million dollars (proxy for size of 
earnout). 
SDC 
Earnout Provisions (EPs) 
Dummy = 1 when payment includes earnout in addition to 
cash, stock, or mixed, and = 0 otherwise (= Non-Earnout) 
(NEP). 
SDC 
EPFA 
Dummy = 1 when there exists at least one financial advisor 
counselling the acquirer and the transaction includes an 
earnout provision, and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
EPNFA 
Dummy = 1 when there does not exists a financial advisor 
counselling the acquirer and the transaction includes an 
earnout provision, and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Financial Advisors (FAs) 
Dummy = 1 when there exists at least one financial advisor 
counselling the acquirer, and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Intangible (INT) 
Dummy = 1 when target belongs to an intangible-rich 
industry (Media and Entertainment, Consumer Products and 
Services, High Technology), and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Market Value (MV) 
Acquirer’s market value of equity four weeks prior to deal’s 
announcement, in million dollars. 
Datastream 
Market-to-Book Value (MTBV) 
Ratio of the acquirer’s market value four weeks prior to the 
deal’s announcement over the acquirer’s book value at the 
end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement. 
Datastream 
MIXED 
Dummy = 1 when the payment is a mixture of cash, stock 
and/or other methods of payment, excluding earnout, and = 
0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Non-Earnout (NEP) 
Dummy = 1 when full-cash, or full-stock, or mixed payments 
without EPs are used, and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
NFA 
Dummy = 1 when there does not exist a financial advisor 
counselling the acquirer, and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
FANEP Dummy = 1 when there exists at least one financial advisor 
counselling the acquirer and the transaction does not include 
an EP, and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Continued 
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Appendix 3.1 (Continued) 
 
Variable Type/Name Description Source 
NFANEP 
Dummy = 1 when there does not exist a financial advisor 
counselling the acquirer and the transaction does not include 
an EP, and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
OFA 
Dummy = 1 if a sample deal includes at least one financial 
advisor counselling the acquirer and the probability of FA-
presence exceeds the cut-off point (a-priori probability of FA 
use), and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
OEP 
Dummy = 1 if a sample deal includes an EP and the 
probability of EP-financing exceeds the cut-off point (a-priori 
probability of EP use), and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
OEPFA 
Dummy = 1 if a sample deal includes an EP along with at least 
a one FA, counselling the acquirer, and the probability of 
EPFA-occurrence (joint presence of EPs and FAs) exceeds the 
cut-off point (a-priori probability of EPFA-presence), and = 0 
otherwise. 
SDC 
Private (PRV) Dummy = 1 if target is private, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Public (PBL) Dummy = 1 if target is publicly traded, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Relative Size (RS) Ratio of DV to MV. 
SDC & 
Datastream 
Relative earnout value (REAV) Ratio of EAV to DV SDC 
Same Industry (SAMEIND) 
Dummy = 1 when acquirer and target share the same two-
digit SIC code and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
STOCK 
Dummy = 1 when payment is 100% stock exchange, and = 0 
otherwise. 
SDC 
Subsidiary (SUB) 
Dummy = 1 if target is a subsidiary institution, and = 0 
otherwise. 
SDC 
THT 
Dummy = 1 if target is belongs to the High-Tec industry, and 
= 0 otherwise 
SDC 
TCPAS 
Dummy = 1 if target is belongs to the Consumer Products and 
Services industry, and = 0 otherwise 
SDC 
Unlisted (UNL) Dummy = 1 if target is not a listed firm, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
 
Note: The table defines the variables used in the empirical analysis and indicates the data source used. SDC denotes the 
Thomson-Reuters SDC ONE Banker database. Regarding the use of dummy variables, a sample observation without the 
value of 1 has the value of 0. AGE, MV, DV, MTBV, REAV, RS and DEBT are log transformed in subsequent regressions. 
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Appendix 3.2: Financial Advisor Ranking by Transaction Value 
 
Financial Advisor 
ALL deals Earnout-financed deals only Non-earnout-financed deals only 
Aggregate DV No of Deals Aggregate DV No of Deals Aggregate DV No of Deals 
Goldman Sachs 360,568.83 39 0 0 360,568.83 39 
S. G. Warburg & Co 235,151.20 28 1,098.89 3 234,052.31 25 
UBS 70,658.60 71 274.16 8 70,384.44 63 
Morgan Stanley 59,053.71 36 0 0 59,053.71 36 
Lazard 52,199.04 92 1,801.34 6 50,397.70 86 
Hoare Govett 50,404.21 139 4,208.37 15 46,195.84 124 
Merrill Lynch 45,613.73 40 531.26 2 45,082.47 38 
Rothschild 36,938.50 111 97.87 5 36,840.63 106 
Schroders 27,116.26 103 647.95 10 26,468.31 93 
SBC 26,816.26 16 117.50 3 26,698.76 13 
Credit Suisse 23,866.27 34 1,665.15 1 22,201.12 33 
Dresdner Kleinwort 23,493.19 51 447.97 7 23,045.22 44 
JP Morgan 21,033.91 29 1,650.61 2 19,383.30 27 
Deutsche Bank 18,958.87 38 750.81 5 18,208.06 33 
Cazenove Inc 17,069.71 40 610.50 5 16,459.21 35 
Natwest 16,371.37 27 102.04 3 16,269.33 24 
ABN AMRO 16,210.31 25 849.90 5 15,360.41 20 
HSBC 15,123.58 42 410.17 8 14,713.41 34 
Societe Generale 14,804.49 60 123.04 3 14,681.45 57 
Citigroup 13,545.02 28 1,562.36 2 11,982.66 26 
Barclays 12,112.27 52 316.69 10 11,795.58 42 
Ernst & Young 11,910.91 39 207.81 8 11,703.10 31 
Lehman Brothers 9,418.34 21 0 0 9,418.34 21 
Kleinwort Benson 7,715.21 56 177.88 7 7,537.33 49 
KPMG 7,279.44 126 602.04 29 6,677.40 97 
Morgan Grenfell & Co 6,808.90 25 1,082.53 2 5,726.37 23 
PWC 6,153.45 61 2,370.88 13 3,782.57 48 
Salomon Brothers 6,042.52 10 0 0 6,042.52 10 
Investec 3,996.47 41 759.18 8 3,237.29 33 
ING 3,306.95 14 110.56 3 3,196.39 11 
Close Brothers 3,289.62 43 196.98 9 3,092.64 34 
Barings 3,125.43 33 66.70 2 3,058.73 31 
Noble Grossart 3,002.70 12 61.15 1 2,941.55 11 
Hambros 2,594.87 58 213.88 8 2,380.99 50 
Hawkpoint Partners 2,444.34 18 91.50 3 2,352.84 15 
Charterhouse 2,370.60 63 131.33 8 2,239.27 55 
Samuel Montagu & Co  2,253.20 29 83.76 5 2,169.44 24 
Robert Fleming 2,205.42 28 18.24 2 2,187.18 26 
Numis 1,979.06 15 214.06 3 1,765.00 12 
Arthur Andersen 1,976.15 16 0 0 1,976.15 16 
KBC 1,662.69 14 32.65 1 1,630.04 13 
Deloitte 1,643.63 27 322.39 10 1,321.24 17 
BDO Stoy Hayward 1,023.26 14 91.39 6 931.87 8 
Altium Capital  748.20 15 269.21 8 478.99 7 
WestLB Panmure  672.38 16 37.81 3 634.57 13 
Coopers & Lybrand 618.09 16 32.71 4 585.38 12 
Collins Stewart  514.09 11 29.02 3 485.07 8 
Guinness Mahon Holdings  452.39 10 1.68 1 450.71 9 
Robert W Baird 388.25 10 149.48 4 238.77 6 
Grant Thornton 286.52 21 96.24 7 190.28 14 
Apax Partners & Co  272.39 10 99.22 3 173.17 7 
Brewin Dolphin 168.32 11 51.73 3 116.59 8 
Beeson Gregory  113.31 11 54.19 5 59.12 6 
All remaining advisory firms 72,801.02 424 1,882.43 67 70,912.59 357 
 
Note: This table presents financial advisory firms involved in at least 10 deals during the period from January 1986 to December 2010 
(inclusive) drawn from the Thomson Financial SDC ONE Banker Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Advisors are sorted based on 
aggregate transaction value in $US million for all deals. The number of deals advised by each advisor is also reported. 
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Chapter 4 
Acquirer Idiosyncratic Volatility and Earnout-Financing 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the impact of the acquiring firm’s information environment on the short-run 
wealth effects of contingent payments (earnouts) in M&A deals. Our results suggest that the well-
documented superior acquirer gains in deals financed with earnouts, relative to deals financed with single 
up-front payment methods, do not persist under increased idiosyncratic volatility in the acquiring firm’s 
equity value. In contrast, under low idiosyncratic volatility the above effect reverses. We argue that under 
increased information asymmetry over the acquiring firm, the market’s reaction to an earnout-financed 
deal mainly reflects its inference that the acquirer’s stock is underpriced, rather than the deal’s synergy 
potential. In contrast, the selection of earnouts by big acquirers with low information asymmetry sends a 
strong signal for value creation that also prevents market participants from inducing a size-related 
discount. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Asymmetric information between the involved firms in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) 
generates valuation risk when negotiating the price and payment method.
1
 Nevertheless, not all 
acquiring firms can equally afford to absorb such a risk under the presence of substantial 
valuation disagreements over the outcome of the concentration. As a result, small acquirers 
frequently finance valuation-complex M&As
2
 with contingent earnout contracts (ECs), 
effectively ‘bridging the gap’ in the implied disaccords over the deal’s intrinsic value (Kohers 
and Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012).
3
 However, as small firms are also likely to 
be characterized by increased idiosyncratic risk (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu, 2001), their 
heightened sensitivity to unsystematic factors renders firm-specific information more valuable. 
Therefore, asymmetric information also exists between acquirers’ managers and outside 
investors. As takeovers are widely followed and reported, the release of information during their 
announcement reduces information asymmetry and enables market participants to better assess 
the acquiring firm’s true value and growth prospects. Accordingly, acquirers’ announcement 
period abnormal equity gains should represent ‘the economic benefit of the acquisition for the 
shareholders of the acquiring firm together with the stock-price impact of other information 
released or inferred by investors when firms make acquisition announcements’ (Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004) (p.202).  
Despite the increased potential for synergy realization characterizing EC-financed deals, 
little attention has been paid to the effect of the release of acquirer-specific information during 
their announcement. Consequently, our narrow understanding on the workings of ECs, 
particularly in the presence of substantial asymmetric information over the acquiring firm, 
warrants a profound investigation and motivates the focus of this study. Accordingly, we ask the 
following question: How influential is the information environment of the acquiring firm, 
                                                          
1 The managers of merging firms may have access to superior information about the valuations of the firms they manage and 
their growth prospects, which gives rise to adverse selection. The (unobserved) efforts of the merging firms’ managers towards 
the maximization of the outcome of the merger give rise to moral hazard. Leading research in this field includes Coase (1937), 
Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973), Alchian, Crawford and Klein (1978), Williamson (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1986). Within 
the M&A context, Chang (1998) investigates of the effects of information asymmetry on the selection of  financing currency. 
2
 Such deals mainly involve unlisted (private or subsidiary) target firms operating in intangible-rich sectors such as the High-
Technology and other services-based industries (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Cain, Denis and Denis, 2011).  
3 EC-financing involves a two-stage payment structure: an up-front payment in the form of cash, stock, or mixture of several 
payments and one future (deferred) payment (usually in cash) that is conditional on the target firm achieving pre-specified and 
pre-agreed performance related goals, such as cash flows, sales, pre-tax income, gross profits and net income. Their measurement 
predominantly occurs annually followed by semi-annual and quarterly measurements (Cain, Denis and Denis, 2011).  
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relative to the deal’s synergy prospects, in shaping acquirers’ announcement period abnormal 
equity gains at the announcement of EC-financed deals? 
The answer to this question is important for several reasons. First, it contributes to 
current literature by drawing attention to the acquiring firm and analyzing how acquirer-specific 
information asymmetry, proxied by the firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility (sigma), 
affects the well-documented superior gains enjoyed by EC acquirers’ shareholders.4 To this end, 
controlling for firm-specific volatility is important ‘as events affect individual stocks and the 
statistical significance of abnormal event-related returns is determined by the volatility of 
individual stock returns relative to the market or industry’ (Campbell et al. (1997), Chapter 4). 
Accordingly, as an accurate proxy for information asymmetry over a publicly traded firm 
(Dierkens, 1991; Moeller et al., 2007), we establish a link between EC-financing and the 
acquiring firm’s sigma.5 In so doing, controlling for sigma enables us to account, to a great 
extent, for the release of acquirer-specific information during the announcement of an EC-
financed deal.  
Second, the process of this investigation enables us to broaden our insights on the 
dynamics involved in the formation of an EC-deal’s market reaction. Specifically, as increased 
information asymmetry may signal misvaluation, examining the distribution of acquirers’ 
announcement period abnormal returns across high and low sigma enables us to extend the 
findings of Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) and determine the extent of such 
considerations within the EC portfolio. Similarly, as high (low) sigma acquirers are likely to be 
small (big) firms (Campbell et al., 2001), investigating the wealth effects generated by EC-
financing across high and low sigma also allows us to extend the findings of Moeller et al. 
(2004) and examine the potential presence of a size effect within the EC portfolio.
6
  
This paper utilizes a large sample of completed US M&A deals covering the period from 
January 1986 to December 2012 (inclusive). Initially, we perform a standard univariate analysis 
                                                          
4
 Empirical evidence (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Cain et al., 2011; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012) illustrates that acquirers’ 
shareholders experience significantly greater abnormal returns at the announcement of an EC-financed deal, relative to deals 
financed with single up-front payments.  
5 Moeller et al. (2007) illustrate the superiority of sigma as an accurate proxy for information asymmetry, relative to alternative 
information asymmetry proxies (standard deviation of the earnings announcement abnormal return) or relative to diversity of 
opinion proxies (dispersion of analyst forecasts and breadth of ownership).  
6 Moeller et al. (2004) identify the presence of a size effect in acquirers’ abnormal returns resulting in small firms gaining more 
from corporate takeover announcements than large firms. 
87 
 
of acquirers’ announcement period abnormal returns. This involves comparing the market-
adjusted announcement period returns of acquirers involved in EC-financed acquisitions, relative 
to counterparts financed with single up-front payments. The analysis is further expanded by 
categorizing the differences in abnormal returns by the acquiring firm’s sigma (high vs low) and 
the target firms’ listing status (private, public and subsidiary). To deal with self-selection 
concerns that may bias our univariate results, the next stage of our analysis comprises the 
utilization of the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology. PSM allows for an unbiased 
causal inference by pairing treated (EC-financed deals) and comparison (non-EC financed deals) 
sample units based on observable pre-treatment characteristics and examining differences in 
announcement period abnormal returns as the response random variable (Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002). Moreover, in order to avoid the negative effects of potential hidden variable bias in our 
propensity score estimators (logit models for EC-use), the Rosenbaum-bounds methodology is 
also utilized as a robustness check (Rosenbaum, 2002). In addition, by including sigma in the 
propensity score estimators of all our PSM sequences (all deals, high acquirer sigma deals and 
low acquirer sigma deals) we are able to match treated deals to control counterfactuals consisted 
of acquirers exhibiting a similar information environment. This enables us to derive, to a great 
extent, the earnout-specific wealth effect on acquirers’ short-run gains. Finally, the last stage of 
this study consists of a multiple regression analysis of acquirers’ short-run abnormal returns, 
while controlling for the impact of several transaction- and merging institution- specific features. 
The main findings of our analysis illustrate EC acquirers exhibiting the highest sigma, on 
average, relative to acquirers utilizing single up-front payments. When examining the likely 
exposure of EC acquirers to misvaluation considerations we find that, at the time of the deal’s 
announcement, EC acquirers exhibit the lowest levels of firm-specific and sector valuation 
errors, compared to acquirers using single up-front payment methods. The above observation 
persists within all deals, as well as within high and low acquirer sigma deals. Regarding the 
distribution of announcement period abnormal returns, our results indicate that high sigma 
acquirers do not enjoy significantly greater gains when financing M&As with ECs, relative to 
single up-front payment methods. Moreover, under high acquirer sigma, EC-financed deals 
significantly underperform their control non-EC counterfactuals, identified via PSM. In contrast, 
under low acquirer sigma, EC-financed deals significantly outperform their control non-EC 
counterfactuals, identified via PSM. When examining the likely exposure of EC acquirers to size 
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effect considerations we find that their shareholders enjoy positive equally-weighted and value-
weighted announcement period average abnormal returns, irrespective of firm size. In contrast, 
acquirers not using ECs experience losses during M&A announcements as their size increases. 
The above results on the effect of the acquiring firm’s information environment on EC acquirers’ 
short-run wealth gains persist within a multivariate framework, while controlling for other 
factors shaping the market’s reaction. 
This paper makes a significant contribution to current literature by identifying a strong 
interaction between sigma and EC-financing determining the short-run wealth gains accrued to 
the acquiring firms’ shareholders. In so doing it is the first to explore the effects of the acquiring 
firm’s information environment in EC-financed deals. Specifically, we show that the well-
documented superior acquirer gains in deals financed with ECs, relative to deals financed with 
single up-front payment methods, do not persist under increased idiosyncratic volatility in the 
acquiring firm’s equity value. In so doing, we extend the findings Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) and 
report a relative undervaluation of EC acquirers’ market value of equity, when compared to that 
of acquirers using single up-front payments. Moreover, we extend Moeller et al. (2004) and 
illustrate the limited exposure of EC-financed deals involving big acquirers to a size effect.  
Thus, consistent with Chang (1998), our results suggest that the selection of ECs by small 
acquirers with high information asymmetry in M&As of, mainly, private targets may also serve 
their managers’ unwillingness to finance valuation-complex deals with undervalued equity. In so 
doing high sigma EC acquirers experience a significant announcement period wealth gain, yet 
not statistically superior than that experienced by high sigma firms also acquiring private targets 
with single up-front payments. We argue that this is due to the prevalence of the release of 
acquirer-specific information, which induces an upwards reassessment of the firm’s equity value 
as the market infers that it may be undervalued. In contrast, big acquirers with low information 
asymmetry benefit more from the use of ECs, than from the use of single up-front payments. As 
acquirer-specific information release is expected to be less substantial under low sigma, we argue 
that this is due to the prevalence of the deal’s increased synergy potential, which is heightened 
due to the use of ECs and priced favorably. To this end, the adverse selection and moral hazard 
mitigating properties of this contingent payment method send a strong signal for value creation 
that prevents market participants from inducing a size-related discount.   
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates and presents 
our testable hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the methods used to conduct the empirical analysis. 
Section 4 provides a description of the data employed, as well as illustrates the empirical results 
and discusses the main findings. Finally, Section 5 provides a conclusion. 
4.2. Theoretical Framework and Testable Hypotheses 
As a major parameter highly correlated with the choice of method of payment that influences the 
market’s perception of an announced acquisition, the degree of asymmetric information 
surrounding a deal generates valuation risk as each side speculates about the other side’s true 
value. In shaping the form and size of the transaction currency, information asymmetry can lead 
an acquirer to buy a “lemon”, as mentioned by Akerlof (1970), but it can also lead a target to be 
acquired at a discount. The lack of observables results in acquiring firms trying to mitigate the 
negative effects of valuation uncertainty on a deal’s likelihood of success through numerous 
ways, closely related to the method of payment. Nevertheless, single up-front payment 
methods may not be optimal in dealing with substantial disagreements over the 
acquisition’s intrinsic value. Similarly, Fishman (1989) argues that in the presence of large 
disagreement between the merging parties, a single up-front payment of, for example, cash 
may not be an optimal contract design.  
To this end, Kohers and Ang (2000) for the US, as well as Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam 
(2012) for the UK, illustrate the usefulness of ECs in deals involving small acquirers of targets 
that are subject to severe valuation risk, such as unlisted (private and subsidiary) firms, or firms 
operating in intangible-rich sectors. The valuation of such companies is difficult to estimate pre-
merger, as it is often dependent on the flair, creativity and skill of key personnel. The above give 
rise to valuation risk and, eventually, more scope for negotiation as substantial valuation 
disagreements emerge during the deal’s process. Similarly, Reuer, Shenkar and Ragozzino 
(2004) indicate that the likelihood of EC-use increases with the uncertainty faced by the bidding 
firm concerning the target’s value. Accordingly, the vast majority of studies on ECs indicate that 
bidders enjoy significant gains from corporate takeovers when utilizing deferred payments. 
Within the UK, Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) demonstrate that bidders using ECs 
generate significantly higher announcement period and post-acquisition value gains for their 
shareholders than bidders using non-EC currencies. The above relation is further depicted to hold 
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for correctly classified EC-occurrences, based on logit models predicting ‘optimal’ EC-use.7 
Nevertheless, asymmetric information also exists between acquirers and outside 
investors. Specifically, acquirers’ managers and market participants do not possess identical 
information sets over the acquiring firm. Evidently, the former know more about its true value 
and growth prospects than the latter. To this end, the extent of information asymmetry is 
expected to be more severe when acquirers consist of small firms, for which the available 
information is limited and, hence, their perceived risk is greater (Banz, 1981). Similarly, 
Campbell et al. (2001) illustrate the increased idiosyncratic risk characterizing small firms. 
Assuming that acquirers’ managers and outside investors are equally well informed about non-
firm-specific factors (i.e. they both bear the same market-wide uncertainty) the above suggest 
that the firm-specific information held by acquirers’ managers will be eventually transferred to 
the market either through the passage of time, or through some information releasing event 
(Dierkens, 1991). Until that time, the market bears some firm-specific uncertainty.
8
 
 Due to their considerable transaction size that usually guarantees excess media coverage, 
M&A announcements result in the release of a significant load of information and attract the 
attention of market participants. Assuming that the capital markets’ assessment is unbiased, the 
announcement period abnormal returns accrued to acquirers’ shareholders should reflect the 
release of information regarding the acquiring firm and/or the deal’s expected economic benefit 
(Moeller et al. 2004). Similarly, Draper and Paudyal (2008) document that undervalued firms 
with greater information asymmetry enjoy greater announcement period abnormal returns as a 
result of acquirer-related information dissemination, revelation of expected synergies, or both. 
In the case of public firms, that dominate the portfolio of acquirers in the vast majority of 
M&A studies, the acquiring firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility constitutes a reliable 
observable reflecting the extent of information asymmetry between managers and outside 
investors. Specifically, Dierkens (1991) explores the relation between sigma and abnormal 
returns for new equity issues explicitly relating the former to the information environment of the 
                                                          
7 Limited evidence is also provided considering the effect of EC-financing in crossborder M&As. Mantecon (2009), examines 
alternative methods of valuation uncertainty avoidance and indicates that EC use benefits predominantly domestic bidders, 
yielding positive announcement period abnormal returns. 
8 Information asymmetry corresponds to only a subset of the total uncertainty about the firm, as the managers of the firm and the 
market are likely to be equally well informed about market-wide variables influencing its value (Dierkens, 1991). 
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firm. Information asymmetry, proxied among others by the firm’s sigma, is subsequently 
presented to be significantly determining new issue outcomes. Similarly, Moeller et al. (2007) 
test information asymmetry models inspired by Myers and Majluf (1984) and put forward by 
Travlos (1987). The authors illustrate the superiority of sigma as an accurate proxy for 
information asymmetry that significantly interacts with the method of payment and the listing 
status of the target firm in shaping the announcement period wealth gains accrued to acquirers’ 
shareholders.
9
 
Accordingly, if deals financed with ECs offer a greater potential for value creation than 
deals financed with single up-front payments, acquirers’ shareholders should enjoy greater 
announcement period abnormal returns, regardless of the release of acquirer-specific 
information. Evidently, the impact of such dissemination should be greater in deals characterized 
by high acquirer sigma in which there is more information asymmetry between acquirers’ 
managers and outside investors (Moeller et al., 2007). Therefore, the above suggest that high 
sigma acquirers should enjoy greater short-run abnormal returns when announcing EC-financed 
deals, relative to deals financed with single up-front payments. Similarly, low sigma acquirers 
should also enjoy greater short-run abnormal returns when announcing EC-financed deals, 
relative to deals financed with single up-front payments. Our first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: EC-financed deals outperform deals financed with single up-front payments under both high 
and low acquirer sigma. 
In contrast, if the market’s reaction to the announcement of EC-financed deals is sensitive 
to the release of acquirer-specific information, the comparative performance of EC-financed 
deals to non-EC financed deals should differ across high and low sigma. Specifically, high sigma 
acquirers should not enjoy greater short-run abnormal returns when announcing EC-financed 
deals, relative to deals financed with single up-front payments. As increased asymmetric 
information over small acquiring firms is likely to imply undervaluation, the above suggest that 
the selection of this contingent financing method by high sigma acquirers may also serve their 
                                                          
9
 Similarly, Pastor and Veronesi (2003) illustrate the positive relation between a firm’s sigma and uncertainty about average 
profitability as well as the idiosyncratic volatility of profitability. Irvine and Pontiff (2009), attribute the recent rise in sigma to 
increased economy-wide competition resulting in firms enjoying less market power. Lastly, Jiang et al. (2008) illustrate that high 
sigma firms tend to have poor information disclosure leading to more heterogeneous beliefs among investors. 
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managers’ unwillingness to mitigate the inherent valuation risk with underpriced equity.10 
Hence, the deal is financed with the most similar contingent alternative. As the vast majority of 
EC-financed deals involve private targets, the market infers that equity is worth more than its 
market value and reacts favorably, yet not more favorably relative to similar M&As financed 
with single up-front payments such as cash, or stock, in which the market would also infer that 
the acquirer’s stock is undervalued. Our second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: EC-financed deals do not outperform deals financed with single up-front payment 
currencies under high acquirer sigma. 
4.3. Methods 
In this sub-section the methodologies used to test the aforementioned hypotheses and derive the 
main results of the paper are discussed. Methods for calculating abnormal returns around M&A 
announcements are, therefore, presented. Subsequently, the univariate and multivariate methods 
of analysis are outlined along with the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Rosenbaum 
Bounds (RB) techniques. 
4.3.1. Measurement of Abnormal Returns and Univariate Analysis 
The commonly used method in estimating abnormal returns in response to an event requires long 
estimation period return series that are free from the effect of the event under analysis. 
Nevertheless, the current sample is composed of many takeovers announced by the same firm 
within a small period of time. Therefore, such method cannot be applied. Alternatively, in line 
with numerous studies with similar characteristics (Fuller et al., 2002; Faccio et al., 2006) the 
announcement period abnormal returns accrued to the acquiring firms’ shareholders are 
estimated using the market-adjusted model (equation 1):  
 ARi,t = Ri,t − Rm,t          (1) 
Where:  ARi,t  is the abnormal return to acquirer i on day t, Ri,t is the stock return on 
firm/acquirer i on day t, Rm,t is the value-weighted market return index on day t (TOTMKUS). 
                                                          
10 The use of stock, as an acquisition currency, may also not be a favorable option for the acquiring side as it can result in an 
unwanted by the bidding firm’s shareholders dilution of ownership structure (Amihud, Lev and Travlos. 1990). 
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The announcement period cumulative excess return is the sum of the abnormal returns in the 5-
day window (t-2 to t+2) surrounding the announcement day. t=0, as outlined in equation 2: 
CARi = ∑ ARi,t
t+2
t−2
             (2) 
At first, the announcement period abnormal returns of US acquirers are analyzed by 
method of payment used (ALL, EC, non EC -NEC-, CASH, STOCK) and target listing status 
(private-PRV, public-PUB, subsidiary-SUB). The analysis is further expanded by examining the 
above interactions within high and low sigma. Furthermore, differentials between the gains to 
acquirers using the above payment methods, involving targets of different listing statuses, are 
calculated along with the differentials of the above between high and low sigma. To assess the 
comparative performance of different groups of acquirers, the difference in means is tested using 
the t-test. 
4.3.2. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Rosenbaum-Bounds (RB) 
Observational studies differ from experimental ones in that randomization is not used to assign 
treatment. Within the M&A context, extant literature is concerned with the understanding of 
motives and consequences of several events occurring (treatments) during the deal process by 
examining the acquiring firms’ announcement period abnormal returns as the response random 
variable (outcome). This paper aims to further explore the wealth effects of EC-financing. 
Nevertheless, ECs are used in a small proportion of our large sample of M&A transactions. This 
raises concerns as to whether sample-selection bias reduces the reliability of our derived results, 
or their causal interpretation, from both the univariate and multiple regression analyses. 
Evidently, addressing such concerns is vital in order to clarify the impact of EC-financing on 
acquirers’ short-run wealth gains. Moeller et al. (2004) and Draper and Paudyal (2008) argue that 
the announcement period market reaction of an M&A deal reflects the effects of information 
dissemination regarding the acquiring firm, revelation of expected synergies, or both. It, 
therefore, needs to be determined whether the impact of EC-use on the distribution of acquirers’ 
announcement period abnormal returns also reflects the acquisition’s expected synergy potential, 
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and not solely the effects of acquirer-related release of information. The PSM methodology
11
 can 
help us address these concerns and enhance our understanding of the wealth implications of EC-
financed acquisitions 
Specifically, implementing the PSM methodology allows for an unbiased causal 
inference, by pairing treated (EC-financed) and comparison/control (non-EC financed) sample 
units based on observable pre-treatment characteristics and observing differences between the 
two groups in a response random variable (announcement period CAR) (Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002). In particular, PSM involves matching (treated) deals that exhibit a certain attribute 
(treatment), i.e. EC-financing, to counterfactual deals (controls) that do not exhibit the treatment 
but illustrate the same propensity score (probability) to do so as the treated deals that actually do. 
We employ PSM in three Exercises. In Exercise 1 we match earnout- (EC) to non-earnout- 
(NEC) financed deals within our entire sample of observations. This enables us to address 
potential self-selection concerns and accurately estimate the effect of EC-financing on acquirers’ 
short-run wealth gains, which is now highly likely to be bias-free. Exercise 2 and Exercise 3 of 
our PSM analysis involve matching EC-deals to NEC counterparts within our high sigma group 
of deals (Exercise 2), as well as within our low sigma group of deals (Exercise 3). As our 
propensity score estimators include sigma, performing these matching sequences enables us to 
match EC-deals to counterfactual deals involving acquiring firms with the most similar 
information environment (sigma). Thus, performing Exercises 2 and 3 allows us to capture, to a 
great extent, the expected synergies-related component of the market’s reaction to EC-financed 
M&A announcements, as well as how it varies between high and low sigma. We employ 1-to-1 
nearest neighbor matching with replacement within 1% of Absolute Probability Difference 
(APD). Moreover, as PSM is based on matching relative to each deal’s propensity score to 
exhibit the treatment, and not on each deal’s separate covariate’s effect on the probability of its 
occurrence, we test for covariate balance between treated and control deals once matching is 
complete, as a robustness check. Rosenbaum (1985) illustrates that a two sample t-test among the 
distribution of covariates between the treated and control groups constitutes a sufficient 
diagnostic to determine covariate balance.  
                                                          
11 Behr and Heid (2011) provide a thorough analysis of the PSM methodology along with its application in evaluating the success 
of German bank mergers in the period 1995-2000. An analytic representation of the PSM method can also be found in 
Rosenbaum (2009), Chapter 3, and Chapters 7 to 13. 
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4.3.3. Determinants of Earnout Choice 
The propensity scores used to perform the matching sequence are computed using the logistic 
regression methodology. The logit model estimates the probability of a sample deal being 
financed with an EC conditional upon merging institution- and deal- specific characteristics and 
may be regarded as “predicting” the use of ECs conditional on these characteristics. Therefore, in 
the logit models, our dependent variables assume the value of 1 if a deal is EC-financed (EC) and 
0 otherwise.  
 Current literature on EC-financing illustrates that earnout provisions are most likely to 
be observed in acquisitions of private firms, operating in intangible-rich sectors, or unrelated 
industries and characterized by substantial risk, mainly sourced from adverse selection and moral 
hazard (Kohers and Ang, 2000). Moreover, Mantecon (2009) demonstrates that the probability of 
observing an EC-financed deal is significantly lower when the latter involves a foreign target 
firm, while Datar, Frankel and Wolfson (2001) illustrate that Common Law countries facilitate, 
to a great extent, contractual agreements, thus increasing the likelihood of its use. In addition, 
EC-financing is hypothesized to be implemented by acquirers expecting high value creation from 
the acquisition which leads to the need to capture the acquirer’s growth opportunities as 
measured by its market-to-book ratio (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). Furthermore, as an EC is more 
likely to be implemented in relatively riskier deals than single upfront payment methods (Kohers 
and Ang, 2000; Cain et al., 2011), Fuller et al. (2002) suggest that a deal’s transaction value 
relative to the acquiring firm’s market value prior to the deal’s announcement constitutes an 
adequate measure of the degree of riskiness of the deal. Finally, the acquirer’s debt-to-equity 
ratio (ratio of total debt to common equity) is also included aiming to capture the leverage status 
of the acquiring firm.  
4.3.4. Rosenbaum-Bounds 
Nevertheless, matching based on the observed covariates may leave out potentially unobserved 
covariates and, consequently, treated and control groups would not be comparable. This criticism 
can be dismissed in a randomized experiment, as randomization tends to balance unobserved 
covariates, but it cannot be dismissed in an observational study. In order to formalize such 
arguments, one needs a way of determining the degree to which deals that seem comparable are, 
96 
 
in fact, not comparable (Rosenbaum-bounds method; Rosenbaum, 1987). The RB method 
permits us to examine the sensitivity of our conclusions, derived from matching, to the effect of 
an unobserved covariate from our propensity score estimator (logit model) and enables us to 
measure how influential a confounding (unobserved) covariate needs to be in order to invalidate 
the effect of the treatment on the response random variable (announcement period CAR). 
Specifically, the RB method measures the degree of departure from random assignment of 
treatment, which allows us to gain confidence regarding the validation of our conclusions from 
the matching sequence. To this end, RB is used as a further robustness check to ensure that our 
logit models produce estimates that are free of hidden-bias due to misspecification errors, which 
are likely to appear due to omitted covariates, or to ensure ourselves that our estimates used in 
the matching exercises are not sensitive (or how sensitive they are) to hidden-bias caused by 
omitted covariates in our logit models (Rosenbaum, 2002). 
Specifically, the RB sensitivity analysis illustrates that two deals may in fact not be 
comparable, due to unobserved parameters but, nevertheless, this non-comparison can be 
controlled for, to an extent, by a parameter  Γ ≥  1. Specifically, two deals, i and j, with the 
same observed covariates, 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗, have odds of treatment 
πi
1−πi
 and 
πj
1−πj
 that differ, at most, by a 
multiplier of Γ regarding their probability of receiving the treatment: 
 1
Γ
≤
πi
1−πi
πj
1−πj
≤ Γ     whenever 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗   (3) 
When Γ = 1 in (3) it can be asserted that two matched deals are indeed comparable, while 
values of Γ greater than 1, Γ ≥ 1, indicate the presence of some bias due to failure to control for 
omitted covariates. The RB method is based on examining how such inferences would change. 
Increasing Γ and testing whether the treatment effect (the difference in the outcome variable i.e. 
the acquiring firms’ announcement period CAR between treated and control groups) becomes 
insignificant provides an adequate process to test for the existence and severity of potential 
hidden variable bias. This enables us to deduce the range of possible p-values for a specified Γ 
and estimate the cut-off point of the RB method beyond which the p-values and, hence, the 
treatment effects, become insignificant. Evidently, to ensure that our logit models’ estimates and, 
thus, the estimation of propensities are free of hidden bias due to potentially unobserved 
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covariates, the RB method is utilized proposing the selection of the least exposed to hidden bias 
model.
 12
 
4.3.5. Multiple Regression Analysis  
The impact of sigma on EC-financed deals is further examined within a multivariate framework 
where the effects of several other factors in shaping the announcement period acquirers’ returns 
are simultaneously controlled. Extant literature demonstrates that a number of control variables 
influence acquirers’ value gains. In particular, the following equation is estimated in a nested 
form: 
CARi = a + ∑ Xi
N
i=1
+ ϵi                                                    (4)                    
Where: the intercept, a, accounts for the abnormal returns accrued to acquirers after 
accounting for the effects of all the explanatory variables Xi. The dependent variable, CAR, is 
the five-day announcement period cumulative abnormal return of acquirers. The vector of 
explanatory variables, X, includes a number of factors that are known to affect acquirers’ gains. 
Such factors consist of: 
Earnout as a method of payment (EC): Previous research indicates that EC-financed 
acquisitions generate greater acquirer announcement period abnormal returns when financed 
with an EC (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012). Therefore to account 
for the potential implications of the occurrence of an EC on acquirers’ gains, a variable taking 
the value of one when an earnout provision is included in the transaction value and zero 
otherwise is included in equation (4). 
Acquirer’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility (SIGMA): Moeller et al. (2007) illustrate 
the significance of a firm’s sigma in shaping the distribution of announcement period abnormal 
returns accrued to the acquiring firms’ shareholders. As in Moeller et al. (2007) we estimate 
                                                          
12
 An alternative method to assess the extent of selection bias within our results would be to conduct a Heckman two-stage 
correction method (Heckman, 1979). Nevertheless, our sample of M&A deals is composed, to a large extent, of deals involving 
private targets for which public information on observed lagged variables, which are frequently used as instruments in such 
methods, is very limited. Thus the use of the PSM technique is preferred. Moreover, to account for the potential effect of 
unobserved covariates, the Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis is implemented.  
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sigma as the standard deviation of the residuals from a market model regression estimated from 
205 days before the announcement to six days before the announcement of the deal. We use 
Datastream’s total market index for the US (TOTMKUS) in order to run the estimation.  
Moreover, in order to reduce the effect of possible spurious outliers in sigma we winsorize 0.1% 
of its distribution and include it in equation (4). 
Acquirer’s age (AGE): Information asymmetry between the merging firms influences 
heavily the announcement period returns accrued to acquirers’ shareholders. Zhang (2006) 
suggests that investors tend to have more information on firms with longer trading history which 
results in lower information asymmetry. Therefore the age of the acquirer (measured by the log 
of number of days between the announcement day and the first record of the company in 
Datastream) is included in equation (4). 
Relative size of the deal (RS): Current literature (Fuller et al., 2002) depicts that 
acquirers’ gains are positively related to the relative size of the deal (measured as the log of the 
deal value over the market value of the acquirer). Therefore, the log-transformed relative size of 
the deal is included in equation (4).  
Target’s domicile (CBA): Domestic and international deals have been illustrated to be 
affecting the acquiring firm’s short-run value gains (Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes, 2005). 
Domestic acquisitions can be perceived as less risky than crossborder acquisitions as there is less 
information asymmetry regarding the target firm, especially in those cases where the latter is a 
listed firm. Therefore, in order to control for the effect of international deals and how they affect 
acquirer returns, a dummy variable that equals one when acquirer and target reside in different 
countries, and zero otherwise, is included in equation (4). 
Additional indicator variables: Extant literature has illustrated the influence exercised by 
the target firm’s listing status on the distribution of announcement period abnormal returns 
accrued to the acquiring firm’s shareholders (Travlos, 1987; Hansen, 1987; Chang, 1998). A 
dummy variable is hence, created for those cases where the acquired firm is unlisted (UNL). 
Finally, key financial ratios of the acquiring firm such as the latter’s market-to-book value 
(MTBV), the  ratio of total cash and cash equivalents to its total assets (CASH_RATIO) and the 
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ratio of total debt to common equity (DEBT) signal information about the bidder’s growth 
prospects, liquidity and leverage status respectively. Therefore, they are included in equation (4).  
4.4. Data and Results 
4.4.1. The Sample 
The sample consists of completed M&A deals announced by US public firms between 
01/01/1986 and 31/12/2012 and recorded by the Security Data Corporation (SDC). In order for 
a deal to remain in the sample, it must meet the following criteria: first, the acquirer is a US 
public firm and has a market value of at least $1m, measured four weeks prior to the 
announcement of the deal. To avoid the insignificant effects of very small deals, the transaction 
value needs to be at least $1m. To ensure that the acquirer enjoys control of the target, only 
acquisitions of at least 50 percent of the target’s equity are included in the sample. Targets of all 
listings (public, private and subsidiary) and domicile (US or non-US) are included in the 
sample. To avoid the confounding effects of multiple deals, deals announced within 5-
days surrounding another deal by the same acquirer are excluded. Furthermore, the daily stock 
price and market value of the acquirer need to be available from Datastream. Buybacks 
and repurchases are excluded from the sample. Cases where either acquirer or target firms 
belong to the government are excluded from the sample. Finally, considering the method of 
financing the acquisition, the percentage of unknown, provided by SDC, must be less than 
100% so that the sum of cash, stock and other payments equals 100%. The above criteria are 
satisfied by 15,384 deals, 1,140 of which are EC-financed, and remain in the sample 
4.4.2. Sample Characteristics 
Table 1 provides information on acquirer, target and deal characteristics for our sample. 
Consistent with previous studies on the US takeover market (Moeller et al., 2004), Panel A 
demonstrates that the majority of US M&A deals is composed of acquisitions of unlisted firms 
(private and subsidiary targets account for 47.16% and 27.02% respectively). Considering the 
acquisitions’ financing currencies, cash payments dominate their distribution, accounting for 
41.37% of their frequency, while EC-financing represents 7.41% of all payment methods.  
Consistent with previous literature on EC-financing (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Cain et al., 
2011), it can be observed, in Panel A, that almost 98% of all EC-financed deals consist of 
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acquisitions of private and subsidiary firms, accounting for 74.56% and 24.04% respectively. 
Moreover, relative to non-EC (NEC) deals, EC-financed deals are depicted to be involving more 
targets operating in intangible-rich sectors (51.93% in EC-deals compared to 39.68% in NEC-
deals). In addition, EC-deals appear to be much smaller in transaction value, on average, when 
compared to NEC-financed deals ($133.58 mil. in EC-deals compared to $454.18 mil. in NEC-
deals). Nevertheless, the median value of the relative size of EC-deals is greater (8.62 vs 7.58), 
indicating the increased risk faced by acquirers in such M&A transactions (Fuller, et al., 2002). 
Finally, targets operating in a Common Law legal framework dominate the group of EC-deals, 
reaching almost 95% of total observations, while crossborder EC-deals account for merely 
14.21% of all EC-deals. The above findings are in line with current literature on EC-financing 
(Kohers and Ang, 2000; Mantecon, 2009; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012) indicating the 
applicability of this payment option in risky M&A deals involving mainly domestic unlisted 
firms, operating in intangible-rich sectors.  
 (Insert Table 4.1 about here) 
Panel B exhibits mean and median acquirer characteristics for our sample. Consistent 
with current literature on EC-financing, relative to their NEC counterparts, EC acquirers consist, 
on average, of small firms ($4,012m vs $6,887m respectively). As a first indication of their 
expected increased levels of information asymmetry, EC acquirers exhibit the second lowest 
average number of trading days, following acquirers utilizing stock (Zhang, 2006; Draper and 
Paudyal, 2008). As more robust evidence, EC acquirers are characterized by the greatest levels 
of sigma in both mean and median terms (3.24% and 2.75%, respectively). We proceed to sort all 
deals by sigma and classify the top one third of deals as HIGH SIGMA and the bottom one third 
as LOW SIGMA. Reported statistics illustrate that nearly 45% of all ECs are employed by high 
sigma acquirers.  
A firm’s sigma has been portrayed as an accurate indicator of the extent of information 
asymmetry between the management and outside investors (Dierkens, 1991). Nevertheless, when 
leverage increases, stockholders bear a greater share of the total risk of the firm and the volatility 
of the stock return increases. Similarly, Myers (1977) illustrates that firm leverage affects 
investment decisions due to debt overhang considerations. As illustrated in Panel B of Table I, 
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EC acquirers exhibit the lowest debt-to-equity ratio when compared to acquirers utilizing single 
up-front payment methods. Furthermore, EC acquirers exhibit a higher cash ratio, relative to 
NEC acquirers. The latter provide evidence suggesting that concerns regarding the acquiring 
firm’s leverage and liquidity status are not likely to be substantial within our portfolio of EC-
financed deals. 
Reported statistics also demonstrate that, relative to acquiring firms utilizing single up-
front payments, EC acquirers are characterized, on average, by the lowest market-to-book ratio 
and experience the highest announcement period average CAR (1.85% for the EC portfolio vs 
1.06% for the NEC portfolio). Draper and Paudyal (2008) argue that undervalued firms with 
greater information asymmetry enjoy higher announcement period returns at the announcement 
of an M&A transaction as a result of information dissemination, revelation of expected 
synergies, or both. Therefore, in order to examine the likely exposure of our EC portfolio of 
deals to misvaluation considerations we follow the methodology offered by Rhodes-Kropf, et al. 
(2005). Specifically, we break acquirers’ market-to-book ratio (MTBV) into three misvaluation 
components: the firm-specific pricing deviation from short-run industry pricing, the sector-wide 
short-run pricing deviation from long-run pricing and the long-run pricing deviation from book 
value. In so doing, we gather fiscal year-end accounting data from Datastream on book value, net 
income, and leverage for all firms listed in the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ indexes and match 
them with their market values three months after. Subsequently, we perform the decomposition 
for all firms within each of the twelve Fama and French industries as of the fiscal year-end of 
each year within our sample range. Afterwards, we calculate the misvaluation components and 
associate them with the acquiring firms of our SDC announcements as long as the latter occur at 
least one month after the date for which we have obtained the (acquiring) firm’s market value. 
Alternatively, we associate the announcements with the previous year’s estimations.13 
(Insert Table 4.2 about here) 
Table 2 illustrates the output of our decomposition process. Consistent with the findings 
of Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), our results for all deals (Panel A) suggest that acquirers within our 
sample are characterized by a positive firm specific misvaluation (0.13), which is greater than the 
                                                          
13 Due to data unavailability issues on firms’ book value, net income and leverage, which are used in order to perform the 
decomposition, 7,587 deals of our sample are included in the analysis.  
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sector-wide deviation from long-run value (0.10), yet smaller than the long-run deviation from 
book value (0.48). Nevertheless, the portfolio consisted of EC-deals exhibits the lowest average 
and median values of firm-specific and sector-related misvaluation, relative to the portfolio 
consisted of single up-front payments across all deals (Panel A), as well as across high (Panel B) 
and low (Panel C) acquirer sigma deals. Specifically, high sigma EC acquirers exhibit a lower 
firm-specific misvaluation component (0.07) than low sigma EC acquirers (0.10) which is, 
nevertheless, still lower than that of low sigma NEC acquirers (0.12). Thus, EC acquirers appear 
to be undervalued, relative to acquirers fully financing the transaction consideration during the 
announcement period. Moreover, based on the discussion offered by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), 
the greater average long-run pricing deviation from book value, characterizing the EC portfolio, 
indicates that firms engaging in EC-financed deals are likely to possess increased growth 
opportunities. Noticeably, such growth opportunities appear to be greater for low sigma EC 
acquirers, than for high sigma EC acquirers.  
4.4.3. Univariate Analysis of Acquirers’ Abnormal Returns  
In Table 3, the findings from our univariate analysis are presented according to the method of 
payment and the target firm’s listing status for all deals (Panel A), deals under high acquirer 
sigma (Panel B) and deals under low acquirer sigma (Panel C). Differentials between the value 
gains accrued to acquirers from deals financed with ECs versus different NEC currencies are 
recorded within panels A to C, while Panel D records differentials of acquirers’ value gains 
between high and low acquirer sigma.  
Consistent with earlier studies on EC-financing (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos and 
Sudarsanam, 2012), Panel A shows that acquirers utilizing this contingent payment method enjoy 
the highest abnormal returns, on average, relative to acquirers utilizing NEC payment currencies. 
Extending the well-documented evidence regarding the suitability of EC-financing in deals 
subject to substantial valuation risk, i.e. involving private targets, EC-financed M&As are 
illustrated to significantly outperform their CASH-financed counterparts by 0.88%. Moreover, in 
line with information asymmetry models (Moeller et al., 2007), Panel B illustrates that high 
sigma stock acquirers of public targets suffer significant losses. In contrast, high sigma acquirers 
of private and subsidiary targets and high sigma cash acquirers of public targets enjoy significant 
gains during the announcement of the deal.  
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(Insert Table 4.3 about here) 
Panels B and C further demonstrate that the aforementioned higher performance of EC-
financed deals, relative to their NEC counterparts, is shaped by deals characterized by low 
acquirer sigma. Consistent with Hypothesis H2, under high sigma (Panel B), EC-financed deals 
do not generate significantly greater acquirer gains, relative to their NEC, CASH and STOCK 
counterparts. Specifically, our results convey that under high acquirer sigma the well-
documented superior performance of EC-financing over single up-front payment currencies 
becomes negligible. Similarly, employing ECs in deals subject to increased valuation risk (i.e. 
involving private targets) does not significantly benefit acquirers’ shareholders, relative to 
employing cash or stock payments. Therefore, the short-run wealth effect of an EC-financed 
takeover by a high sigma acquirer, particularly when involving a private target, appears to be 
shaped, to a great extent, by the release of information over the acquiring firm’s relatively 
underpriced equity (Table 2, Panel B). The latter causes a positive market reaction, which 
matches that of similar cases in which the market would also infer that the acquirer’s equity is 
undervalued, such as cash- or stock- financed deals involving private targets.  
 On the other hand, under low acquirer sigma (Panel C), EC-financed takeovers 
outperform their NEC counterparts by 1.08%, significant at 1%. Furthermore, under low sigma, 
EC-financed acquisitions of private targets significantly outperform their CASH and STOCK 
counterparts by 0.84% and 0.75%, respectively. Evidently, the suitability of EC-financing in 
M&A deals exposing the acquirer to substantial valuation risk, i.e. involving private targets, 
appears to be sourcing from deals whose acquirer-specific information release is not expected to 
be substantial. Specifically, our results suggest that relative to its most commonly used 
alternative risk-mitigating payment method when involving private targets (stock), EC-financing 
significantly enhances acquirers’ gains under low information asymmetry over the acquiring 
firm. The above suggest that the market acknowledges the deal’s increased synergy prospects 
and reacts significantly more favorably. To this end, the risk-mitigating properties of this 
contingent financing method, in addition to the likely increased growth opportunities 
characterizing the acquiring firm (Table 2, Panel C), enhance the market’s perception of the 
announced takeover resulting in greater acquirer gains.  
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Panel D exhibits differences in average portfolio abnormal returns between deals 
involving high and low sigma acquirers. It can be observed that unlisted target deals, regardless 
of payment method, and cash-financed public target deals generate greater announcement period 
returns for high sigma acquirers than for low sigma acquirers.  The above reflect the effect of the 
release of information, causing the market to infer that the acquiring firm’s equity is 
undervalued.  Nevertheless, our results suggest that high sigma acquirers do not benefit more 
from the use of ECs, relative to low sigma acquirers. Similarly, EC-financed deals involving 
private targets do not generate greater returns for high sigma acquirers, than for low sigma 
acquirers. It is therefore likely that the positive wealth effect associated with the release of 
acquirer-specific information at the announcement of EC-deals by high sigma acquirers is 
matched by the positive wealth effect of the revelation of expected synergies when low sigma 
acquirers announce EC- deals.
14
  
4.4.4. Addressing Size Effect Considerations 
The observation that low sigma acquirers benefit more from the use of ECs than high sigma 
acquirers and the insignificant difference in the wealth gains generated by EC-financing across 
high and low acquirer sigma prompt us to examine the exposure of our EC portfolio of deals to 
size effect considerations.  Specifically, Moeller et al. (2004) identify the presence of a size 
effect in acquirers’ abnormal returns resulting in small firms gaining more from corporate 
takeover announcements than large firms. The size effect is further illustrated to be linked to 
managerial inefficiencies that are likely to be present in large firms. Nevertheless, large firms, 
for which there is more information available, are characterized by less information asymmetry 
(Banz, 1981). Similarly Campbell et al. (2001) illustrate that firms exhibiting high levels of 
idiosyncratic stock return volatility are more likely to be small firms. Consequently, as high 
sigma EC-deals appear to match the performance of low sigma EC-deals, we proceed to extend 
in Table 4 the findings of Moeller et al. (2004) and investigate the extent of size effect 
considerations within the portfolio of EC-financed deals. Specifically, the presence of a size 
effect would be suggested in case we observed opposite signs between equally weighted average 
abnormal returns (CAR) and weighted-by-market-value average abnormal returns (WCAR). The 
                                                          
14 In section 4.5 we aim to address this issue and decompose the synergy-related component of an EC-deal’s market reaction by 
matching, via PSM, EC-financed deals to NEC-financed ones involving acquirers with similar levels of sigma within our entire 
set of observations, as well as within solely high sigma and low acquirer sigma deals. 
105 
 
above would indicate that large and small acquiring firms’ shareholders reap different abnormal 
returns at the announcement of corporate takeovers.  
(Insert Table 4.4 about here) 
Consistent with Moeller et al. (2004), Panel A of Table 4 reports that for all firms the 
average CAR reaches 1.13%, while the WCAR is equal to -0.26%. We proceed to sort all deals 
by the acquiring firm’ market capitalization (measured 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement) 
and classify the top one third of deals as HIGH MV and the bottom one third as LOW MV. It can 
be observed that large acquirers (HIGH MV) experience an insignificant average CAR of 0.04% 
and a WCAR equal to -0.32%. On the other hand, small acquirers (SMALL MV) experience a 
highly significant average CAR of 2.23% and a WCAR equal to 1.59%. The above suggest the 
presence of a size effect in our sample. Nevertheless, within EC-financed deals it can be 
observed across all three categories of Panel A (all deals, deals involving high MV acquirers, 
deals involving low MV acquirers) that CAR is significantly positive, as is WCAR. The above 
suggest that the exposure of EC-financed deals to size effect considerations is very limited.  
Moreover, as can be observed in Panels B and C, low sigma deals consist of substantially 
larger acquiring firms, relative to high sigma deals, across all reported methods of payment 
(ALL, EC, NEC). Specifically, more than half of high MV acquirers are characterized by low 
sigma. Similarly only 25 out of 221 low sigma EC deals involve small acquirers and only 36 out 
of 506 high sigma EC deals involve large acquirers. Evidently, in order to further conclude that 
size effect considerations are less likely to be present within EC-financed deals, we should 
observe no difference in the signs of CAR and WCAR generated by EC-financed deals involving 
acquirers with high and low sigma. Evidence reported in Panels B and C further confirms the 
above. Thus, our results suggest that the selection of ECs by big acquirers with low information 
asymmetry sends a strong signal for value creation to market participants, preventing the 
occurrence of a size-related discount. To this end the selection of ECs appears to signal the likely 
absence of managerial inefficiencies that are usually present in big firms and deteriorate the 
expected synergy gains from M&A deals, ultimately leading to a positive market reaction.  
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4.4.5. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Rosenbaum-Bounds (RB)  
In drawing inferences about the causal impact of a decision (i.e. treatment use) on a performance 
measure (outcome), it is customary to compare the latter in pairs of groups of treated and 
untreated sample units. In an experimental setting such groups are selected randomly. However, 
in a non-experimental setting, inferences on the causal effect of a decision (treatment) may be 
biased due to systematic sample self-selection. Consequently, the effect of the choice of EC-
financing on acquirers’ short-run abnormal returns (outcome) may be due to the pre-treatment 
characteristics of the treated groups (EC-deals), rather than to the treatment per-se (EC-
financing). Moreover, Moeller et al. (2004) and Draper and Paudyal (2008) suggest that the 
distribution of acquirers’ short-run wealth gains is non-exclusively reflective of information 
dissemination regarding the buyer and revelation of expected synergy gains. It therefore needs to 
be determined how the latter affect the wealth gains generated by EC-financing under high and 
low acquirer sigma.  
Implementing PSM can assist address the above concerns, allowing for an unbiased 
causal inference by pairing treated (EC-financed deals) and comparison sample units (NEC-
financed deals) based on observable pre-treatment characteristics and examining differences in 
announcement period abnormal returns as the response random variable (Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002). We use one-to-one nearest neighbor matching with replacement. In order to avoid the 
negative effects of potential hidden variable bias in our propensity score estimators (logit 
models) we also implement the Rosenbaum-Bounds (RB) methodology, resulting in the selection 
of the least exposed to hidden variable bias model. 
Table 5 illustrates the output of our PSM sequences on the treatment effect of EC-
financing within all deals (Exercise 1), as well as within high (Exercise 2) and low (Exercise 3) 
acquirer sigma deals. Panel A presents the output of the logistic regression methodology, which 
means to model the probability of an event occurring conditional on certain characteristics.
15
 
Accordingly, the dependent variable assumes the value of one if a sample deal includes an 
earnout provision and zero otherwise. Our logit models are based on nested reduced-form 
estimations with various combinations of covariates to avoid possible multicollinearity and to 
                                                          
15 Due to data unavailability on acquirers’ market-to-book and debt-to-equity ratios for Exercise 1 our sample is reduced 
from 15,384 deals to 15,027 deals.  
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measure the extent to which our estimations are exposed to omitted variable bias. Lastly, in order 
to capture variation that is due to the time period over which a deal is announced and, eventually, 
improve matching accuracy, all models include year fixed effects. 
 (Insert Table 4.5 about here) 
The logit output of Exercise 1 illustrates that, consistent with Kohers and Ang (2000) as 
well as Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012), EC-financing is more likely to occur in 
acquisitions involving private targets, or targets operating in intangible-rich sectors, thus 
exposing the acquirer to substantial valuation risk. Moreover, the applicability of EC-financing 
in risky M&As is further verified as relatively large deals expose acquirers to considerable 
valuation risk and post-merger integration difficulties, which are likely to lead to disagreements 
and, thus, influence the implementation of an EC. In addition, EC-financing appears to be less 
likely to occur when the deal involves a highly leveraged acquiring firm, thus indicating 
potential targets’ hesitation towards engaging in such a contingent payment structure under 
substantial leverage considerations. On the other hand, in unreported estimations the acquiring 
firm’s cash ratio exerted a consistently insignificant effect. Similarly, the target firm’s domicile 
and operating legal framework do not appear to exert a significant influence on the probability of 
implementing this contingent financing method. Noticeably, the highly positive and significant 
coefficient of sigma suggests that firms with greater information asymmetry are more likely to 
finance M&As with ECs. This suggests that, along with the intrinsic risks of the deal, ECs may 
also be employed due to the potential unwillingness of acquirers’ managers to mitigate them with 
undervalued equity.  
The logit model output enables us to calculate propensity scores and match treated (EC-
financed) deals to their NEC-financed control counterfactuals. Nevertheless, as outlined in 
section 3.2, the main function of the PSM method is to identify a counterfactual sample unit, j, 
that does not receive the treatment but, nevertheless, exhibits the same probability to receive the 
treatment as a treated sample unit, i. The identification of the counterfactual sample unit, j, is 
conditional on a propensity score, PS, determined by all covariates in the propensity score 
estimator (logit model) and not on each ex-ante characteristic. Consequently, an important 
robustness check of our matching sequence incorporates the comparison of the distributions of 
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each of the models’ covariates among treated and control groups. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) 
illustrate that the two sample t-test for comparing the distributions of covariates’ means is 
appropriate. As can be seen in Panel B for Exercise 1, the aforementioned differences are 
rendered statistically insignificant, thus suggesting successful matching.  
Panel C illustrates the treatment effect (difference in average abnormal returns between 
treated and control groups) of EC-financing. It can be observed in Exercise 1 that implementing 
an earnout provision yields, on average, 0.64% greater announcement period abnormal returns to 
acquirers’ shareholders. Therefore, it appears that once reducing, to a great extent, selection bias 
considerations, the univariate effect of EC-financing on acquirers’ gains (Table 3, Panel A) is 
corrected downwards. Lastly, Panel D presents the results of the Rosenbaum-Bounds (RB) 
sensitivity analysis, which allows us to investigate the exposure of our derived conclusions from 
matching to the effect of a missing covariate in our propensity score estimator (logit model). 
Specifically, RB allows us to measure how influential a confounding (unobserved) covariate 
needs to be in order to invalidate the effect of the treatment. Our estimates confirm that the 
impact of the treatment on acquirers’ value gains would be rendered negligible if an unobserved 
covariate caused the odds of treatment assignment to change by at least 7%. Hence, our results 
from matching suggest that our PSM Exercise 1 offers, to a great extent, bias-free treatment 
effects.
16
 
Table 5 also illustrates the results of our matching sequences on the treatment effect of 
EC-financing within high (Exercise 2) and low (Exercise 3) acquirer sigma deals. Employing 
separate PSM sequences in these two groups of M&A transactions, while also including sigma in 
its continuous form as a matching covariate, enables us to identify control counterfactuals that 
are highly likely to exhibit consubstantial information dissemination at the time of the deal’s 
announcement as their treated EC-financed matched deals. Consequently, examining differences 
in the outcome variable between treated and control deals allows us to capture, to a great extent, 
the expected synergies component of the treatment effect of EC-financing and observe how it 
varies between high and low acquirer sigma.   
                                                          
16
 The RB critical value of Γ at p=0.10 resembles the proportion of treatment frequencies within the exercise, which 
consists the a-priori probability of an included observation belonging to the treated group (1103/15035 =7.34%). 
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Panel A presents the logit model on the probability of EC-financing, estimated within 
high (Exercise 2) and low (Exercise 3) acquirer sigma deals. We use the same propensity score 
estimator in both (high and low sigma) matching sequences in order to better assess differences 
in the treatment effect of EC-financing. Panel B illustrates the balance of covariates between 
treated and control deals in our two matching sequences. It can be observed that differences in 
the distributions of covariates are rendered statistically insignificant, thus suggesting successful 
matching.  
Panel C illustrates that, within high sigma, treated EC-deals significantly underperform 
their matched counterparts. Evidently, once employing PSM and, hence, substantially reducing 
potential self-selection bias considerations, the insignificant difference in announcement period 
abnormal returns between EC-financing and NEC-financing, under high acquirer sigma (Table 3, 
Panel B), is further corrected downwards and rendered weakly statistically significant. In 
contrast, under low sigma, the above observation reverses as treated EC-deals significantly 
outperform their NEC control counterfactuals. Lastly, Panel D illustrates that our results from 
matching offer, to a great extent, bias-free estimates as the above effects on acquirers’ gains 
would be rendered negligible if an unobserved covariate caused the odds of treatment assignment 
within high and low sigma to change by at least 7% and 6%, respectively.  
Overall, our PSM results suggest that under increased information asymmetry over the 
acquiring firm, financing valuation-complex deals (such as deals involving private targets 
operating in intangible-rich sectors) with ECs does not significantly increase acquirers’ gains. 
This provides further evidence suggesting that the synergy effect of EC-financing is, to a great 
extent, overshadowed by the release of information over the acquiring firm’s true value. In 
contrast, big firms, which are characterized by low information asymmetry, enjoy significantly 
greater gains when financing valuation-complex deals with ECs. 
The superior performance of ECs when involving big acquirers with low information 
asymmetry can also be linked to recent legal evidence suggesting that the success of ECs is 
highly dependent on the support provided to the target by the acquirer during the earnout period. 
Specifically, the achievement of the EC thresholds often relies on the implied duty of ‘good 
faith’, ‘fair dealing’, as well as the new doctrine of the acquiring firm’s ‘implied obligation to 
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use reasonable efforts’ in order to support the target firm achieve the deferred payment’s 
conditions.
17
 Such support can include guaranteed levels of working capital, marketing 
assistance, and/or sales force. The above increase in significance in case the target is partially 
integrated and does not operate as a fully stand-alone firm post-merger, or in case changes need 
to be made in its processes and operations,
18
 as part of its integration with the buyer. To this end, 
it is not rare for courts to impose liability on acquirers for failing to support acquired businesses, 
noting that “earnouts all too often transform current disagreements over price into future 
litigation over outcome”.19 Evidently, as ECs are mostly employed in small, yet valuation-
complex deals (Table 1, Panel A), big acquirers should be better able to accommodate the 
target’s need for assistance during the earnout period, thus ultimately enhancing the probability 
of realization of the expected synergy gains.  
4.4.6. Multiple Regression Analysis of Short-Run Abnormal Returns 
Table 6 reports the results from our multiple regression analysis of short-run abnormal returns of 
acquirers’ shareholders. This allows us to assess the impact of sigma on the announcement 
period market reaction to EC-financed takeovers while taking into consideration the impact of 
several other factors influencing it simultaneously.
20
 
(Insert Table 4.6 about here) 
Consistent with previous literature on the US takeover market (Moeller et al., 2004), it 
can be observed, in Models 1 to 5 for all deals, that the average acquirer generally earns a 
significant positive return at the announcement of an M&A transaction. In line with Asquith, 
Bruner and Mullins (1983) and Fuller et al. (2002) estimates indicate that relatively large deals 
add value (Models 1 to 5), as do deals involving unlisted targets (Model 3). Moreover, consistent 
with Draper and Paudyal (2008), young firms with a short trading history appear to increase their 
shareholders’ value gains (Models 1 to 5), while, similar to Rau and Vermaelen (1998), 
                                                          
17 See O’Tool v. Genmar Holdings, Inc, 387 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2004) and Hodges v. Medassets Net Revenues, LLC, 2008 WL 
476140 (N.D. Ga. 2008) 
18 Such changes can include potential bundling of the target firm’s products to those of the acquirer.  
19 See Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 984 A.2d 126 (Del. Ch. 2009), 
20 Due to data unavailability regarding acquiring firms’ market-to-book, debt-to-equity and cash ratios, our entire sample is 
reduced to 12,411 deals. High sigma deals are, therefore, reduced to 4,641 deals, low sigma deals are reduced to 3,548 deals. Our 
univariate results persist in the reduced sample.  
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“glamour” high market-to-book acquirers destroy value (Models 1 to 5).21 Lastly, estimates 
suggest that leverage and liquidity considerations do not appear to impose a significant effect on 
acquirers’ short-run wealth gains, while, consistent with Moeller et al. (2005), acquirers 
engaging in international deals break even.  
Considering EC-financing, Model 1 illustrates that acquirers earn a positive, yet 
insignificant, value gain when implementing this contingent payment method. Nevertheless, 
estimates reported in Model 2 indicate that in deals exposing the acquirer to substantial valuation 
risk, as approximated by the relative size of the deal (Fuller et al., 2002), the additional value 
gain of EC-financing is realized. In contrast, Model 3 illustrates that the latter does not appear to 
be sourcing from the listing nature of the selling firm.
22
 Noticeably, when accounting for non-
publicly traded target firms, the negative effect of the acquiring firm’s market-to-book ratio 
becomes insignificant. This provides further evidence on the positive news conveyed in 
acquisitions of unlisted targets (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002). 
In Models 4 and 5 we aim to estimate the effect of sigma on an EC-financed deal’s 
market reaction. To do so, we sort all deals by sigma and create two dummy variables 
(HIGH_SIGMA and LOW_SIGMA). Our HIGH_SIGMA (LOW_SIGMA) dummy variable 
assumes the value of one for the top (bottom) one third of deals, exhibiting the highest (lowest) 
values of acquirer sigma, and zero otherwise. Reported estimates in Models 4 and 5 indicate that 
acquirers earn significant benefits, when implementing an EC under low sigma. Moreover, 
reported linear effects of our high and low sigma dummy variables indicate that high sigma 
acquirers not financing corporate takeovers with an earnout provision enjoy significant value 
gains. The above provide further evidence suggesting that, in contrast to deals financed with 
single up-front payments, implementing an earnout provision under increased information 
asymmetry over the acquiring firm does not provide acquirers’ shareholders with any additional 
value gains.  
                                                          
21 Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) illustrate that glamour acquirers, i.e. high market-to-book 
firms, destroy value for their shareholders during acquisition announcements.  
22 Similarly, Barbopoulos and Sudarsam (2012) illustrate the insignificant interaction between EC-financing and UNL 
which, nevertheless, becomes significant when examining the wealth effects of correctly classified EC-deals, based on a 
logit model predicting the occurrence of EC.  
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In order to further verify the above, in Models 6 and 7 we restrict our sample to only high 
and low acquirer sigma deals and incorporate our findings from the PSM method (Exercises 2 
and 3, respectively). Specifically, we create two dummy variables (CONTROL_EC_HIGH and 
CONTROL_EC_LOW) taking the value of one if a deal constitutes a control counterfactual from 
our matching sequence in each sigma group (high and low respectively) and zero otherwise. A 
control deal constitutes a sample unit j that does not receive the treatment (EC-financing) but, 
nevertheless, exhibits the same probability to receive the treatment as a treated sample unit i. It 
can be observed, in Model 6, that acquirers not implementing an EC in deals exhibiting the same 
probability to be financed with this contingent payment method, as deals that actually were, 
enjoy a significant value gain under high sigma. In contrast, under low sigma, it is treated EC 
acquirers that enjoy a significant short-run wealth benefit, while deals that were equally likely to 
be financed with an EC, but were not, impose an insignificant effect. Noticeably, low sigma 
liquid acquirers, unlike their high sigma counterparts, appear to experience greater short-run 
wealth gains. This indicates that engaging in an M&A transaction while highly liquid constitutes 
a favorable condition to market participants when information asymmetry over the acquiring 
firm is not substantial.  
Lastly, in Models 8 and 9 we attempt to examine the potential exposure of our 
multivariate results to potential selection bias considerations. To do so, in Model 8 (Model 9) we 
reduce our sample so as to include solely treated and control observations as in Exercise 2 
(Exercise 3) of our PSM sequence within high (low) acquirer sigma deals from section 4.5. 
Evidently, the negative effect of EC-financing in Model 8 and its insignificant impact in Model 9 
further corroborate the robustness of our multivariate conclusions to selection bias 
considerations. 
4.5. Conclusion 
This study presents new evidence on the wealth effects of contingent earnouts (ECs), as an 
acquisition’s payment method. In so doing, we identify the acquiring firm’s idiosyncratic stock 
return volatility (sigma) as a highly significant factor influencing acquirers’ announcement 
period abnormal equity gains from EC-financed deals.  
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Specifically, we illustrate that the well-documented superior gains attributed to EC-
financing, relative to single up-front payment methods, are mainly sourcing from low sigma 
deals. In addition, relative to deals not financed with ECs, EC-financed acquisitions of private 
targets are depicted to only generate greater short-run wealth gains under low acquirer sigma. 
We implement Propensity Score Matching in order to further control for potential selection bias 
in our univariate results. Our PSM output illustrates that EC-financed deals significantly 
underperform their NEC matched counterparts under high acquirer sigma. In contrast, under low 
acquirer sigma the aforementioned effect reverses. The above results persist within a multivariate 
framework, while controlling for other factors known to influence takeover outcomes.  
Thus, despite accounting for 45% of their distribution, high sigma EC- financed deals do 
not generate greater returns than deals in which the market would infer that the acquiring firm’s 
equity is undervalued. In so doing, we extend the findings of Rhodes-Kropf, et al. (2005) and 
show that prior to the deal’s announcement EC acquirers are relatively undervalued, compared to 
acquirers using single up-front payment. We argue that the above provide evidence for our 
hypothesis suggesting that the release of acquirer-specific information during the announcement 
of an EC-financed deal by a high sigma acquirer prevails, over the revelation of expected 
synergy gains, in shaping the market’s reaction to the takeover. Thus, in line with information 
asymmetry models the market’s reaction reflects its upwards reassessment of the acquirer’s 
equity value.  
In contrast, under low acquirer sigma the above effect reverses resulting in significantly 
greater acquirer value gains than single up-front payments. As low sigma acquirers are likely to 
be big firms we proceed to extend the findings of Moeller et al. (2004) and examine the likely 
presence of a size effect within the portfolio of EC-financed deals. In contrast to deals not 
financed with ECs, our results do not support the presence of a size effect within the EC 
portfolio. We argue that the selection of ECs by big acquirers with low information asymmetry 
sends a strong signal for value creation to market participants, preventing the occurrence of a 
size-related discount. To this end the selection of ECs appears to signal the likely absence of 
managerial inefficiencies that may be present in big firms and deteriorate the expected synergy 
gains from M&A deals, ultimately leading to significant value gains.  
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Overall, our results suggest that the well-documented positive wealth effect of EC-
financing is not entirely reflective of the deal’s increased synergy potential. In fact, in a little less 
than half of EC-financed deals the overall wealth effect reflects, to a great extent, the market’s 
inference that the acquirer’s stock is undervalued. Evidently, the interaction between EC and 
sigma constitutes a highly important factor in determining the short run wealth gains generated 
by this contingent payment method.  
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4.6. Tables Chapter 4 
 
Table 4.1: Acquirer, Target and Deal Characteristics 
Panel A: Deal Characteristics 
  All  EC NEC CASH STOCK 
  Mean Median (% of N) Mean Median (% of N) Mean Median (% of N) Mean Median (% of N) Mean  Median (% of N) 
Deal Value (DV) 430.42 46 133.58 30.93 454.18 47.8 218.06 45 587.72 46.92 
Deal’s relative size (RS) 24.56 7.67 19.05 8.62 24.99 7.58 14.48 4.66 27.04 7.7 
Foreign target (CBA) 1,796 11.67% 162 14.21% 1,634 11.47% 1,027 16.14% 206 5.41% 
Diversifying deal (DVSD) 6,167 40.09% 467 40.96% 5,700 40.02% 2,022 31.77% 1,292 33.91% 
Private target (PRV) 7,255 47.16% 850 74.56% 6,405 44.97% 2,551 40.08% 1,905 50.00% 
Subsidiary target (SUB) 4,157 27.02% 274 24.04% 3,883 27.26% 2,597 40.81% 293 7.69% 
Public target (PUB) 3,972 25.82% 16 1.40% 3,956 27.77% 1,216 19.11% 1,612 42.31% 
Target in intangible sector (INT) 6,244 40.59% 592 51.93% 5,652 39.68% 2,663 41.84% 1,525 40.03% 
Target in Common law (COMMON) 14,714 95.64% 1,077 94.47% 13,637 95.74% 5,981 93.98% 3,752 98.48% 
Number of observations (N) 15,384 100% 1,140 7.41% 14,244 92.59% 6,364 41.37% 3,810 24.77% 
Panel B: Acquirer Characteristics 
Market value (MV) 6,674.40 668.33 4,012.36 354.09 6,887.45 702.52 8,861.93 980.87 6,921.47 665.71 
market-to-book value (MTBV) 3.65 2.11 2.90 2.12 3.71 2.10 3.21 2.17 4.55 2.26 
Liquidity (CASH_RATIO) 0.26 0.11 0.28 0.19 0.26 0.11 0.18 0.09 0.49 0.23 
Debt-to-equity ratio (DEBT) 116.56 53.56 41.87 23.89 122.47 56.30 116.20 53.49 110.25 48.96 
Number of trading days (AGE) 4,673 3,795 4,204 3,305 4,711 3,843 5,336 4,700 4,103 3,252 
Idiosyncratic volatility (SIGMA) 2.79 2.31 3.24 2.75 2.75 2.27 2.33 2.02 3.16 2.55 
HIGH SIGMA 5,128 33.33% 506 44.37% 4,622 32.45% 1,436 22.56% 1,586 41.63% 
LOW SIGMA 5,128 33.33% 221 19.39% 4,907 34.45% 2,584 60.60% 1,117 29.32% 
CAR 1.12 0.40 1.85 0.87 1.06 0.37 1.13 0.55 0.43 -0.34 
 
Note: Panel A presents mean and median deal and target characteristics for all deals, deals not including an earnout provision (NEC), deals including an earnout provision (EC), 
cash deals (CASH) and stock deals (STOCK). DV stands for the deal’s transaction value (in $mil.); RS corresponds to the relative size of the deal (=deal value/acquirer’s market 
value 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); CBA corresponds to international deals; DVSD corresponds to diversifying deals (the acquiring and target firms do not share the 
same 2-digit SIC number); PRV corresponds to deals involving private targets; SUB corresponds to deals involving subsidiary targets; INT corresponds to deals involving targets 
operating in intangible-rich sectors (High-Tech, Consumer Products and Services, Media and Entertainment, Telecommunications); COMMON corresponds to deals involving 
targets operating under a Common Law legal framework; N stands for the number of observations.  Panel B illustrates acquirer characteristics under the same method of payment 
variations as in Panel A. MV corresponds to the acquiring firm’s market capitalization (measured 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); MTBV corresponds to the acquiring 
firm’s market-to-book ratio (measured 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); CASH RATIO corresponds to the acquirer’ s ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets at 
the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement; DEBT corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of total debt to common equity at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s 
announcement; AGE corresponds to the number of days between the acquirer’s first recorded day on Datastream and the deal’s announcement day; SIGMA corresponds to the 
acquiring firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility (measured as in Moeller et al., 2007); HIGH SIGMA corresponds to the top one third of deals exhibiting the highest levels of 
sigma; LOW SIGMA corresponds to the bottom one third of deals exhibiting the lowest levels of sigma; CAR corresponds to the 5-day (-2,+2) announcement period acquirer 
cumulative abnormal return. Further information on the definition of each variable can be found in Appendix 4.1.  
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Table 4.2: Acquirer MTBV Decomposition 
Panel A: ALL deals 
Payment 
Method 
N 
Firm Specific Valuation Error Sector Valuation Error Long-Run Value to Book 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
ALL 7,587 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.70 0.71 
EC 544 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.72 0.76 
NEC 7,043 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.69 0.70 
Panel B: HIGH SIGMA deals 
ALL 1,763 0.17 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.70 0.73 
EC 178 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.70 0.78 
NEC 1,585 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.70 0.72 
Panel C: LOW SIGMA deals 
ALL 3,211 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.69 0.68 
EC 150 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.78 0.80 
NEC 3,061 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.69 0.68 
 
Note: The data presents the decomposition of acquirers’ market-to-book value into three valuation components (firm specific valuation error, time-series sector error and long-run 
value to book) for all deals (Panel A), as well as across high (Panel B) and low (Panel C) acquirer sigma deals. SIGMA corresponds to the acquiring firm’s idiosyncratic stock 
return volatility (measured as in Moeller et al., 2007); HIGH SIGMA corresponds to the top one third of deals exhibiting the highest levels of sigma; LOW SIGMA corresponds to 
the bottom one third of deals exhibiting the lowest levels of sigma. The results in each panel are presented for all deals (ALL), deals financed with an earnout provision (EC) and 
deals not financed with an earnout provision (NEC). The estimated equation is of the form:  
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑉)𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0𝑗𝑡 + 𝑎1𝑗𝑡 ln(𝐵𝑉)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑗𝑡𝑙𝑛(𝑁𝐼)𝑖𝑡
+ + 𝑎3𝑗𝑡𝐼(<0)𝑙𝑛(𝑁𝐼)𝑖𝑡
+ + 𝑎4𝑗𝑡𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  
 
where:  𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑉)𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the market value of firm i operating in industry j at time t,  ln(𝐵𝑉)𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the firm’s book value, (𝑁𝐼)𝑖𝑡
+  is the 
absolute value of the firm’s net income, 𝐼(<0) is an indicator function for negative net income observations, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio. The estimations are conducted 
at a yearly rate for each of the twelve Fama and French industries. Once the estimations are completed, we calculate fitted values ln 𝑀?̂?𝑖𝑡, as well as fitted values using each firm’s 
corresponding industry’s average coefficients across the time periods of our sample range (1986-2012=27 years) ln 𝑀𝑉̅̅̅̅ ?̅?𝑡. The firm-specific valuation error is equal to  ln 𝑀?̂?𝑖𝑡 -
 𝑙𝑛(𝑀𝑉)𝑖𝑡. The time series-sector valuation error is equal to  ln 𝑀?̂?𝑖𝑡 -  ln 𝑀𝑉̅̅̅̅ ?̅?𝑡. The long-run value to book is equal to  ln 𝑀𝑉̅̅̅̅ ?̅?𝑡 - ln(𝐵𝑉)𝑖𝑡.  
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Table 4.3: Univariate Analysis of Announcement Period Abnormal Returns 
Panel A: ALL Deals 
    ALL EC NEC CASH STOCK EC vs ALL EC vs NEC EC vs CASH EC vs STOCK 
ALL 
Mean 1.13a 1.85a 1.07a 1.13a 0.44a 0.72a 0.78a 0.72a 1.41a 
N 15,384 1,140 14,244 6,364 3,810         
PRIVATE 
Mean 1.63a 1.84a 1.61a 0.97a 1.92a 0.21 0.24 0.88a -0.08 
N 7,255 850 6,405 2,551 1,905         
PUBLIC 
Mean -0.88a -2.33 -0.87a 0.53a -1.71a -1.45 -1.46 -2.86c -0.62 
N 3,972 16 3,956 1,216 1,612         
SUBSIDIARY 
Mean 2.16a 2.12a 2.16a 1.58a 2.60a -0.04 -0.04 0.54 -0.48 
N 4,157 274 3,883 2,597 293         
Panel B: HIGH SIGMA deals 
ALL 
Mean 2.37a 2.39a 2.37a 2.75a 1.54a 0.02 0.03 -0.35 0.85 
N 5,128 506 4,622 1,436 1,586         
PRIVATE 
Mean 2.68a 2.50a 2.71a 2.25a 2.95a -0.18 -0.21 0.25 -0.45 
N 2,979 395 2,584 661 967         
PUBLIC 
Mean -0.75c -2.19 -0.74c 2.21a -1.95a -1.44 -1.45 -4.4 -0.24 
N 880 5 875 173 474         
SUBSIDIARY 
Mean 3.80a 2.22b 3.94a 3.45a 3.57a -1.58 -1.72 -1.23 -1.35 
N 1,269 106 1,163 602 145         
Panel C: LOW SIGMA deals 
ALL 
Mean 0.20a 1.23a 0.15a 0.42a -0.58a 1.03a 1.08a 0.81a 1.81a 
N 5,128 221 4,907 2,584 1,117         
PRIVATE 
Mean 0.55a 1.07a 0.51a 0.23c 0.32c 0.52 0.56 0.84b 0.75b 
N 1,891 153 1,738 901 422         
PUBLIC 
Mean -0.83a -1.15 -0.83a 0.19 -1.36a -0.32 -0.32 -1.34 0.21 
N 1,785 6 1,779 633 632         
SUBSIDIARY 
Mean 1.00a 1.86b 0.97a 0.72a 1.25c 0.86 0.89 1.14b 0.61 
N 1,452 62 1,390 1,050 63         
Panel D: HIGH vs LOW          
ALL Mean 2.17a 1.16 2.22a 2.33a 2.12a         
PRIVATE Mean 2.13a 1.43 2.20a 2.02a 2.63a         
PUBLIC Mean 0.08 -1.04 0.09 2.02a -0.59         
SUBSIDIARY Mean 2.80a 0.36 2.97a 2.73a 2.32         
 
Note: The table presents mean announcement period 5-day (t-2, t+2) cumulative abnormal returns for all acquisitions (Panel A) 
divided by target listing status (ALL, PRIVATE, PUBLIC SUBSIDIARY) and method of payment (ALL, earnout- EC, non-
earnout NEC, CASH, STOCK). The analysis is further categorized by high (Panel B) and low (Panel C) acquirer sigma deals. 
Panel D illustrates differences in mean abnormal returns between high and low acquirer sigma deals. SIGMA corresponds to the 
acquiring firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility (measured as in Moeller et al., 2007); HIGH SIGMA corresponds to the top 
one third of deals exhibiting the highest levels of sigma; LOW SIGMA corresponds to the bottom one third of deals exhibiting the 
lowest levels of sigma. The statistical significance of differences in returns between groups of acquirers is tested using the t-test 
for equality of means. a, b, and c indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of the mean for each covariate presented. 
Further information on the definition of each variable can be found in Appendix 4.1.  
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Table 4.4: Acquirer Size, Idiosyncratic Volatility and Abnormal Returns 
  ALL deals HIGH MV deals LOW MV deals 
  N MV CAR WCAR N MV CAR WCAR N MV CAR WCAR 
Panel A: ALL deals 
ALL 15,384 6,675.02 1.13a -0.26 5,128 19,150.38 0.04 -0.32 5,128 125.59 2.23a 1.59 
EC 1,240 4,015.73 1.85a 0.79 240 17,675.57 1.12a 0.76 529 124.21 2.38a 1.57 
NEC 14,144 6,887.74 1.07a -0.31 4,888 19,222.80 -0.01 -0.37 4,599 125.74 2.22a 1.59 
Panel B: HIGH SIGMA deals 
ALL 5,128 1,930.87 2.37a -0.18 774 11,135.76 0.58 -0.50 2,893 104.52 3.05a 2.19 
EC 506 1,276.62 2.39a 0.28 36 14,760.98 -1.53 0.01 344 108.77 2.66a 1.31 
NEC 4,622 2,002.35 2.37a -0.21 738 10,958.92 0.68c -0.53 2,549 103.95 3.10a 2.32 
Panel C: LOW SIGMA deals 
ALL 5,128 12,132.63 0.20a -0.25 2,804 21,654.58 -0.05 -0.27 647 156.79 1.01a 1.02 
EC 221 14,149.79 1.23a 0.97 111 27,509.89 1.27a 0.97 25 156.39 2.66c 2.63 
NEC 4,907 12,041.74 0.15a -0.32 2,693 21,413.23 -0.10 -0.33 622 156.81 0.95a 0.95 
 
Note: The table presents US M&A activity for all deals (All), EC-financed deals (EC) and non-EC-financed deals (NEC) 
according to the acquiring firm’s market capitalization (high and low MV) and idiosyncratic stock return volatility (high and low 
sigma). MV (sigma) classifications into High (Low) were made by sorting all deals by MV (sigma) and labeling as high (low) 
MV (sigma) the top (bottom) one third of deals exhibiting its highest (lowest) values. N stands for the number of deals; SIGMA 
corresponds to the acquiring firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility (measured as in Moeller et al., 2007); HIGH SIGMA 
corresponds to the top one third of deals exhibiting the highest levels of sigma; LOW SIGMA corresponds to the bottom one third 
of deals exhibiting the lowest levels of sigma;  MV reports each group’s average market capitalization of included acquiring 
firms measured 20 days before the announcement of the deal; CAR reports each group’ average cumulative abnormal return for 
the window beginning two days before the announcement of the M&A deal and ending two days after the announcement; WCAR 
reports the weighted by MV average CAR of each group of deals. Superscripts a, b and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% statistical significance threshold respectively. Further information on the definition of each variable can be found in 
Appendix 4.1. 
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Table 4.5: Propensity Score Matching and Rosenbaum Bounds 
    Exercise 1     Exercise 2     Exercise 3   
Panel A: Logistic Regression 
Dependent variable   EC     EC     EC   
Sample used   ALL deals     HIGH SIGMA deals     LOW SIGMA deals   
Intercept   -4.436a     -4.016a     -7.279a   
Acquirer-specific volatility (SIGMA)   5.594a     -1.365     112.927a   
Relative size of deal (RS)   0.161a     0.095a     0.086a   
Acquirer market-to-book (MTBV)   0.001     -0.165a     -0.246b   
Acquirer’s trading history (AGE)         -0.022     0.058   
Acquirer debt-to-equity (DEBT)   -0.002a               
Private target (PRV)   1.214a     1.139a     1.357a   
Target in intangible-rich sector (INT)         0.046     0.056   
Target in High-Tech sector (THT)   0.178b               
Target in consumer products & services (TCPAS)   0.452a               
Target in Telecoms sector (TTELECOM)   0.094               
Foreign target (CBA)   0.128     0.221     0.283   
Diversifying deal (DVSD)   -0.012     -0.04     0.065   
Target operates under Common Law (COMMON)   -0.029     -0.005     0.097   
Year fixed effects (YFE)   yes     yes     yes   
Pseudo R-Squared (in %)   9.84     7.29     9.94   
H-L Goodness of Fit test   11.01     13.3     3.71   
Mean VIF   1.20     1.20     1.21   
N   15,027     5,128     5,128   
Panel B: Covariate Balance 
Dependent variable 
EC 
treated 
NEC 
control 
Diff. 
treated 
vs 
control 
EC 
treated 
NEC control 
Diff. 
treated 
vs 
control 
EC 
treated 
NEC control 
Diff. 
treated 
vs 
control 
Acquirer-specific volatility (SIGMA) 0.032a 0.032a 0 0.048a 0.047a 0.001 0.014a 0.014a 0 
Relative size of deal (RS) -2.513a -2.506a -0.007 -2.229a -2.185a -0.044 -3.121a -3.102a -0.019 
Acquirer market-to-book (MTBV) 0.797a 0.760a 0.037 0.761a 0.745a 0.015 0.868a 0.874a -0.006 
Acquirer’s trading history (AGE)       7.659a 7.661a -0.002 8.483a 8.431a 0.052 
Acquirer debt-to-equity (DEBT) 42.963a 66.288a -23.325             
Private target (PRV) 819 811   393 400   153 158   
Target in intangible-rich sector (INT)       300 282   74 70   
Target in High-Tech sector (THT) 344 328               
Target in consumer products & services (TCPAS) 143 160               
Target in Telecoms sector (TTELECOM) 43 41               
Foreign target (CBA) 158 140   70 67   36 25   
Diversifying deal (DVSD) 447 455   197 202   100 95   
Target operates under Common Law (COMMON) 1042 1049   478 483   207 210   
Panel C: Differentials Treated VS Matched M&A Deals 
Mean CAR Treated (in %)   1.81a     2.29a     1.23a   
N   1103     504     221   
Mean CAR Control (in%)   1.17a     3.55a     0.40a   
N   1103     504     221   
Mean (in%) Difference (Treated VS Control)   0.64c     -1.26c     0.83a   
Panel D: Rosenbaum Bounds 
RB: p-value of estimated difference at Γ=1   0.024     0.036     0.067   
RB: critical value of Γ at cut-off p=0.05   1.03     1.02     1.02   
RB: critical value of Γ at cut-off p=0.10   1.07     1.07     1.06   
 
Note: Panel A presents the output of the logistic regression models that were used to estimate the probability of occurrence of an 
EC relative to alternative single up-front payment methods. Panel B presents the balance of covariates between treated and control 
deals in our matching sequences. The PSM technique employs 1-to-1 nearest neighbor matching allowing for replacement. 
Differences in average covariates are tested using the t-test. Panel C reports mean 5-day announcement period cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) for treated and matched deals. The statistical significance of differences in mean returns between the two 
groups is tested using the T-test for equality of means. Panel D shows the outcome of the Rosenbaum-Bounds test. a, b, and c 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of the mean for each covariate presented. SIGMA corresponds to the 
acquiring firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility (measured as in Moeller et al., 2007); HIGH SIGMA corresponds to the top 
one third of deals exhibiting the highest levels of sigma; LOW SIGMA corresponds to the bottom one third of deals exhibiting the 
lowest levels of sigma; RS corresponds to the relative size of the deal (=deal value/acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the 
deal’s announcement); MTBV corresponds to the acquiring firm’s market-to-book ratio (measured 20 days prior to the deal’s 
announcement); AGE corresponds to the number of days between the acquirer’s first recorded day on Datastream and the deal’s 
announcement day; DEBT corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of total debt to common equity at the end of the last quarter prior to 
the deal’s announcement; PRV corresponds to deals involving private targets; SUB corresponds to deals involving subsidiary 
targets; INT corresponds to deals involving targets operating in intangible-rich sectors (High-Tech, Consumer Products and 
Services, Media and Entertainment, Telecommunications); THT corresponds to deals involving targets operating in the High-Tech 
sector; TCPAS corresponds to deals involving targets operating in the Consumer Products and Services sector; TTELECOM 
corresponds to deals involving targets operating in the Telecommunications sector; CBA corresponds to international deals; DVSD 
corresponds to diversifying deals (the acquiring and target firms do not share the same 2-digit SIC number); COMMON; CAR 
corresponds to the 5-day (-2,+2) announcement period acquirer cumulative abnormal return; VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor, 
which quantifies the severity of multicollinearity. Variance inflation is the reciprocal of tolerance.  Further information on the 
definition of each variable can be found in Appendix 4.1.   
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Table 4.6: Multivariate Analysis  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Sample Range ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL HIGH SIGMA LOW SIGMA 
 
HIGH SIGMA 
 
LOW SIGMA 
  
Intercept 0.058a 0.057a 0.020b 0.034a 0.050a 0.053a 0.009 0.066c -0.033 
Relative size of deal (RS) 0.003a 0.003a 0.005a 0.003a 0.003a 0.004a 0.001c 0.008a 0.006a 
Acquirer’s market-to-book (MTBV) -0.003a -0.003a -0.002 -0.004a -0.004a -0.003b -0.003b -0.005 0.002 
Acquirer’s trading history (AGE) -0.004a -0.004a -0.002b -0.002b -0.003a -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.003 
Acquirer’s debt-to-equity (DEBT) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Acquirer’s liquidity (CASH_RATIO) 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001c 0.001c 0.003 -0.002 
Foreign target (CBA) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004c 0.009 0.011 
Earnout (EC) 0.004 0.013b -0.012 0.006b 0.001 -0.001 0.010a -0.017b 0.006 
Unlisted target (UNL)     0.030a         0.022 0.016b 
HIGH_SIGMA       0.015a         
LOW_SIGMA         -0.010a       
EC x RS   0.004c             
EC x UNL     0.009           
EC x HIGH_SIGMA       -0.008         
EC x LOW_SIGMA         0.009c       
CONTROL_EC_HIGH           0.015a     
CONTROL_EC_LOW             -0.001   
Adjusted R-squared (in%) 0.92 3.00 0.94 1.48 1.14 0.82 0.38 1.84 3.77 
F-stat 20.1 48.48 17.77 24.27 18.83 6.49 2.95 3.53 3.47 
N 12,411 12,411 12,411 12,411 12,411 4,641 3,548 950 442 
 
Note: The table illustrates the multivariate analysis examining the wealth effects of earnout-financed deals. The dependent variable consists of the announcement period market 
adjusted 5-day (t-2,t+2) excess returns of acquirers which are regressed against a set of explanatory variables. Regression outputs are estimated using ordinary least squares with 
the coefficients adjusted for possible heteroscedasticity using White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. The intercept measures the excess returns 
to acquirers after accounting for the effects of all explanatory variables. a, b, and c indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. RS corresponds to the relative size of 
the deal (=deal value/acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); MTBV corresponds to the acquiring firm’s market-to-book ratio (measured 20 days prior 
to the deal’s announcement); AGE corresponds to the number of days between the acquirer’s first recorded day on Datastream and the deal’s announcement day; DEBT 
corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of total debt to common equity at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement; CASH RATIO corresponds to the acquirer’ s ratio 
of cash and cash equivalents to total assets at the end of the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement; CBA corresponds to international deals; EC corresponds to deals financed 
with an earnout provision; UNL corresponds to deals involving unlisted (private or subsidiary) targets; SIGMA corresponds to the acquiring firm’s idiosyncratic stock return 
volatility (measured as in Moeller et al., 2007); HIGH_SIGMA corresponds to the top one third of deals exhibiting the highest levels of sigma; LOW_SIGMA corresponds to the 
bottom one third of deals exhibiting the lowest levels of sigma; CONTROL_EC_HIGH corresponds to deals that were control counterfactuals in PSM Exercise 2 (see section 4.3.2 
for information on the formulation of the matching sequence); CONTROL_EC_LOW corresponds to deals that were control counterfactuals in PSM Exercise 3 (see section 4.3.2. 
for information on the formulation of the atching sequence); N stands for the number of observations. Further information on the definition of each variable can be found in 
Appendix 4.1. 
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Appendix 4.1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Type/Name Description Source 
ALL Refers to the entire sample analysed in this paper. SDC 
Acquirer’s  Age (AGE) 
Number of days between day the bidder is first recorded on 
Datastream and bid’s announcement day. 
Datastream 
Crossborder (CBA) 
Dummy = 1 with a UK bidder and non-UK target, and = 0 when 
both bidder and target are UK institutions (= Domestic). 
SDC 
CASH Dummy = 1 when payment is 100% cash. SDC 
CONTROL 
Dummy = 1 if a sample deal consists a control group deal in the 
PSM methodology and = 0 otherwise. 
- 
COMMON 
Dummy = 1 when the acquisition is crossborder and the target's 
nation follows the English Common Law legal system, and = 0 
otherwise. 
SDC 
CASH_RATIO Bidder's total cash and cash equivalents to its total assets Datastream 
Crossindustry (DVSD) 
Dummy = 1 when bidder and target do not share the same two-
digit SIC code and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Deal Value (DV) Bid’s transaction value, in millions dollars. SDC 
DEBT Acquirer’s total debt to common equity. Datastream 
Earnout (EC) 
Dummy = 1 when payment includes earnout in addition to cash, 
stock, or mixed, and = 0 otherwise (= Non-Earnout) (NEA). 
SDC 
HIGH_SIGMA 
Dummy = 1 if a sample deal belongs to the top one third of deals 
based on their distribution of sigma  
Datastream 
Intangible (INT) 
Dummy = 1 when target belongs to a high intangible assets 
industry (Media and Entertainment, Consumer Products and 
Services, High Technology and Telecommunications) and = 0 
otherwise. 
SDC 
LOW_SIGMA 
Dummy = 1 if a sample deal belongs to the bottom one third of 
deals based on their distribution of sigma 
 
Market Value (MV) 
Bidder’s market value of equity at four weeks prior to bid’s 
announcement, in millions dollars. 
Datastream 
Market-to-Book Value (MTBV) 
Bidder’s market-to-book value estimated four weeks prior to the 
deal announcement 
Datastream 
Non-Earnout (NEC) 
Dummy = 1 with full-cash, or full-stock, or mixed payment 
without EA, and = 0 when EA is included. 
SDC 
Private (PRV) Dummy = 1 if target is private, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Public (PBL) Dummy = 1 if target is publicly listed, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Relative Size (RS) Ratio of DV to MV. 
SDC & 
Datastream 
STOCK Dummy = 1 when payment is 100% stock exchange. SDC 
STOCKEC 
Dummy = 1 when payment includes earnout in addition to stock 
and =0 otherwise 
SDC 
Subsidiary (SUB) Dummy = 1 if target is a subsidiary firm, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
THT 
Dummy = 1 if target is belongs to the High Technology industry, 
and = 0 otherwise 
SDC 
TCPAS 
Dummy = 1 if target is belongs to the Consumer Products and 
Services industry, and = 0 otherwise 
SDC 
TTELECOM 
Dummy = 1 if target is belongs to the Telecommunications 
industry, and = 0 otherwise 
SDC 
Unlisted (UNL) Dummy = 1 if target is not a listed firm, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Note: The table defines the variables used in the empirical analysis and indicates the data source used. SDC denotes Thomson-
Reuters SDC M&A database. With a dummy variable, a sample observation without the value of 1 has the value of 0. Age, 
MTBV, RS and Debt are log transformed in subsequent regressions. 
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Chapter 5 
Cross-Border Earnout-Financing and the Multinational Network Hypothesis 
 
Abstract 
We present new insights on the workings and wealth effects of earnouts in international changes of 
corporate control. When firms choose to join a multinational network via the acquisition of a foreign 
company earnout-financing offers a major value-creating opportunity. Specifically, earnout-financed 
initial international expansions yield greater announcement period abnormal returns to acquirers relative 
to all domestic and remaining international deals. We argue that our results reflect the ability of this 
contingent payment method to mitigate the inherent risks in the acquiring firm’s attempt to gain access to 
the benefits of operating within a multinational network through the acquisition of a foreign firm. On the 
other hand, we argue that agency problems and monitoring costs are likely to deteriorate the expected 
synergy gains from non-initial earnout-financed international deals.  
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5.1. Introduction 
Since the mid-1980s the world economy has witnessed a surge of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), primarily channeled through cross-border acquisitions (CBAs).1 However, empirical 
evidence on acquirers’ announcement period abnormal returns suggests that their shareholders 
benefit more from domestic than from international M&As or, at best, break even when 
expanding internationally (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Gregory and McCorriston, 2005).
2
 
Thus, as CBA deals offer substantial investment opportunities, one possible explanation is that 
acquirers under-estimate the inherent threats to value creation. To this end, earlier studies 
suggest that the choice of two-part contingent payments, or earnout contracts (ECs), can assist 
the acquirer mitigate the implied valuation risk and thus address, to a great extent, such concerns 
(Kohers and Ang, 2000).
3
 However, despite their intuitive appropriateness, evidence suggests 
that the use of earnouts in international M&As does not offer significant value gains or any 
additional value gains to acquirers, relative to single up-front payments (Mantecon, 2009, 
Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012). Therefore, another possible explanation is that acquirers 
also over-estimate the implicit benefits of international takeovers. Within this context, Doukas 
and Travlos (1988) suggest that the shareholders of firms acquiring cross-border targets should 
experience greater gains when their multinational network increases. Accordingly we ask the 
following question: Does the performance of ECs in CBA deals depend on the extent of the 
acquiring firm’s multinational network?  
The answer to this question is important for several reasons. First, it contributes to current 
evidence suggesting that the costs and benefits of international business expansion are not 
uniform across all CBA deals.  Specifically, operating within a multinational network allows 
firms to arbitrage institutional restrictions, capture informational externalities, and gain cost 
savings by joint production in marketing and manufacturing (Doukas and Travos, 1988).
4
 
Consequently, companies wishing to expand internationally for the first time in their business 
                                                          
1 For instance, in 2007 the value of CBAs worldwide reached $1,197bn compared to only $39bn in 1987 (UNCTAD, 2009). 
2 In this article, when using the acronyms “CBA” and “M&A” throughout our study, we refer to changes of corporate control, 
and not to partial acquisitions, toehold investments or acquisitions of assets.  
3 ECs constitute a contingent payment device in which the total transaction value is delivered to the seller in two stages: an up-
front payment in the form of cash, stock, or mixture of cash and stock, and a future (deferred) payment, often in the form of cash, 
that is conditional upon the target firm achieving certain pre-agreed performance-related goals (Cain, Denis and Denis, 2011). 
4 Kogut (1983) offers an extensive discussion on the effects of these options on firm value.  
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history (FT) and join a multinational network through the acquisition of a foreign firm face a 
substantial value-creating opportunity. As such, the expansion of the firm’s operations in a 
global scale accomplishes the investors’ international diversification objectives as well as 
enables the acquiring firm to benefit from the inherent systemic operational advantages. Yet, FT 
deals also impose significant complexities, due to the intrinsic risks of exiting the home country 
for the first time and entering a new, and at most times less developed (Doukas, 1995), 
geographic market.
5
 A failure to optimally account for the inherent risks can ultimately offset the 
implied benefits. Consequently, the contingent risk-mitigating properties of EC-financing can 
offer a reliable solution. Nevertheless, the wealth effects of the choice of ECs, conditional on the 
extent of the acquiring firm’s multinational network, remain to be investigated.  
Second, it contributes to the ongoing investigation of the determinants of value creation in 
CBA deals and, in particular, EC-financed international changes of corporate control. 
Specifically, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) illustrate that transactions leading to an increase 
in global diversification negatively impact the market’s reaction to CBA deals. Similarly, at an 
earlier study, Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) identify global diversification valuation discounts, 
closely related to agency problems and free-cash-flow considerations (Jensen, 1986).
6
 Within 
this context, non-FT international M&As in either a new country (NFT_NEW), or in a country 
where the acquiring firm has already engaged in a CBA deal in the past (NFT_SAME), should 
render the use of ECs less value enhancing.
7
 In addition, the inherent costs of monitoring and 
bonding foreign operations increase as a firm becomes more globally diversified. This should 
further reduce the expected synergy gains from the use of ECs, which require the costly close 
monitoring of the target’s performance post-merger (Cain et al., 2011).  
Evidently, the above are expected to be more pronounced in NFT_SAME deals, which do 
not expand the acquiring firm’s multinational network and, therefore, do not alter the market’s 
                                                          
5 These include unfamiliar institutions and cultural values, disparate accounting practices, capital restrictions, tax policies and 
disclosure requirements, divergent contract enforceability due to legal and regulatory differences, as well as unpredictable future 
cash flows due to unforeseen exchange rate movements.  
6
 The increase in the acquiring firm’s global diversification is reflected by the increase in its proportion of sales from foreign 
operations to total sales (Denis, Denis and Yost, 2002) 
7
 The sum of all CBA deals consists of the sum of all first-time CBA deals (FT), the sum of all non-first-time CBA deals in a new 
country (NFT_NEW) and the sum of all non-first-time CBA deals in a country where the acquiring firm has already engaged in a 
CBA deal in the past (NFT_SAME), i.e. CBA = FT + NFT_NEW + NFT_SAME. 
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perception over the acquirer’s ability to benefit from operating within such (Doukas and Travlos, 
1988). Nevertheless, the implications of the above on the wealth effects of earnouts in 
international changes of corporate control remain to be investigated.  
The UK M&A market offers a useful laboratory to gain robust insights into the workings of 
ECs in CBA deals. We argue that the choice of the UK M&A market enables us to draw 
sufficiently general conclusions provided that UK acquirers are regularly involved in cross-
border M&A activities,
8
 while ECs appear in the financing process of more than 27% of 
domestic and 16% of cross-border deals, respectively.
9
 The latter set the UK market for 
corporate control as one of the most CBA-active markets, as well as the most earnout-active 
market (domestically and internationally) worldwide. 
In the methodological front, we employ a three-stage approach. The first stage comprises a 
standard univariate analysis of the abnormal returns gained by acquirers. This involves the 
comparison of the market-adjusted announcement period returns of acquirers involved in the 
aforementioned three CBA categories (FT, NFT_NEW, NFT_SAME) and financed with ECs, 
relative to domestic and CBA counterparts financed with earnouts as well as single up-front 
payments. In addition, we perform a multiple regression analysis, which allows us to control for 
the simultaneous impact of several deal- and merging firm- specific features on acquirers’ 
abnormal returns. As deals that increase the acquiring firm’s multinational network have been 
illustrated to generate greater acquirer gains (Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Markides and Ittner, 
1993; Doukas, 1995), we employ the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method. This enables us 
to deal with selection bias concerns that may affect our univariate and multivariate conclusions, 
as well as their causal interpretation. Moreover, in order to ensure that our propensity score 
estimator (i.e. the logit model that predicts treatment use, i.e. EC-use) produces estimates that are 
free of hidden-bias, or omitted variable bias, which is likely to affect the quality of our PSM 
results, the Rosenbaum-bounds (RB) sensitivity analysis method is also employed. This allows 
                                                          
8 Healy and Palepu (1993) portray the UK as a leader in CBA deals accounting for roughly 30% of global activity in the late 
1980s. Similarly data available from the UN (UNCTAD, 2000) portray the UK as holding the same proportion of CBA activity 
by the late 1990s.  
9 The rate of earnout use in our study (UK based) is much higher than the 3.9% in Cain et al. (2011), the 4.1% in Datar, Frankel 
and Wolfson (2001) and the 5.6% in Kohers and Ang (2000), which are all US based. 
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us to identify the extent to which the accuracy of each of our matching sequences is affected by 
the impact of unobserved covariates (Rosenbaum, 2002). 
Our results portray EC-financing as the second most frequent payment method in 
international changes of corporate control. When comparing the distributions of acquirers’ 
announcement period abnormal returns, EC-financed FT deals significantly outperform all 
domestic corporate takeovers. Within the CBA portfolio of deals, EC-financed FT deals yield 
significantly greater gains to acquirers relative to FT deals financed with cash, as well as relative 
to both NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME deals irrespective of payment method. The aforementioned 
wealth effects are further verified within a multivariate framework, while including other factors 
known to influence both domestic and international takeover outcomes. Moreover, when 
examining the performance of ECs solely within the FT portfolio, our results indicate that 
acquirers enjoy greater gains when employing ECs in less developed countries.  
The outputs of our PSM and RB methods further illustrate the robustness of our conclusions 
to potential selection bias considerations within the FT portfolio. Specifically, treated EC-
financed FT deals significantly outperform their matched non-EC FT counterfactuals by roughly 
2.20%, among alternative matching estimations. Similarly, the effect of EC-financing persists 
when conducting a multivariate analysis within treated and control FT deals.  Regarding the 
effects of EC-financing in non-FT deals, EC-financed NFT_NEW deals are illustrated to yield 
gains to acquirers that are indistinguishable from those of domestic deals. In contrast, in the case 
of NFT_SAME deals the gains to EC acquirers, relative to those from domestic deals, are 
significantly lower. As for their relative performance, EC-financed NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME 
deals are illustrated to yield statistically equal gains to acquirers. We also employ PSM and RB 
within the NFT_NEW portfolio of deals. Our results depict our treated EC-financed NFT_NEW 
deals yielding equal gains to acquirers as their matched NEC-financed NFT_NEW counterparts. 
Lastly, we expand our investigation on the performance of ECs in cross-border transactions by 
considering strategic alternatives to mergers or acquisitions of firms. Our results portray EC-
financed FT divestitures underperforming their EC-financed NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME 
counterparts.  
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Our paper makes valuable contributions to M&A literature. Specifically, in contrast to 
current evidence depicting acquirers suffering losses from CBA deals, relative to domestic ones, 
or at best breaking even, we identify a portfolio of CBA deals, i.e. EC-financed FT deals, 
significantly outperforming all domestic and remaining CBA deals. Our results are, therefore, in 
line with the Multinational Network Hypothesis (MNH) of Doukas and Travlos (1988). All the 
more so, having accounted for potential selection bias considerations within the FT portfolio, our 
results set EC-financing as the payment strategy yielding the highest gains to the shareholders of 
firms that wish to join a multinational network through the acquisition of a foreign company. In 
addition, we further illustrate the usefulness of this uncertainty reduction payment mechanism in 
initial international expansions in less developed countries, which exhibit a higher level of 
investment risk, in line with Doukas (1995).  
Moreover, we complement and extend the findings of Mantecon (2009) and Barbopoulos 
and Sudarsanam (2012), suggesting that EC-financed CBA deals yield insignificant 
announcement period wealth gains. Specifically, we distinguish the latter between those of FT 
and non-FT deals and further illustrate the value-increasing performance of ECs in FT deals, 
relative to (a) all domestic deals, (b) FT deals not financed with ECs and (c) all non-FT deals, in 
both univariate and multivariate frameworks. In so doing, we argue that the potential presence of 
agency problems and monitoring costs reduce acquirers’ gains in EC-financed non-FT cross-
border acquisitions of firms. In contrast, the lower integration costs characterizing international 
divestitures, in addition to the divested asset’s inefficient performance that lead to its eventual 
sale, result in a reversal of the wealth effects of EC-financing between FT and non-FT 
divestitures.  
We proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews the salient literature and presents our testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the methods used to conduct our empirical analysis. Section 4 
provides a description of the data employed and discusses our main findings. Finally, Section 5 
provides a conclusion. 
  
128 
 
 
5.2. Theoretical Framework and Testable Hypotheses 
Over the recent decades, globalization-related relaxations in restrictions of capital mobility along 
with further integration of product and capital markets have expanded firms’ opportunity sets, 
motivating them to take advantage of operating, informational and financial synergies, inherent 
within a multinational network.
10
 To this end, cross-border M&As offer substantial value-
creating opportunities to firms choosing to expand internationally through corporate takeovers. 
Nevertheless, evidence on the wealth effects generated by CBAs suggests that acquirers, at best, 
break even when expanding internationally (Fatemi and Furtado, 1988; Datta and Puia, 1995; 
Gregory and McCoriston, 2005; Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes, 2005). Similarly, Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) identify the presence of a cross-border effect resulting in CBA acquirers 
experiencing significantly lower short-run abnormal returns, than their domestic counterparts.  
Aiming at explaining the variation of acquirers’ abnormal returns during the announcement 
of international corporate takeovers, extant literature has identified a series of elements affecting 
the value of the assets being exchanged and, consequently, the likelihood of success of CBA 
deals.  Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) and Froot and Stein (1991) illustrate the role of capital 
market imperfections and exchange rate movements. The latter can result in firms benefiting 
from a relatively appreciated currency when acquiring foreign assets, thus reducing the need for 
costly external financing. Similarly, Morck and Yeung (1992) point to the importance of product 
or factor market imperfections providing evidence that CBA deals help internalize markets for 
intangible goods. Moreover, Agmon and Lessard (1977) and Baker, Foley, and Wurgler (2009) 
argue that CBA deals in countries with higher capital controls are likely to lead to higher 
corporate wealth creation, while Doukas and Travlos (1988) and Doukas (1995) suggest that 
firms should gain greater gains when expanding into less developed economies. In addition, 
Manzon, Sharp and Travlos (1994) test whether differences in firm-level and target country tax 
systems explain the cross-section in bidder returns in crossborder transactions. Lastly, divergent 
corporate governance techniques closely related to the operating legal frameworks across 
countries have also been identified by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000, 
2001) as well as Bris and Cabolis (2008) and Barbopoulos, Paudyal and Pescetto (2011). 
                                                          
10 Markides and Ittner (1993) offer an extensive discussion on the implied operational, informational and financial benefits of 
international corporate takeovers.  
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Consequently, different legal provisions affect the premium offered to the target firm, the 
integration costs post-merger and, hence, the net gains accrued to acquiring firms.  
The implied complexities of international deals complement deal- and merging firm- 
specific factors known to affect the outcome of an announced corporate takeover. Evidently, the 
increased valuation uncertainty that characterizes acquisitions of foreign firms could be 
accommodated by the contingent pricing properties of stock-financing (Hansen, 1987). 
Nevertheless, under equity-financing the target’s ownership in the combined firm is usually 
relatively small and, hence, the acquirer is disproportionately exposed to post-merger price 
corrections in case of misvaluation error (Kohers and Ang, 2000). Moreover, foreign targets are 
rarely willing to accept foreign equity, which forces acquirers to pay with cash (Gaughan, 2002), 
while Fishman (1989) argues that in cases of valuation disagreement cash-financing offers a sub-
optimal payment device. Consequently, this process can result in the likely deterioration of the 
positive wealth effects that are related to the high-value potential of deals financed with cash 
(Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005).
11
   
As an alternative contingent payment device, EC-financing can offer a reliable solution. 
Accordingly, the vast majority of studies on ECs illustrate that in deals involving targets that are 
subject to severe valuation uncertainty, the implied disagreement over the intrinsic value of the 
deal can be addressed via EC-use (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012; 
Cadman, Carrizosa and Faurel, 2014). Similarly, Reuer, Shenkar and Ragozzino (2004) indicate 
that the likelihood of use of an EC increases with the uncertainty faced by the bidding firm 
concerning the target’s value. Such targets include unlisted firms, firms operating in intangible-
rich sectors such as the high-tech and other services-based industries, or firms operating in 
unaffiliated industries. By deferring a significant portion of the entire transaction value and 
linking its delivery to the target’s performance post-merger, EC-financing offers a reliable 
solution to the implied disagreement, while reducing the acquirer’s exposure to valuation risk 
(Kohers and Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012). Furthermore, the contingent 
properties of ECs incentivise the target firm’s management to maximize performance post-
                                                          
11
 Fishman (1989) argues that a cash offer is made by a bidder who attaches a high value to the target and signals its confidence 
that the target will be a high-value company under its control over the post-acquisition period. Similarly, Eckbo, Giammarino and 
Henkel (1990) demonstrate that higher valued bidders increase the cash component of their offer. 
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merger, thus reducing moral hazard and increasing the probability of realization of the expected 
synergy gains (Datar, Frankel and Wolfson, 2001; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009). As a result, 
Kohers and Ang (2000) for the US, as well as Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) for the UK, 
indicate that bidders enjoy significant gains from corporate takeovers when utilizing ECs, as the 
acquisition’s payment currency.12  
Nevertheless, evidence on the performance of ECs in international M&As indicates zero net 
gains to acquirers (Mantecon, 2009; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012). Specifically, when 
examining the wealth effects generated by ECs, Mantecon (2009) identifies insignificant 
announcement period wealth gains accrued to EC acquirers’ shareholders. Moreover, it is 
suggested that the costs involved in CBA deals can ultimately offset the implied benefits.
13
 
Reuer et al. (2004) and Mantecon (2009) further illustrate that country characteristics affect the 
choice of entry strategy. 
The above suggest that the inherent complexities of CBA deals appeal to the use of ECs, 
yet, similar to when using single up-front financing methods, acquirers at best break even when 
using ECs in CBA deals. Nevertheless, the associated costs and benefits of international deals are 
not uniform across all international M&A deals. Specifically, Doukas and Travlos (1988) 
postulate the Multinational Network Hypothesis illustrating that the benefits of international 
business expansion mainly stem from arbitraging institutional restrictions, capturing 
informational externalities, and cost saving by joint production in marketing and manufacturing. 
Consequently, firms should experience greater gains when their multinational network increases, 
i.e. when firms expand internationally for the first time in their business history, or at a 
subsequent time in a new country. Moreover, Doukas and Travlos (1988), Markides and Ittner 
(1993) and Doukas (1995) further argue that the benefits associated with an increase of a firm’s 
multinational network should be greater when expanding in less developed countries and, 
consistent with Jensen’s free–cash-flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), lower when the acquirer is a 
highly profitable firm. 
                                                          
12 Kohers and Ang (2000) report a 2.2% 2-day cumulative abnormal return for earnout acquirers compared to 1.8% for cash and 
1.13% for stock acquirers. 
13 Mantecon (2009) identifies superior acquirer wealth gains when engaging in cross-border joint ventures, yet their very low 
frequency suggests that the inherent costs are greater than the implied benefits. The low frequency of cross-border joint ventures 
is confirmed within our study accounting for roughly 2.3% of cross-border transactions.  
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Evidently, CBA deals that expand the acquiring firm’s multinational network offer greater 
potential for value creation, as well as include greater risks than those that do not. This becomes 
particularly apparent when firms expand internationally for the first time in their business 
history. Despite allowing the acquiring firm to cross domestic boundaries and gain access to the 
benefits of operating within a multinational network, FT deals also include the inherent 
complexities of leaving the home country for the first time and entering a new geographic 
market. A failure to account for the implied risks can ultimately diminish the expected benefits. 
To this end, EC-financing can assist reduce the acquirer’s exposure to the inherent risks, increase 
information sharing between the involved firms as well as maintain the target firms’ 
management which, being familiar with the dynamics of its domestic market, is incentivized to 
maximize performance and receive the deferred payment. The above should send a strong signal 
for value creation to market participants reflecting the acquiring firm’s successful joining of a 
multinational network. Our first and second hypotheses are as follows:  
H1: EC-financed FT deals outperform domestic deals. 
H2: EC-financed FT deals outperform FT deals not financed with ECs. 
On the other hand, as a firm engages in subsequent CBA deals, in either a new country or 
not, it becomes more globally diversified. To this end, Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) argue 
that the monitoring of managerial decision making can be more difficult in firms that are 
globally diversified. Within a similar context, Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) identify the presence 
of a discount on acquirers’ announcement period abnormal equity gains that increases with the 
extent of the firm’s global diversification. The discount is further illustrated to be closely related 
to Jensen’s free-cash-flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) and agency costs. Moreover, large globally 
diversified firms face greater costs involved in monitoring and bonding foreign operations. 
Provided that ECs constitute multidimensional instruments with significant costs involved in 
drafting, designing, and monitoring their performance post-merger (Cain et al. 2011), the above 
suggest that, relative to EC-financed FT deals, EC-financed NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME deals 
should yield lower gains to acquirers.  
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Nevertheless, NFT_NEW deals may still appeal more to the use of ECs, than NFT_SAME 
deals, due to the inherent risks of entering a new geographic market. Moreover, NFT_SAME 
deals do not convey the positive news of an expansion of the acquiring firm’s multinational 
network and, therefore, do not alter the market’s perception over the acquirer’s ability to benefit 
from arbitraging institutional restrictions, capturing informational externalities and reducing 
operational costs (Doukas and Travlos, 1988). Lastly, the acquiring firm’s prior M&A 
experience in the target’s country should enhance its valuation technology, ultimately rendering 
EC-financing less appealing. Consequently, the above suggest that the gains accrued to EC 
acquirers from NFT_SAME deals should not be greater than those from NFT_NEW deals. Our 
third and fourth hypotheses are as follows: 
H3: EC-financed FT deals outperform NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME deals, either financed with 
ECs or not.   
H4: EC-financed NFT_SAME deals do not outperform NFT_NEW deals, either financed with 
ECs or not.  
The above hypotheses, if verified, illustrate the superior performance of EC-financed FT 
deals, relative to both domestic and remaining international M&A deals. Thus, consistent with 
the predictions of the MNH, the wealth gains generated by EC-financing in international changes 
of corporate control would be illustrated to differ depending on the extent of the acquiring firm’s 
multinational network. More so, verifying the above suggests that when firms choose to gain 
access to the operating benefits of a multinational network through the acquisition of a foreign 
company, financing the deal with ECs can enhance, to a great extent, its likelihood of success.  
 5.3. Methods 
In this sub-section the methodologies used to test the aforementioned hypotheses and derive the 
main results of the paper are discussed. Methods for calculating abnormal returns around M&A 
announcements are presented, along with the univariate and multivariate methods of their 
analysis. Subsequently, we outline the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Rosenbaum Bounds 
(RB) techniques. As the PSM method also involves identifying the determinants of EC-choice, 
as an M&A deal’s financing method, methods for performing the latter are presented.  
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5.3.1. Measurement of Short-Run Abnormal Returns 
The commonly used methods to estimate abnormal returns in response to an event (i.e. M&A) 
that is announced by an acquiring firm i requires a long time-series, or a window of returns of the 
acquiring firm i, which needs to be free of the effect of other (similar) events announced from the 
same firm i within the estimation period. Nevertheless, our sample is composed of many M&As 
that are announced by frequent acquirers within small periods. Therefore, standard asset pricing 
methods cannot be applied. Alternatively, in line with numerous previous studies 
accommodating similar concerns (Fuller et al., 2002; Faccio, McConnell and Stolin, 2006), the 
short-run abnormal returns for an acquiring firm i, in response to an M&A announcement, are 
estimated using the market-adjusted model (as shown in Equation 1): 
  ARi,t = Ri,t − Rm,t (1) 
Where:  ARi,t, is the abnormal return to acquirer i at day t, Ri,t is the stock return of acquirer i at 
day t, Rm,t is the value-weighted market return index (FTSE All Share) at day t. The 
announcement period Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for acquirer i is the sum of the 
abnormal returns in a 5-day window (t − 2 to t + 2) surrounding the deal’s announcement day, 
t = 0, as shown in Equation (2): 
 
CARi = ∑ ARi,t
t+2
t−2
 (2) 
5.3.2. Univariate and Multiple Regression Analysis 
At first, the announcement period abnormal returns of UK acquirers are analyzed by method of 
payment used (ALL, CASH, STOCK, MIXED, EC, non-EC or NEC) and type of M&A deal 
(ALL, DOM, CBA, FT, NFT_NEW, NFT_SAME). Furthermore, differentials between the gains 
to acquirers using the above payment methods in the aforementioned different types of M&A 
deals are calculated. To assess the comparative performance of different groups of acquirers, the 
difference in means is tested using the t-test. 
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Subsequently, we examine the above interactions in a multivariate framework where the 
effects of several other factors in shaping the announcement period acquirers’ returns are 
simultaneously controlled. In particular, the following equation is estimated in a nested form: 
CARi = a + ∑ Xi
N
i=1
+ ϵi                                                    (3)                    
Where: a is the intercept, the dependent variable, CAR, is the five-day announcement period 
cumulative abnormal return of acquirers. The vector of explanatory variables, X, includes a 
number of factors that are known to affect acquirers’ gains. Such factors consist of: 
Method of payment (EC, CASH, STOCK): Previous research indicates that valuation-complex 
M&A deals generate greater acquirer announcement period abnormal returns when financed with 
ECs (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012). Moreover evidence suggests 
positive wealth gains when financing acquisitions with cash (Fishman, 1989; Fuller et al., 2002) 
and mixed wealth effects when using stock as the transaction medium (Travlos, 1987; Hansen, 
1987; Chang, 1998). Therefore to account for the potential implications of different methods of 
payment on acquirers’ gains, dummy variables are constructed and included in equation (3) 
taking the value of one when an earnout provision is included in the transaction (EC), when cash 
is the deal’s transaction medium (CASH), when stock is the acquisition’s transaction medium 
(STOCK) and zero otherwise, respectively. 
Type of M&A deal (CBA, FT, NFT_NEW, NFT_SAME): Domestic and international deals have 
been illustrated to be affecting the acquiring firm’s short-run value gains (Conn, Cosh, Guest and 
Hughes, 2005). Moreover, the Multinational Network Hypothesis (Doukas and Travlos, 1988) 
postulates different gains to acquirers when expanding internationally for the first time, or at a 
subsequent time in a new country, or at a subsequent time yet not in a new country. Therefore, 
dummy variables are constructed and included in equation (3) taking the value of one when a 
deal constitutes an international takeover (CBA), when a deal constitutes the acquiring firm’s 
first ever CBA deal (FT), when a deal constitutes an acquiring firm’s subsequent CBA deal but 
in a new country (NFT_NEW), when a deal constitutes an acquiring firm’s subsequent CBA deal 
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in a country in which the acquirer has already engaged in a CBA deal in the past (NFT_SAME), 
and zero otherwise, respectively.
14
 
Target’s operating legal system (COMMON, FRENCH, GERMAN, SCANDINAVIAN, CIVIL): 
Current literature (Barbopoulos Paudyal and Prescetto, 2012) depicts that the target firm’s 
operating legal system interacts with the acquiring firm’s announcement period returns as the 
legal tradition of the target's domicile interacts with target's status and method of payment in 
shaping the net gains of acquirers. Therefore, dummy variables are constructed and included in 
equation (3) taking the value of one when the target firm operates in a Common Law legal 
system (COMMON), when the target firm operates in a French Civil Law legal system 
(FRENCH), when a target firm operates in German Civil Law legal system (GERMAN), when a 
target firm operates in Scandinavian Civil Law legal system, as well as when a firm operates in 
any of the latter three Civil Law categories (CIVIL) and zero otherwise, respectively.  
Target country capital controls (CAP CTRLS): Agmon and Lessard (1977) and Baker, Foley, 
and Wurgler (2009) argue that CBA deals in countries with higher capital controls are likely to 
lead to higher corporate wealth creation. Therefore, knowledge of the regulatory provisions on 
capital mobility is critically important for the managers of acquiring firms. The level of capital 
control of targets' domiciles is measured by the capital control index developed by Gwartney, 
Hall, & Lawson (2014) published in the Economic Freedom of the World: 2014 Annual Report. 
This time varying index covers 141 countries and the value ranges from 1.4 (for the least open 
economy) to 9.8 (for the most open economy). As this index is updated annually, it is rendered 
highly suitable for the purpose of the current study. 
Foreign Exchange rate (FX RATE): Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) and Kiymaz (2004) suggest 
that the gains of acquirers from CBA deals are affected by the relative strength of their domestic 
currency, relative to the currency of the target firm’s country. To measure the wealth effects of 
exchange rate fluctuations, an index is constructed using the procedure outlined in Kiymaz 
(2004). A positive (negative) value of the index indicates that the Pound Sterling has appreciated 
                                                          
14 While classifying deals as FT, we ensure that the acquiring firm has not engaged in any prior international acquisitions of 
assets, such as divestitures, or minority stakes that do not imply a change of corporate control, i.e. the total number of firms 
remains unchanged after the completion of the deal. In contrast, we do not apply such restrictions when classifying non-FT deals.   
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(depreciated) relative to the currency of the target's nation. Acquisitions made at the time of 
stronger domestic currency are expected to generate higher gains. 
Target country economic development (DEVELOPED): Doukas and Travlos (1988) and Doukas 
(1995) suggest that firms should gain greater gains when expanding into less developed 
economies. Therefore, we use country classifications offered by the International Monetary 
Fund, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World 
Bank and construct a dummy variable, which we include in equation (3), taking the value of one 
if the target firm resides in a developed country, and zero otherwise. 
Target country corporate tax rate (CORP TAX): Manzon, Sharp and Travlos (1994) test whether 
differences in firm-level and target country tax systems explain the cross-section of bidder 
returns in crossborder transactions. Therefore, to account for divergent tax policies across 
countries we use data on corporate tax rates offered by the International Monetary Fund, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank and 
include in equation (3). 
Acquirer’s trading history (AGE): Information asymmetry between the merging firms influences 
heavily the announcement period returns accrued to acquirers’ shareholders. Draper and Paudyal 
(2008) and Zhang (2006) suggest that investors tend to have more information on firms with 
longer trading history which results in lower information asymmetry. Therefore the age of the 
acquirer (measured by the log of number of days between the announcement day and the first 
record of the company in Datastream) is included in equation (3). 
Relative size of the deal (RS): Current literature (Fuller et al., 2002) depicts that acquirers’ gains 
are positively related to the relative size of the deal (measured as the log of the deal value over 
the market value of the acquirer). Therefore, the log-transformed relative size of the deal is 
included in equation (3).  
Diversification (DVSD): Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) and Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam 
(2012) point to the wealth effects generated by the industry relatedness of the target firm. 
Therefore, to control for the potential effect of corporate diversification a dummy variable taking 
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the value of one for cross-industry deals (i.e. target and acquirer do not have the same 2-digit 
SIC code) and zero otherwise is included in equation (3). 
Additional indicator variables: Extant literature has illustrated the influence exercised by the 
target firm’s listing status on the distribution of announcement period abnormal returns accrued 
to the acquiring firm’s shareholders (Travlos, 1987; Hansen, 1987; Chang, 1998, Fuller et al., 
2002). A dummy variables is hence, created for those cases where the acquired firm is unlisted 
(UNL). Finally, key financial ratios of the acquiring firm such as its market-to-book value 
(MTBV) and the ratio of net profit over revenue (NET MARGIN) signal information about the 
acquirer’s growth opportunities and profitability, respectively. Therefore, they are included in 
equation (3). 
5.3.3. Propensity Score Matching (PSM)  
Observational studies differ from experimental ones in that randomization is not used to assign 
treatment. Within the M&A context, extant literature is concerned with the understanding of 
motives and consequences of several events occurring (treatments) during the deal process by 
examining the acquiring firms’ announcement period abnormal returns as the response random 
variable (outcome). This paper aims to further explore the wealth effects of EC-financing on the 
distribution of acquirers’ announcement period abnormal returns in international corporate 
takeovers. Nevertheless, ECs are used in a small proportion of our large sample of M&A 
transactions. This raises concerns as to whether sample-selection bias reduces the reliability of 
our derived results and conclusions from both the univariate and multiple regression analyses. 
Evidently, addressing such concerns is vital in order to clarify the impact of EC-financing on 
acquirers’ short-run wealth gains. Specifically, the MNH indicates that acquirers should reap 
greater abnormal equity gains when expanding internationally for the first time, as well as when 
expanding internationally subsequently but in a new country. It, therefore, needs to be 
determined whether the wealth effects generated by EC-financing in FT and NFT_NEW deals 
reflect the impact of EC-use on the acquisition’s expected synergy potential, and not solely the 
effect of the expansion of the acquiring firm’s multinational network. The PSM methodology can 
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help us address these concerns and enhance our understanding of the wealth implications of EC-
financed cross-border acquisitions of firms.
15
 
Implementing the PSM methodology allows for an unbiased causal inference, by pairing 
treated (EC-financed) and comparison/control (non-EC financed) sample units based on 
observable pre-treatment characteristics and observing differences between the two groups in a 
response random variable (announcement period CAR) (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Specifically, 
PSM involves matching (treated) deals that exhibit a certain attribute (treatment), i.e. EC-
financing, to counterfactual deals (controls) that do not exhibit the treatment but illustrate the 
same propensity score (probability) to do so as the treated deals that actually do. We employ 
PSM in two Exercises. In Exercise 1, we match EC-financed FT deals to NEC-financed FT 
deals. In Exercise 2, we match EC-financed NFT_NEW deals to NEC-financed NFT_NEW 
deals. These two matching exercises enable us to address potential self-selection concerns and 
accurately estimate the effect of EC-financing on acquirers’ short-run wealth gains which is now 
highly likely to be bias-free. We employ 1-to-1 nearest neighbor matching with replacement 
within 1% of Absolute Probability Difference (APD).  
Lastly, as PSM is based on matching relative to each deal’s probability to exhibit the 
treatment (calculated from the propensity score estimator, i.e. the logit model) and not on each 
deal’s separate covariate’s effect on the latter, we test for covariate balance between treated and 
control deals once matching is complete, as a robustness check. Rosenbaum (1985) illustrates 
that a two-sample t-test among the distributions of covariates between the treated and control 
groups constitutes a sufficient diagnostic to determine covariate balance. 
5.3.4. Determinants of Earnout Choice 
The PSM method is based on matching treated to counterfactual sample units based on a 
propensity score predicting the use of the treatment. Therefore, the logistic regression 
methodology is implemented in order to model the choice of ECs in FT (Exercise 1) and 
NFT_NEW (Exercise 2) deals and calculate each deal’s propensity to exhibit the treatment (EC). 
Specifically, the logit model estimates the probability of a sample deal being financed with an 
                                                          
15 Behr and Heid (2011) provide a thorough analysis of the PSM methodology along with its application in evaluating the success 
of German bank mergers in the period 1995-2000. 
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EC, conditional upon merging institution- and deal- specific characteristics, and may be regarded 
as “predicting” the use of ECs conditional on these characteristics. Therefore, in the estimations, 
our dependent variable assumes the value of 1 if a deal is EC-financed and 0 otherwise. The 
binary variable is regressed, in a logistic regression framework, against a set of independent 
variables. 
 Current literature on EC-financing illustrates that earnout provisions are most likely to be 
observed in acquisitions of unlisted firms, operating in intangible-rich sectors, or unrelated 
industries, and characterized by substantial risk, mainly sourced from adverse selection and 
moral hazard concerns (Kohers and Ang, 2000). Moreover, Datar et al. (2001) illustrate that 
Common Law countries facilitate, to a great extent, contractual agreements, thus increasing the 
likelihood of its use. In addition, EC-financing is hypothesized to be implemented by acquirers 
expecting high value creation from the acquisition which leads to the need to capture the 
acquirer’s growth opportunities as measured by its market-to-book ratio (Rau and Vermaelen, 
1998). Furthermore, as an EC is more likely to be implemented in relatively riskier deals than 
single upfront payment methods (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Cain et al., 2011), Fuller et al. (2002) 
suggest that a deal’s transaction value relative to the acquiring firm’s market value prior to the 
deal’s announcement constitutes an adequate measure of the degree of riskiness of the deal. In 
addition we also include factors known to influence crossborder takeover activity. These consist 
of the target country’s level of economic development, the capital controls in place in the target 
country, the corporate tax rate that is in effect in the target country and the relative strength of 
the acquiring firm’s currency. Lastly, this study also utilizes certain key financial ratios of the 
acquiring firm, as further determinants of the decision to engage in an EC-financed deal. They 
consist of the acquiring firm’s cash ratio (total cash and cash equivalents over total assets), its 
debt-to-equity ratio (total debt to common equity) and its ratio of net profit over revenue (profit 
margin). The latter are expected to capture the liquidity, leverage and profitability status of the 
acquiring firm. Lastly, when matching within NFT_NEW deals we also include the ratio of the 
acquiring firm’s foreign to total sales. This allows us to capture, to a great extent, the extent to 
which the acquiring firm’s degree of global diversification affects the probability of EC use, as 
well as match treated EC-financed deals to NEC-counterfactual deals involving acquirers that are 
similarly globally diversified. 
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5.3.5. Rosenbaum-Bounds (RB) 
Matching based on the observed covariates may leave out potentially unobserved covariates and, 
consequently, treated and control groups would not be comparable. This criticism can be 
dismissed in a randomized experiment, as randomization tends to balance unobserved covariates, 
but it cannot be dismissed in an observational study. In order to formalize such arguments, one 
needs a way of determining the degree to which deals that seem comparable are, in fact, not 
comparable (Rosenbaum-bounds method; Rosenbaum, 1987). The RB method permits us to 
examine the sensitivity of our conclusions, derived from matching, to the effect of an unobserved 
covariate from our propensity score estimator (logit model) and enables us to measure how 
influential a confounding (unobserved) covariate needs to be in order to invalidate the effect of 
the treatment on the response random variable (announcement period CAR). Specifically, the RB 
method measures the degree of departure from random assignment of the treatment. This allows 
us to gain confidence regarding the validation of our conclusions from the matching sequence. 
To this end, RB is used as a further robustness check to ensure that our logit models produce 
estimates that are free of hidden-bias due to misspecification errors, which are likely to appear 
due to omitted covariates, or to ensure ourselves that our estimates used in the matching 
exercises are not sensitive (or how sensitive they are) to hidden-bias caused by omitted 
covariates in our logit models (Rosenbaum, 2002). 
Specifically, the RB sensitivity analysis illustrates that two deals may in fact not be 
comparable, due to unobserved parameters but, nevertheless, this non-comparison can be 
controlled for, to an extent, by a parameter Γ ≥  1. Specifically, two deals, i and j, with the same 
observed covariates, 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗, have odds of treatment 
πi
1−πi
 and 
πj
1−πj
 that differ, at most, by a 
multiplier of Γ regarding their probability of receiving the treatment: 
 1
Γ
≤
πi
1−πi
πj
1−πj
≤ Γ     whenever 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗   (4) 
When Γ = 1 in (4) it can be asserted that two matched deals are indeed comparable, while values 
of Γ greater than 1, Γ ≥ 1, indicate the presence of some bias due to failure to control for omitted 
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covariates. The RB method is based on examining how such inferences would change. 
Increasing Γ and testing whether the treatment effect (the difference in the outcome variable i.e. 
the acquiring firms’ announcement period CAR between treated and control groups) becomes 
insignificant provides an adequate process to test for the existence and severity of potential 
hidden variable bias. This enables us to deduce the range of possible p-values for a specified Γ 
and estimate the cut-off point of the RB method beyond which the p-values and, hence, the 
treatment effects, become insignificant. On the other hand, in the case of insignificant treatment 
effects the RB method tests how sensitive the latter are to becoming negative and significant. 
Evidently, to ensure that our logit models’ estimates and, thus, the estimation of propensities are 
free of hidden bias due to potentially unobserved covariates, the RB method is utilized proposing 
the selection of the least exposed to hidden bias model.
 16
 
5.4. Data and Results 
5.4.1. The Sample 
The sample consists of completed M&A deals announced by UK public firms between 
01/01/1985 and 31/12/2013 and recorded by the Security Data Corporation (SDC).
17
 SDC 
records 31,828 M&A deals involving UK public acquirers within the sample period covered. In 
order for a deal to remain in the sample, it must meet the following criteria: first, the acquirer is a 
UK public company listed in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and has a market value of at 
least $1m, measured four weeks prior to the announcement of the deal. To avoid the insignificant 
effects of very small deals, the transaction value needs to be at least $1m. Because we wish to 
study transactions clearly motivated by changes in control, we follow Rossi and Volpin (2004) 
and focus on mergers and acquisitions of at least 50 percent of the target firm’s equity (business 
combinations in which the total number of companies decreases after the completion of the 
transaction). Targets of all listings (public, private and subsidiary) and domicile (UK or non-UK) 
are included in the sample. To avoid the confounding effects of multiple deals, deals announced 
                                                          
16
 An alternative method to assess the extent of selection bias within our results would be to conduct a Heckman two-stage 
correction method (Heckman, 1979). Nevertheless, our sample of M&A deals is composed, to a large extent, of deals involving 
private targets for which public information on observed lagged variables, which are frequently used as instruments in such 
methods, is very limited. Thus the use of the PSM technique is preferred. Moreover, to account for the potential effect of 
unobserved covariates, the Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis is implemented.  
17
 The starting date of the sample is guided by the comprehensiveness of SDC. Netter, Stegemoller and Wintoki (2011) suggest 
that SDC offers complete coverage of M&A announcements by at least 1989.  
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within 5-days surrounding another bid by the same acquirer are excluded from the sample. 
Furthermore, the daily stock price and market value of the acquirer need to be available from 
Datastream. Buy-backs, repurchases, exchange offers, recapitalizations, privatizations, self-
tender offers, spin-offs and reverse takeovers are excluded from the sample. Cases where either 
acquirer, or target firms are government organizations are excluded from the sample. The above 
criteria are satisfied by 5,495 deals and remain in the sample. Cross-border M&A cases consist 
of 1,693 deals, 453 of which are EC-financed.  
5.4.2. Sample Characteristics  
Table 1 illustrates the distribution of all, domestic, and international M&A deals (Panel A), 
further categorizing the latter based on the extent of the acquiring firm’s multinational network 
(FT, NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME) and presents summary statistics on the above for all deals 
(Panel B), as well as for EC-financed deals specifically (Panel C). Consistent with Faccio and 
Masulis (2005) and Draper and Paudyal (2006), Panel A shows that the vast majority of UK 
M&As involve unlisted firms (85.60% of all domestic deals and 86.24% of all CBA deals 
respectively), while cash and mixed payments dominate the acquisitions’ financing currencies 
(37.64% and 24.22% respectively). Regarding the target’s domicile, roughly 30% of targets 
within our sample reside beyond UK borders, while almost 60% operate within a Common Law 
legal framework. One in five CBA deals (20.08%) constitutes an acquiring firm’s initial 
international expansion. Subsequent international expansions are mostly observed within 
countries in which the acquiring firm has already engaged in a CBA deal in the past (50.26% of 
all CBA deals), while non-initial international expansions in a new country account for roughly 
30% of all CBA activity. Consistent with previous studies on EC-use (Barbopoulos and 
Sudarsanam, 2012), roughly 28% of all deals and 27% of all CBA deals within our sample 
involve the use of contingent earnout payments as their transaction currency. Within CBA deals, 
EC-use is observed in almost one in four FT deals (24.12%), while its frequency in NFT_NEW 
and NFT_SAME deals reaches 30.28% and 25.73%, respectively. Cash-financing constitutes the 
most frequent payment method in CBA deals, consistent with Moeller et al. (2005). Lastly, 
roughly half of our sampled M&As account for diversifying deals, irrespective of the target 
firm’s domicile.  
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(Insert Table 5.1 about here) 
Panel B illustrates the increased average size of CBA deals accounting for more than twice 
the size of domestic deals ($265m and $121m respectively). CBA deals also involve larger 
acquirers, on average, relative to domestic deals ($3,455m and $943.7m respectively). 
Nevertheless, not all CBA deals appear to share the above characteristics as FT deals are 
substantially smaller in size ($34m on average), whereas the average size of subsequent 
international expansions in either a new country or not increases almost tenfold ($333m and 
$316m respectively). Similarly, FT deals involve much smaller acquirers than NFT_NEW and 
NFT_SAME deals ($298m compared to $3,121 and $4,913m respectively). Yet, FT deals exhibit 
the greatest average and median relative deal size (0.72 and 0.11) compared to domestic (0.43 
and 0.09), NFT_NEW (0.12 and 0.04) and NFT_SAME (0.22 and 0.03) deals. The above further 
corroborate the increased risk faced by acquirers in their initial, relative to their subsequent, 
international takeovers, as well as relative to domestic deals. Furthermore, the above also suggest 
the potential existence of agency problems in non-FT deals, signaled by the large size of the 
involved acquirers. Lastly, FT acquirers exhibit the greatest cash ratio and the lowest debt-to-
equity ratio, relative to domestic, NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME acquirers. The above indicate the 
absence of liquidity and leverage considerations, which could negatively affect the likelihood of 
success of a firm’s initial international expansion.  
In Panel C we focus on EC acquirers specifically. As in Panel B, EC-financed FT deals are, 
on average, smaller in size than EC-financed NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME deals ($21.66m 
compared to $24.36m and $54.6m respectively), involve smaller acquirers ($207m compared to 
$1,100m and $1,758m respectively) and incorporate greater valuation risk, as approximated by 
their increased relative deal size (0.31 compared to 0.08 and 0.13 respectively). This increased 
risk is also reflected by the average relative earnout value (=value of earnout component over 
deal value)
18
 of EC-financed FT deals when compared to their non-FT CBA counterparts (0.44 
compared to 0.36 and 0.37 respectively). In contrast to reported statistics in Panel B, acquirers 
involved in EC-financed FT deals exhibit larger average market-to-book values than their 
counterparts in NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME EC-financed deals. As EC acquirers consist of 
                                                          
18 Cain et al. (2011) illustrate the accuracy of this measure as a further proxy of an EC-financed deal’s implied riskiness.  
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mainly small firms, the above observation likely indicates their increased growth potential when 
engaging in FT deals, relative to acquirers not using ECs in FT deals or relative to acquirers in 
subsequent CBA deals. Lastly, acquirers in EC-financed FT deals also exhibit higher liquidity 
and lower leverage ratios than their domestic counterparts, further suggesting the absence of such 
concerns that should render target firms, and especially foreign ones, more reluctant towards 
engaging in a contingent payment structure.  
5.4.3. Univariate Analysis of Acquirers’ Short-Run Abnormal Returns 
In Tables 2 and 3, the findings from our univariate analysis are presented according to the 
method of payment used (ALL, CASH, STOCK, MIXED, EC, non-EC or NEC) and the 
different types of M&A deals (ALL, DOM, CBA, FT, NFT_NEW, NFT_SAME). Differentials 
between the value gains accrued to acquirers from deals financed with ECs versus different NEC 
currencies among all different types of M&A deals as well as differentials between the value 
gains accrued to acquirers among different types of M&A deals for a given payment currency are 
also recorded.  
(Insert Table 5.2 about here) 
As indicated by prior research on EC-financing (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012), Table 
2 (Panel A) illustrates the superior returns yielded to acquirers’ shareholders from EC-financed 
domestic deals, relative to their domestic NEC counterparts. Moreover, in line with existing 
evidence (Mantecon, 2009), choosing this two-part transaction mechanism instead of single up-
front payments does not significantly enhance acquirers’ gains in international changes of 
corporate control. In contrast, as preliminary evidence in support of hypothesis H2, EC-financed 
FT deals yield significantly greater returns to acquirers than cash-financed FT deals by 1.71%. 
Consistent with prior evidence on the performance of international takeovers (Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005; Gregory and McCoriston, 2005), Panel B illustrates that, relative to 
domestic deals, acquirers do not enjoy greater gains when engaging in CBA deals. Moreover, 
EC-financed CBA deals appear to destroy value, relative to their domestic EC-financed 
counterparts. Nevertheless, our results suggest that the well-documented superior performance of 
EC-financing in domestic deals is matched by employing this contingent payment method in FT 
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and NFT_NEW deals. Consistent with hypothesis H3, EC-financed FT deals significantly 
outperform their NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME EC-financed counterparts by 2.02% and 2.82% 
respectively. On the other hand, when using NEC payment currencies in FT deals, acquirers 
enjoy significant gains solely relative to NFT_SAME deals by 1.05%.
19
 Lastly, consistent with 
hypothesis H4, acquirers enjoy similar gains when employing ECs in NFT_NEW and 
NFT_SAME deals 
(Insert Table 5.3 about here) 
In Table 3 (Panel C) we aim to investigate the performance of different EC-financed CBA 
portfolios relative to portfolios of domestic and CBA deals not financed with ECs. Consistent 
with hypothesis H1, relative to domestic deals, acquirers enjoy significantly greater average 
gains from EC-financed FT deals by 1.66%. Specifically, EC-financed FT deals significantly 
outperform all domestic cash-, stock- and non-earnout- financed deals by 1.78%, 2.43% and 
1.83%, respectively. Consequently, the documented inferior performance of CBA deals relative 
to domestic deals (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005) does not appear to hold for EC-financed FT 
deals. In contrast, NFT_NEW EC-financed deals match the performance of domestic deals, 
while NFT_SAME EC-financed deals significantly underperform all domestic deals. Consistent 
with hypothesis H3, EC-financed FT deals yield superior gains to acquirers’ shareholders, 
relative to both NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME deals across all payment methods. Moreover, EC-
financed FT deals significantly outperform all CBA deals, which include all FT deals not 
financed with ECs, by 2% and all NEC-financed CBA deals by 1.98%. Lastly, consistent with 
hypothesis H4, EC-financed NFT_NEW deals result in greater, yet statistically insignificant, 
average gains to acquirers than NFT_SAME deals.  
5.4.4. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Rosenbaum-Bounds (RB) 
In drawing inferences about the causal impact of a decision (i.e. treatment use) on a 
performance measure (outcome), it is customary to compare the latter in pairs of groups of 
treated and untreated sample units. In an experimental setting such groups are selected randomly. 
                                                          
19 The low frequency of stock-financed CBA deals (Gaughan, 2002) is confirmed within our sample rendering marginally 
significant the positive wealth effects generated by stock financing in FT deals, relative to NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME deals.  
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However, in a non-experimental setting, inferences on the causal effect of a decision (treatment) 
may be biased due to systematic sample self-selection. Consequently, as FT and NFT_NEW 
deals increase the acquiring firm’s multinational network, the wealth implications of the choice 
of EC-financing on acquirers’ short-run abnormal returns (outcome) in such deals may be due to 
the pre-treatment characteristics of the treated groups (FT deals, NFT_NEW deals), rather than 
to the treatment per-se (EC-financing). As mentioned in section 3.3, PSM can assist address such 
concerns. We employ one-to-one nearest neighbor matching with replacement. In order to avoid 
the negative effects of potential hidden variable bias in our propensity score estimators (logit 
models) we also implement the Rosenbaum-Bounds (RB) methodology, resulting in the selection 
of the least exposed to hidden variable bias models. 
5.4.4.1 PSM and RB Methods for FT Deals 
Table 4 presents the output of our PSM method for FT deals. We use three alternative 
specifications in order to model the choice of ECs as the payment method. Subsequently, based 
on each model’s covariate estimates, we calculate each deal’s propensity score to exhibit the 
treatment (EC-financing) and match EC-financed FT deals to their nearest, in terms of propensity 
score, NEC-financed FT counterfactuals. 
(Insert Table 5.4 about here) 
In line with prior research on EC-financing (Kohers and Ang, 2000; Barbopoulos and 
Sudarsanam, 2012) reported estimates in Model 1 suggest that the likelihood of financing an 
initial international takeover expansion with an EC increases in deals exposing the acquirer to 
substantial valuation risk, as reflected by their relative transaction value. In addition, the 
probability of EC-financing is illustrated to increase when firms with substantial growth 
opportunities, yet not as liquid, engage in FT deals. In contrast, their leverage and profitability 
status do not appear to impose a significant effect. Moreover, the insignificant effects of country-
specific factors suggest that it is mostly deal-specific valuation-related issues that appeal to the 
use of ECs in FT deals. In Model 2, we further proxy for the listing status of the target firm and 
the operating legal framework of the target country. Consistent with prior research on EC-use, 
the likelihood of financing an FT deal with an EC increases when involving unlisted targets. On 
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the other hand, Civil Law countries impose an insignificant effect. Lastly, in Model 3 we further 
proxy for the industry relatedness of the target firm and its nature of operations. Reported 
estimates suggest that diversifying FT deals are less likely to be financed with an EC, while 
targets operating in intangible-rich industries impose an insignificant effect. As the vast majority 
of acquirers in EC-financed FT deals operate in intangible-rich sectors,
20
 the choice of ECs 
appears to aim at facilitating the acquiring firm’s attempt to arbitrage cross-country operational 
restrictions through the joining of a multinational network.  
Once identifying the determinants of EC-use in FT deals, we proceed to match treated EC-
financed deals to untreated NEC-financed FT deals. Nevertheless, as Section 3.3 outlines, the 
main purpose of the PSM method is to identify a counterfactual sample unit 𝑗 that does not 
receive the treatment (EC-financing), yet it exhibits the same probability to receive the treatment 
as a treated sample unit 𝑖. The identification of the counterfactual sample unit 𝑗 is conditional on 
a propensity score that is determined by all covariates included in the propensity score estimator 
(logit model), and not on each ex-ante characteristic, or covariate, ‘X’. Consequently, an 
important robustness check in each of our matching sequences involves the comparison of the 
distributions of each of the models’ covariates between the treated and control groups. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) illustrate that the two-sample t-test for comparing the distributions 
of covariates’ means is appropriate. As we observe in Panel B, the distribution of covariates 
among all three sequences does not yield any significant differences between the treated and 
untreated groups, hence confirming efficient matching. 
Panel C records the valuation effects (contribution) of EC-financing in FT deals. Evidently, 
it can be observed that, among our three matching sequences, EC-financed deals yield 
significantly greater gains to FT acquirers than non-EC payment currencies by 2.18%, 2.26% and 
2.22% respectively. Consequently, once reducing potential selection bias considerations, our 
results from matching provide robust support for our Hypothesis H2 and, specifically, establish 
EC-financing as a superior transaction medium when firms choose to engage in a CBA deal for 
                                                          
20 We observe within our sample that roughly 73% of acquirers operate in industries characterized as highly intangible. These 
consist of the High-Tech, Consumer Products and Services, Media and Entertainment and Telecommunications sectors.  
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the first time in their business history.
21
 To this end, EC-financing appears to facilitate the 
acquiring firm’s joining of a multinational network through the acquisition of a foreign company, 
yielding superior gains to FT acquirers compared to single up-front payment currencies.  
Lastly, Panel D presents the results from the Rosenbaum-bounds (RB) sensitivity analysis, 
which allows us to investigate the exposure of our derived conclusions to the effect of missing 
covariates from our propensity score estimator (logit model) and, thus, identify potential miss-
matching between treated and untreated M&As. Specifically, it allows us to measure how 
influential a confounding (unobserved) covariate needs to be in order to invalidate the effect of 
the treatment. Our estimates confirm that the effect of the treatment on acquirers’ gains would be 
rendered negligible if an unobserved covariate caused the odds of treatment assignment to 
change in each matching exercise by at least 98%, 47% and 60% respectively. Hence, our results 
from matching are, to a great extent, less likely to be sensitive to the impact of a missing 
covariate.
22
 
5.4.4.2 PSM and RB Methods for NFT_NEW Deals 
Table 5 presents the output of our PSM method for NFT_NEW deals. We use two alternative 
specifications in order to model the choice of ECs as the payment method of NFT_NEW deals. 
Subsequently, based on each model’s covariate estimates, we calculate each deal’s propensity 
score to exhibit the treatment (EC-financing) and match EC-financed NFT_NEW deals to their 
nearest, in terms of propensity score, NEC-financed NFT_NEW counterfactuals.  
(Insert Table 5.5 about here) 
Table 5 (Panel A) indicates a divergence in the determinants of EC-financing between FT 
and NFT_NEW deals. Specifically, in contrast to reported estimates in Table 5 (Panel A), 
relatively riskier deals and liquidity considerations do not appear to influence the probability of 
EC-use. Nevertheless, the acquiring firm’s debt-to-equity ratio imposes a negative and 
significant effect indicating target firms’ reluctance towards engaging in a contingent payment 
                                                          
21 Univariate results (Table 2, Panel A) illustrate that EC-financed FT significantly outperform all cash-financed FT deals, yet not 
all non-earnout FT deals, thus providing partial support for hypothesis H2.  
22 We argue that as the RB critical value of Γ at p=0.10 (=98%, 47% and 60%) exceeds the percentage of the treatment’s 
involvement (24.11%=82/340 in Table 1, Panel A) in a deal, which constitutes the a-priori probability of a deal to be included in 
the treated group, we gain extra confidence regarding the quality and reliability of our PSM process.  
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structure under substantial leverage considerations. Moreover, as NFT_NEW deals prerequisite 
the existence of at least one prior CBA deal for the acquiring firm, we include in the estimation 
the latter’s foreign to total sales. This allows us to capture, to a great extent, the proportion of 
sales attributable to foreign operations of each deal’s acquiring firm and, thus, approximate (and 
match based on) its degree of global diversification.
23
 Reported estimates across both models 
indicate that the latter exerts a negative, yet marginally insignificant, influence.  
In contrast, and unlike reported estimates in Table 5, the relative strength of the pound 
sterling at the time of the deal’s announcement imposes a positive effect. Assuming that foreign 
targets and, specifically, unlisted ones that appeal to EC-financing possess superior bargaining 
power (Chang, 1998) and request a higher premium, an appreciated currency can assist EC 
acquirers effectively satisfy the up-front valuation requirements of sellers at a discount (Harris 
and Ravenscraft, 1991), while still offering them incentives to maximize performance post-
merger and receive the deferred payment. Nevertheless, this also implies a discount in the cash 
flows generated post-merger due to the relative depreciation of the target firm’s home currency. 
Evidently, this can potentially offset the expected synergy gains from such transactions.  Lastly, 
consistent with prior research on EC-financing (Reuer et al., 2004) targets operating in 
intangible-rich sectors are more likely to be acquired via the use of ECs, while as in 
Barbopoulos, Paudyal and Pescetto (2011) targets operating in a Common Law legal framework 
impose an insignificant effect.  
Panel B illustrates the balance of covariates between treated and control sample units among 
our two matching sequences. Reported differentials indicate that the distribution of covariates in 
both sequences does not yield any significant differences between the treated and untreated 
groups, hence confirming efficient matching. Panel C records the valuation effects (contribution) 
of EC-financing in NFT_NEW deals. Evidently, it can be observed that the differences in 
abnormal returns between treated and control deals are statistically insignificant. This suggests 
that when acquirers have expanded their operations at least once in the past in a foreign country 
                                                          
23 Denis Denis and Yost (2002) argue that the observed increase in the prevalence of global diversification over time stems from 
both an increase in the fraction of firms operating in multiple national markets, and, conditional on the existence of global 
diversification, the fraction of total firm sales that are attributable to foreign operations. 
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through a corporate takeover, further expanding to a new country while using ECs yields 
indistinguishable gains from using single up-front payments. Lastly, Panel D illustrates the 
results from the Rosenbaum-bounds (RB) sensitivity analysis. Specifically, due to the statistical 
insignificance of the calculated treatment effects (Panel C), RB allows us to measure how 
influential a confounding (unobserved) covariate needs to be in order to render the effect of the 
treatment negative and significant. Our estimates suggest that this would be the case if an 
unobserved covariate caused the odds of treatment assignment to change in each matching 
exercise by at least 8% and 13%, respectively. 
Overall, our results from matching suggest a distinction in the wealth effects generated by 
EC-financing in CBA deals that expand the acquiring firm’s multinational network. Specifically, 
once reducing, to a great extent, selection bias considerations, FT deals appear to offer a greater 
potential for value creation when financed with ECs than single up-front payments. This 
provides robust support in favor of hypothesis H2, complementing evidence presented in the 
univariate analysis (Table 2, Panel A). In contrast, evidence from subsequent international 
takeovers in a new country suggests a deterioration of the wealth effects generated by EC-
financing. Thus, the likely exposure of firms engaging in NFT_NEW deals to agency problems,
24
 
along with the additional inherent costs of monitoring the performance of an EC post-merger 
lower the expected synergy gains from such transactions, rendering them indistinguishable from 
those corresponding to single up-front payments. Moreover, as the identification of our 
counterfactual sample units takes into account acquirers’ foreign to total sales, our results 
suggest a decline in the expected synergy gains from EC-use when globally diversified firms 
choose to further expand and, hence, diversify globally. 
5.4.5. Multivariate Analysis of Acquirers’ Short-Run Abnormal Returns 
Table 6 reports the results from our multiple regression analysis of short-run abnormal returns of 
acquirers’ shareholders. This allows us to assess the impact of EC-financing on acquirers’ wealth 
gains from CBA deals, while taking into consideration the impact of several other factors 
influencing them simultaneously. Moreover, in order to capture variation in abnormal returns 
                                                          
24 Table 1 (Panel C) illustrates that acquirers in EC-financed NFT_NEW deals are, on average, roughly five times the size of the 
average EC acquirer in FT deals, and almost four times the size of the average EC acquirer in domestic deals. 
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that is due to the time period over which the deal is announced, all estimations include year fixed 
effects. 
(Insert Table 5.6 about here) 
In Models 1 and 2 we aim to investigate the performance of ECs in CBA and FT deals, 
respectively, relative to all domestic and remaining international deals. Reported estimates 
indicate that relatively large deals add more value, as in Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) and 
Fuller et al. (2002). In addition, deals involving unlisted targets generate significant value gains 
for acquirers, as in Fuller at al. (2002) and Draper and Paudyal (2006). Consistent with Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) high market-to-book acquirers suffer 
losses. Lastly, consistent with the estimates reported by Barbopoulos, Paudyal and Pescetto 
(2011), the age of the acquiring firm and diversifying deals impose insignificant effects. In line 
with current evidence on the performance of international deals (Moeller and Schlingemann, 
2005; Gregory and McCoriston, 2005), it can be observed in Model 1 that CBA deals do not 
yield greater gains to acquirers, relative to domestic deals, regardless of payment method. 
Nevertheless, as can be seen in Model 2, acquirers reap significant gains when using ECs to join 
a multinational network through the acquisition of a foreign firm. Moreover, consistent with our 
hypotheses H1, H2 and H3, such gains appear to be superior, relative to those of both domestic 
and remaining CBA deals, thus further corroborating our univariate results.  
In Models 3 to 8 we focus on factors likely to influence the outcome of international 
changes of corporate control. In so doing we further account for the effects of target country-
specific factors such as the level of economic development, the capital controls in place, the size 
of the corporate tax rate and the relative exchange rate fluctuations. Model 3 indicates that solely 
EC-financed FT deals yield significant gains to acquirers, while non-EC-financed FT deals and 
non-FT cash-, stock- and EC- financed deals appear to result in zero net gains. In Model 4, we 
further proxy for the target firm’s listing status and the deal’s industry relatedness. As in the 
estimations for all deals (Models 1 and 2), deals involving unlisted targets yield significant gains 
to acquirers’ shareholders, while the positive wealth effect generated by EC-financed FT deals 
persists. Furthermore, reported estimates in Model 5 indicate that the aforementioned effect 
remains unchanged when further proxying for the different legal systems across target countries. 
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In Model 6 we aim to further account for the acquiring firm’s profitability. Highly profitable 
firms appear to reap significant gains from CBA deals, reported estimates suggest that the 
positive gains generated by EC-financing in FT deals persist. Lastly, in Models 7 and 8 we focus 
on the wealth effects generated by NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME deals, relative to the remaining 
CBA deals. Consistent with our univariate conclusions, the choice of ECs does not offer 
significant value gains to acquirers.   
In Models 9 to 12 we aim to identify factors that increase the gains accrued to acquirers’ 
shareholders from EC-financed FT deals. As an uncertainty reduction payment mechanism, the 
choice of EC-financing should be more value-enhancing as firms with relatively shorter trading 
histories and, hence, greater information asymmetry (Zhang, 2006), expand internationally for 
the first time in their business history through a corporate takeover. Moreover, in line with 
Doukas (1995), acquirer gains should be greater when employing EC-financing in initial 
international expansions in less developed economies, which incorporate a greater investment 
risk. Evidently, reported estimates in Models 9 and 10 further corroborate the above and indicate 
the value-increasing properties of this contingent financing method.
25
 In contrast, estimates 
reported in Model 11, indicate that the operating legal system of the target’s home country does 
not contribute to the latter. Furthermore, reported estimates in Model 12 illustrate that the wealth 
gains accrued to acquirers’ shareholders at the announcement of EC-financed FT deals decrease 
as the acquiring firm’s profitability increases. Similarly, Doukas (1995) argues that the gains 
from initial international expansions should be lower while the acquiring firm is highly 
profitable. As ECs constitute complex instruments whose success prerequisites the expectation of 
significant, yet difficult to be realized, synergy gains our estimates suggest a negative market 
reaction when the latter are placed under free-cash-flow considerations.
26
  
Lastly, in Model 13 we attempt to examine the potential exposure of our multivariate results 
on the effect of EC-financing in FT deals to selection bias considerations. To do so, in Model 13 
we reduce our sample so as to include solely treated and control observations as in Model 1 of 
                                                          
25
 In unreported statistics we observe that 63% of EC-financed FT deals in non-developed countries occur in emerging 
economies. Similarly, Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) illustrate the value-increasing effects related to acquisitions of targets 
residing in countries characterized as emerging economies by firms residing in developed nations. 
26 Jensen (1986) postulates the free-cash-flow hypothesis indicating that highly profitable firms, due to their excess cash flows, 
tend to expand by accepting marginal investment projects with negative net present values. 
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our PSM sequence from section 4.1. Evidently, our results indicate the robustness of our 
conclusions to such considerations.
27
 
5.4.6. Earnout-Financing in International Divestitures 
Aiming at further investigating the performance of cross-country EC-financing, we consider 
the case of divestitures, a strategic alternative to deals involving changes in corporate control 
(Williamson, 1975; Hennart, 1993; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005).
28
 Therefore, as in Goergen 
and Renneboog (2004) we examine the wealth effects generated by such international deals 
separately. Specifically, we obtain from SDC all completed international divestiture 
announcements by UK public firms between 01/01/1985 and 31/12/2013 and apply the same 
sample criteria as in section 4.1. This results in 829 international divestiture deals, 104 of which 
are EC-financed. Subsequently, we further categorize them by type of international expansion 
(FT, NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME) and perform univariate comparisons of acquirers’ 
announcement period abnormal returns, focusing on the wealth effects of different payment 
methods among them.
29
 
Extant literature indicates that a divestiture may be the outcome of the divestor’s strategic 
redirection of business resources from low to high yielding activities (Rosenfeld, 1984). 
Similarly, Duhaime and Grant (1984) provide evidence that divested units tend to be low 
financial performers lacking competitive strength while Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987) illustrate 
that a divestment may aim at eliminating managerial diseconomies. More recently, Owen Shi 
and Yawson (2010) argue that a firm reconfigures its operations in response to changes in its 
business environment, thus divesting some of its operations when necessary.  
Regarding the wealth effects of divestitures, Rosenfeld (1984) reports significant positive 
value gains to both divesting (i.e. selling) and acquiring firms (US based) in international 
divestitures. Moreover, Mulherin and Boone (2000) illustrate the decreased integration costs 
                                                          
27
 When repeating the analysis so as to relate to treated and control deals based on the PSM outputs of Models 2 and 3, our results 
remain qualitatively unchanged.  
28 As in Rossi and Volpin (2004) we consider a change of corporate control a transaction in which the total number of firms 
reduces after the completion of the announcement.  
29 When classifying an international divestiture deal as FT, we ensure that the acquiring firm has not engaged in any prior non-
divestiture, yet M&A-related international activities. We do not implement such a restriction when classifying a divestiture deal 
as NFT_NEW or NFT_SAME.  
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associated with divestitures as well as the positive announcement period wealth effects yielded to 
acquirers’ shareholders. Lastly, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) argue that the documented 
wealth effects of divestitures support the view that such deals create value by transferring assets 
to a more efficient firm.  
The above suggest that divested assets constitute poor performing low yielding divisions of 
firms, characterized by managerial diseconomies. Nevertheless, when such assets are acquired by 
foreign firms evidence indicates a positive market reaction due to the correction of existing 
inefficiencies. Evidently, the reduced exposure of acquirers to integration costs in divestitures 
(Mulherin and Boone, 2000) should increase the likelihood of success of ECs, when applied to 
NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME divestitures. To this end, the contingent nature of EC-financing can 
assist increase the efficiency of the divested asset’s performance post-merger by incentivizing 
the delivery of the deferred payment. 
Nevertheless, firms wishing to join a multinational network do not possess any prior 
international experience and, therefore, are exposed to greater uncertainty when expanding 
internationally for the first time. As divested assets constitute poor performing divisions of firms, 
acquirers choosing to finance an FT divestiture with an EC are faced, a priori, with an increased 
risk of the target firm’s management not meeting the required performance thresholds post-
merger. Such concerns are expected to also materialize during the process of NFT_NEW and 
NFT_SAME divestitures. Yet, in the case of FT divestitures, a poor post-merger performance 
can effectively jeopardize the success of the acquiring firm’s joining of a multinational network. 
Evidently, the increased uncertainty over the outcome of an EC-financed FT divestiture should 
induce a discount on market participants’ synergy expectations, reflecting the greater implied 
business risk. The above suggest a reversal of the performance of ECs in international 
divestitures, yielding greater gains to acquirers when applied in NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME 
deals, rather than in FT deals. 
(Insert Table 5.7 about here) 
Consistent with the aforementioned predictions, Table 7 (Panel A) illustrates that acquirers 
experience zero gains when expanding internationally for the first time through an EC-financed 
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divestiture. In contrast acquirers reap significant gains from EC-financed NFT_NEW and 
NFT_SAME divestitures reaching 2.03% and 2.61% respectively. Stock-financing appears to be 
the method of payment generating the greatest returns in international divestitures, 
outperforming those generated by EC-financing, yet, in line with Gaughan (2002) its frequency 
is very limited. Lastly, Panel B illustrates that acquirers financing FT divestitures with ECs enjoy 
significantly lower announcement period equity gains than those using ECs as the financing 
mechanism of NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME divestitures.   
5.5. Conclusion 
We present new insights on the workings and wealth effects of cross-border EC-financing. 
Salient literature on international changes of corporate control identifies lower gains accrued to 
acquirers involved in cross-country deals, relative to domestic ones. Similarly, prior research 
suggests that acquirers at best break even when involved in EC-financed international takeovers. 
Yet, we identify a portfolio of EC-financed international deals (EC-financed FT deals) yielding 
superior announcement period abnormal returns to acquirers’ shareholders, relative to all 
domestic and remaining international deals.  
Therefore, in line with the predictions of the Multinational Network Hypothesis (Doukas 
and Travlos, 1988), our results confirm the superior performance of FT deals and proceed to 
establish EC-financing as the optimal financing method when firms choose to expand 
internationally for the first time in their business history through a corporate takeover. The above 
suggest that the contingent nature of EC-financing addresses acquirers’ lack of prior international 
experience and allows them to efficiently accommodate the inherent risks of leaving the home 
country for the first time and expanding into a new geographic market. To this end, the 
uncertainty reduction properties of EC-financing assist maximize the likelihood of success of the 
deal by facilitating the acquiring firm’s attempt to gain access to the benefits of operating within 
a multinational network. To this extent, our multivariate results further suggest that the gains 
from EC-financed FT deals increase when expanding into less developed countries that exhibit a 
higher level of investment risk. We employ PSM and RB in order to reduce the exposure of our 
derived conclusions to potential selection bias considerations. Our results illustrate our treated 
EC-financed FT deals yielding roughly 2.20% greater announcement period abnormal returns, 
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relative to their control NEC-financed FT counterfactual deals, among alternative matching 
estimations.  
In contrast, the superior performance of ECs when applied to FT takeovers does not appear 
to hold for subsequent international acquisitions of firms in either a new country (NFT_NEW) or 
not (NFT_SAME). We argue that agency problems and monitoring costs, highly likely to be 
present in large globally diversified firms, deteriorate the benefits of subsequent EC-financed 
international expansions. This is further supported as descriptive statistics illustrate that acquirers 
involved in EC-financed non-FT deals are, on average, more than five times the size of acquirers 
involved in EC-financed FT deals. 
 We follow prior research and consider a strategic alternative to cross-border mergers or 
acquisitions of firms, i.e. divestitures. Our results suggest the appropriateness of the contingent 
properties of ECs as an incentive mechanism towards the correction of existing inefficiencies 
that are present in divested assets globally. Yet, compared to international changes of corporate 
control, the wealth effects generated by EC-financing between FT and non-FT divestiture deals 
appear to reverse. Thus, our results suggest a discount in market participants’ synergy 
expectations of EC-financed FT divestitures, due to their excess implied risk, which ultimately 
affects the likelihood of successfully joining a multinational network.  
Overall, this study offers a thorough examination of the wealth effects generated by EC-
financing in international transactions. Specifically, when firms choose to join a multinational 
network through the acquisition of a foreign firm, EC-financing offers a major value-creating 
opportunity. On the other hand, agency problems and monitoring costs appear to deteriorate the 
expected synergistic gains attributed to EC-financing from NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME 
corporate takeovers. In contrast, NFT_NEW and NFT_SAME acquisitions of divested assets 
render the application of EC-financing value enhancing. 
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5.6. Tables Chapter 5 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
ALL DOM CBA 
 CBA  = FT  + NFT_NEW  + NFT_SAME 
 FT NFT_NEW NFT_SAME 
Panel A: Distribution of deals by listing status, industry relatedness, method of payment and target legal system 
 N % Total N % Total N % Total N % Total N % Total N % Total 
Private  4,481 81.59% 3,078 81.02% 1,403 82.87% 288 84.71% 414 82.47% 701 82.37% 
Unlisted  4,712 85.80% 3,252 85.60% 1,460 86.24% 302 88.82% 439 87.45% 719 84.49% 
Public 780 14.20% 547 14.40% 233 13.76% 38 11.18% 63 12.55% 132 15.51% 
Diversified 2,823 51.40% 1,998 52.59% 825 48.73% 163 47.94% 255 50.80% 407 47.83% 
Cash 2,067 37.64% 1,249 32.88% 818 48.32% 145 42.65% 234 46.61% 439 51.59% 
Stock  571 10.40% 450 11.85% 121 7.15% 44 12.94% 28 5.58% 49 5.76% 
Mixed 1,330 24.22% 1,029 27.09% 301 17.78% 69 20.29% 88 17.53% 144 16.92% 
NEC 3,968 72.25% 2,728 71.81% 1,240 73.24% 258 75.88% 350 69.72% 632 74.27% 
EC 1,524 27.75% 1,071 28.19% 453 26.76% 82 24.12% 152 30.28% 219 25.73% 
Common Law 4,840 88.13% 3,799 100% 1,041 61.49% 198 58.24% 202 40.24% 641 75.32% 
Civil Law 303 5.52% - - 303 17.90% 63 18.53% 140 27.89% 100 11.75% 
Total 5,492 - 3,799 - 1,693 - 340 - 502 - 851 - 
% All Total 100% - 69.17% - 30.83% - 6.19% - 9.14% - 15.50% - 
% CBA Total - - - - 100% - 20.08% - 29.65% - 50.26% - 
Panel B: Summary Statistics for All Deals 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Deal Value 165.45 9.88 121.1 8.02 264.97 14.97 34.47 8.99 333.70 13.06 316.52 21.20 
Market Value 1,717.83 159.63 943.68 105.71 3,454.99 393.9 298.45 88.11 3,121.50 365.38 4,912.85 731.99 
Relative Deal Size 0.38 0.07 0.43 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.72 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.22 0.03 
Market-to-Book Value 3.27 2.10 2.71 1.90 4.49 2.51 2.17 2.20 4.36 2.58 5.45 2.56 
Acquirer Age 5,317.30 3,825.50 4,930.13 3,423 6,186.07 5,054 3,544.51 1,846 5,940.41 4,849.50 7,386.37 7,330 
Cash Ratio 21.51 15.42 19.43 12.46 26.08 20.06 28.10 21.07 26.19 19.38 25.21 20.07 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio 62.59 38.83 59.17 37.9 70.16 41.50 35.14 19.71 81.32 41.69 77.35 46.42 
Panel C: Summary Statistics for EC deals 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Deal Value 23.64 9.00 17.35 7.25 38.49 13.17 21.66 9.18 24.36 11.13 54.6 17.65 
Market Value 658.13 115.44 404.83 85.49 1,256.98 277.96 206.69 70.01 1,100.74 269.34 1,758.68 435.65 
Relative Deal Size 0.22 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.31 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.04 
Relative Earnout Value 0.42 0.36 0.43 0.39 0.38 0.33 0.44 0.38 0.36 0.31 0.37 0.33 
Market-to-Book Value 3.30 2.19 3.31 2.03 3.29 2.63 4.10 2.35 3.34 2.89 2.97 2.57 
Acquirer Age 4,627.47 3,104.50 4,148.57 2,540 5,759.72 4,583 3,032.13 1,809 5,043.58 4,069 7,278.05 6,951 
Cash Ratio 22.67 16.48 21.69 15.14 25.01 19.83 26.06 18.63 27.07 21.92 23.20 18.77 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio 55.52 30.82 59.76 29.86 45.38 35.30 45.93 17.16 25.69 28.64 58.75 41.86 
 
Note: The table presents the UK domestic (DOM) and cross-border (CBA) M&A activity. The UK cross-border activity is 
divided into three groups: First Time (FT) if the deal constitutes the acquirer’s first cross-border M&A deal ever, Not First Time 
New Country (NFT_NEW) if the deal constitutes the acquirer’s first M&A deal in a given country but not her first cross-border 
deal ever and Not First Time Same Country (NFT_SAME) if the deal occurs in a country in which the acquirer has engaged in an 
M&A deal in the past. Panel A refers to the distribution of deals according to the listing status of the target firm (private, unlisted, 
public), industry relatedness (diversified), method of payment (cash, stock, mixed, non earnout or NEC, earnout or EC) and legal 
system of the target firm’s home country (Common Law, Civil Law). Panel B presents deal- (deal value, relative deal size) and 
acquirer- (market value, market to book value, age, cash ratio and debt-to-equity ratio) specific summary statistics for all deals, 
while Panel C presents the same summary statistics for EC-financed deals specifically. Panel C also reports the relative earnout 
value of the deal (=contingent earnout value/deal value). Further information on the definition of each variable can be found in 
the Appendix 5.1.  
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Table 5.2: Univariate Analysis of Acquirers’ Abnormal Returns 
 
Panel A: Portfolios by M&A activity and differentials by method of payment 
    ALL CASH STOCK MIXED EC NEC EC vs. NEC EC vs. CASH EC vs. STOCK EC vs. MIXED 
All deals (ALL) 
Mean 1.03
a
 0.94
a
 0.45 1.11
a
 1.32
a
 0.93
a
 0.39 0.38
c
 0.87
c
 0.20 
t-stat 9.17 6.63 0.83 4.57 6.40 6.88 1.55 1.79 1.84 0.64 
N 5,492 2,067 571 1,330 1,524 3,968         
Domestic deals (DOM) 
Mean 1.14
a
 1.02
a
 0.37 1.18
a
 1.55
a
 0.97
a
 0.58
c
 0.52
c
 1.18
b
 0.37 
t-stat 8.02 5.59 0.59 4.20 6.15 5.71 1.83 1.72 2.09 0.99 
N 3,799 1,249 450 1,029 1,071 2,728         
Cross-Border deals (CBA) 
Mean 0.80
a
 0.80
a
 0.74 0.90
c
 0.76
b
 0.82
a
 -0.06 -0.04 0.02 -0.13 
t-stat 4.44 3.62 0.74 1.83 2.18 3.87 0.14 0.10 0.02 0.23 
N 1,693 818 121 301 453 1,240         
First Time deals (FT) 
Mean 1.91
a
 1.09
c
 3.56
c
 1.50 2.80
a
 1.62
a
 1.18 1.71
c
 -0.76 1.30 
t-stat 4.03 1.97 1.73 1.48 2.89 3.00 1.07 1.65 0.38 0.92 
N 340 145 44 69 82 258         
Not First Time and New Country deals (NFT_NEW) 
Mean 0.71
b
 1.06
a
 -1.59 0.38 0.78 0.68
c
 0.10 -0.28 2.37 0.40 
t-stat 2.31 2.81 0.91 0.48 1.26 1.94 0.15 0.41 1.46 0.41 
N 502 234 28 88 152 350         
Not First Time and Same Country deals (NFT_SAME) 
Mean 0.42
c
 0.57
c
 -0.46 0.92 -0.02 0.57
c
 -0.59 -0.58 0.44 -0.94 
t-stat 1.70 1.83 0.36 1.21 0.04 1.94 1.04 1.08 0.40 1.13 
N 851 439 49 144 219 632         
Panel B: Differentials by type of M&A activity and method of payment 
    ALL CASH STOCK MIXED EC NEC         
CBA vs DOM  
Mean Diff -0.33 -0.22 0.37 -0.28 -0.79
c
 -0.16         
t-stat 1.36 0.77 0.28 0.48 1.76  0.53         
FT vs DOM  
Mean Diff 0.77 0.06 3.19 0.33 1.25 0.65         
t-stat 1.56 0.11 1.51 0.29 1.32 1.12         
NFT_NEW vs DOM  
Mean Diff -0.43 0.04 -1.96 -0.80 -0.77 -0.30 
 
      
t-stat 1.05 0.08 0.76 0.81 1.09 0.60         
NFT_SAME vs DOM  
Mean Diff -0.72
b
 -0.46 -0.83 -0.26 -1.57
a
 -0.41         
t-stat 2.24 1.27 0.42 0.32 2.64 1.06         
FT vs NFT_NEW  
Mean Diff 1.20
b
 0.03 5.15
c
 1.12 2.02
c
 0.94         
t-stat 2.22 0.04 1.76 0.89 1.83 1.53         
FT vs NFT_SAME  
Mean Diff 1.49
a
 0.52 4.02
c
 0.58 2.82
a
 1.05
c
         
t-stat 3.03 0.83 1.71 0.44 3.00 1.83         
NFT_NEW vs NFT_SAME  
Mean Diff 0.29 0.49 -1.13 -0.54 0.80 0.11         
t-stat 0.73 0.97 0.53 -0.47 1.07 0.23         
 
Note: The table presents mean announcement period 5-day (t-2, t+2) cumulative abnormal returns. Panel A presents portfolios according to the 
type of M&A (all deals, domestic deals, cross-border deals, FT corresponding to deals constituting an acquiring firm’s first cross-border M&A 
ever, NFT_NEW corresponding to deals constituting non-FT cross-border expansions but in unprecedented countries, NFT_SAME 
corresponding to deals constituting non-FT cross-border expansions in countries in which the acquiring firm has already engaged in an M&A in 
the past and method of payment (ALL, CASH, STOCK, MIXED, earnout or EC, non-earnout or NEC). Panel A also reports portfolio 
differentials by method of payment across the different types of M&A activity. Panel B presents portfolio differentials between different M&A 
types for a given method of payment. The statistical significance of differences in returns between groups of acquirers is tested using the T-test 
for equality of means. a, b, and c indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. Further information on the definition of each variable 
can be found in the Appendix 5.1.  
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Table 5.3: Univariate Analysis of Acquirers’ Abnormal Returns 
 
Panel A: Portfolios by type of M&A and method of payment 
    ALL CASH STOCK MIXED NEC 
ALL (1) 
Mean 1.03a 0.94a 0.45a 1.11a 0.93a 
N 5,492 2,067 571 1,330 3,968 
DOM (2) 
Mean 1.14a 1.02a 0.37 1.18a 0.97a 
N 3,799 1,249 450 1,029 2,728 
CBA (3) 
Mean 0.80a 0.80a 0.74 0.90c 0.82a 
N 1,693 818 121 301 1,240 
First Time (FT) (3) 
Mean 1.91a 1.09c 3.56c 1.50 1.62a 
N 340 145 44 69 258 
Not First Time and New Country (NFT_NEW) (5) 
Mean 0.71b 1.06a -1.59 0.38 0.68c 
N 502 234 28 88 350 
Not First Time and Same Country (NFT_SAME) (6) 
Mean 0.42c 0.57c -0.46 0.92 0.57c 
N 851 439 49 144 632 
Panel B: EC portfolios by type of M&A activity 
ALL (7) 
Mean 1.32a         
N 1,524         
DOM (8) 
Mean 1.55a         
N 1,071         
CBA (9) 
Mean 0.76b         
N 453         
First Time (FT) (10) 
Mean 2.80a         
N 82         
Not First Time and New Country (NFT_NEW) (11) 
Mean 0.78         
N 152         
Not First Time and Same Country (NFT_SAME) (12) 
Mean -0.02         
N 219         
Panel C: Differentials by type of M&A activity and method of payment 
    ALL CASH STOCK MIXED NEC 
CBA (9) vs DOM (2) 
Mean Diff -0.38 -0.26 0.39 -0.42 -0.21 
t-stat 0.88 0.71 0.54 0.86 0.48 
FT (10) vs DOM (2) 
Mean Diff 1.66c 1.78b 2.43c 1.62 1.83c 
t-stat 1.71 2.35 1.68 1.57 1.83 
NFT_NEW (11) vs DOM (2) 
Mean Diff -0.36 -0.24 0.41 -0.40 -0.19 
t-stat 0.49 0.43 0.36 0.52 0.26 
NFT_SAME (12) vs DOM (2) 
Mean Diff -1.15c -1.04b -0.39 -1.19c -0.99c 
t-stat 1.92 2.19 0.40 1.86 1.66 
FT (10) vs NFT_NEW (5) 
Mean Diff 2.09b 1.74b 4.39c 2.42c 2.12b 
t-stat 1.83 2.03 2.25 1.95 2.46 
FT (10) vs NFT_SAME (6) 
Mean Diff 2.38a 2.23a 3.26c 1.88 2.23b 
t-stat 2.81 2.69 2.05 1.51 2.52 
FT (10) vs CBA (3) 
Mean Diff 2.00b 2.00a 2.06 1.91c 1.98b 
t-stat 2.35 2.62 1.41 1.79 2.30 
NFT_NEW (11) vs NFT_SAME (12) 
Mean Diff 0.36 0.21 1.24 0.14 0.21 
t-stat 0.57 0.33 0.95 0.14 0.32 
 
Note: The table presents mean announcement period 5-day (t-2, t+2) cumulative abnormal returns. Panel A presents portfolios according to the 
type of M&A (all deals -ALL, domestic deals -DOM, cross-border deals -CBA, FT corresponding to deals constituting an acquiring firm’s first 
cross-border M&A ever, NFT_NEW corresponding to deals constituting non-FT cross-border expansions but in unprecedented countries, 
NFT_SAME corresponding to deals constituting non-FT cross-border expansions in a countries in which the acquiring firm has already engaged 
in an M&A in the past) and method of payment (ALL, CASH, STOCK, MIXED, earnout or EC, non-earnout or NEC). Panel B presents 
portfolios for EC deals according to M&A type. T-statistics for the portfolios presented in Panel A and Panel B are reported in Panel A of Table 
2. Panel C reports differentials for different combinations of M&A portfolios reported in Panel A and Panel B. The statistical significance of 
differences in returns between groups of acquirers is tested using the T-test for equality of means. a, b, and c indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 
percent respectively. Further information on the definition of each variable can be found in the Appendix 5.1. 
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Table 5.4: Propensity Score Matching FT deals 
Panel A Logistic Regression Outputs 
    Model 1     Model 2     Model 3   
Intercept   1.215     -0.867     -0.527   
RS   0.255b     0.303a     0.320a   
MTBV   0.361c     0.387b     0.350c   
CASH RATIO   -0.013c     -0.014b     -0.015b   
DEBT-TO-EQUITY    -0.001     -0.002     -0.002   
NET MARGIN   0.001     0.001     0.001   
DEVELOPED   -0.409     -0.610     -0.925   
CAP CTRLS   -0.120     -0.095     -0.067   
CORP TAX    -1.226     -1.217     -1.271   
FX RATE   0.146     0.608     0.582   
UNL         2.365b     2.434b   
CIVIL         -0.032         
DVSD               -0.624b   
INT               0.324   
Pseudo R-squared (in %) 5.84     9.25     11.08   
H-L Goodness of Fit test 7.17     6.43     4.09   
Mean VIF   1.21     1.20     1.19   
N   254     254     254   
Panel B: Balance of Covariates 
Covariate  
EC 
treated 
EC 
control  
Diff. treated 
vs control 
EC 
treated 
EC 
control  
Diff. treated 
vs control 
EC 
treated 
EC 
control  
Diff. treated 
vs control 
RS -2.273 -2.019 -0.254 -2.273 -2.184 -0.089 -2.273 -2.325 0.052 
MTBV 1.010 0.960 0.050 1.010 1.015 -0.005 1.010 1.164 -0.154 
CASH RATIO 24.913 25.096 -0.183 24.913 27.727 -2.814 24.913 30.352 -5.439 
DEBT-TO-EQUITY 51.74 84.682 -32.942 51.74 29.498 22.242 51.740 51.572 0.168 
NET MARGIN -13.842 -3.409 -10.433 -13.842 -21.551 7.709 -13.842 -49.848 36.006 
DEVELOPED 57 59 - 57 59 - 57 58 - 
CAP CTRLS 6.316 6.320 -0.004 6.316 6.513 -0.197 6.316 6.452 -0.136 
CORP TAX  0.365 0.376 -0.011 0.365 0.366 -0.001 0.365 0.396 -0.031 
FX RATE 0.014 0.030 -0.015 0.014 0.028 -0.014 0.014 0.043 -0.029 
UNL - - - 59 59 - 59 59 - 
CIVIL - - - 13 12 - - - - 
DVSD - - - - - - 23 16 - 
INT - - - - - - 28 34 - 
Panel C: Differentials Treated VS Matched M&A Deals 
Mean CAR Treated (in %) 2.17a     2.17a     2.17a   
N   60     60     60   
Mean CAR Control (in %) -0.010     -0.001     -0.005   
N   60     60     60   
Mean (in %) Difference (Treated vs Control) 2.18a     2.26b     2.22b   
Panel D: Rosenbaum Bounds 
RB: p-value of estimated difference at Γ=1 0.0004     0.0067     0.003   
RB: critical value of Γ at cut-off p=0.05 1.73     1.29     1.41   
RB: critical value of Γ at cut-off p=0.10 1.98     1.47     1.60   
 
Note: Panel A presents the output of the logistic regression models that were used to estimate the probability of occurrence of an EC relative to alternative single up-
front payment methods within FT deals (deals that constitute the acquirer’s first ever cross-border M&A transaction). Panel B presents the balance of covariates 
between treated and control deals in our matching sequences. The PSM technique employs 1-to-1 nearest neighbor matching allowing for replacement. RS corresponds 
the deal’s relative deal size (=deal value/acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); MTBV corresponds to the acquiring firm’s market-to-book 
ratio (measured 20 days prior to the deal’s); CASH RATIO corresponds to the ratio of the acquirer’s total cash and cash equivalents to its total assets at the quarter prior 
to the announcement of the deal; DEBT-TO-EQUITY corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of total debt over the aggregate value of number of shares outstanding during 
the quarter prior to the announcement of the deal; NET_MARGIN corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of net profits to revenue during the last quarter prior to the deal’s 
announcement; DEVELOPED corresponds to international deals in which the target resides in a developed country; CAP CTRLS corresponds to the target country’s 
capital controls in place at the time of the deal’s announcement; CORP TAX corresponds to the target country’s corporate tax rate at the time of the deal’s 
announcement; FX RATE corresponds to the exchange rate between the pound sterling and the target’s home currency (as in Kiymaz, 2004) at the time of the deal’s 
announcement; UNL refers to deals in which the target is an unlisted firm (private or subsidiary); CIVIL refers to deals in which the target operates under a Civil Law 
legal frameworks (French, German or Scandinavian); DVSD refers to deals in which the acquirer and target operate in different industries, i.e. they do not share the 
same two-digit SIC code; INT refers to deals in which the target operates within an intangible-rich sector (Media and Entertainment, Consumer Products and Services, 
High Technology and Telecommunications); EC refers to deals financed with an earnout provision. Differences in average covariates are tested using the t-test. Panel 
C reports mean 5-day announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for treated and matched deals. The statistical significance of differences in mean 
returns between the two groups is tested using the T-test for equality of means. Panel D shows the outcome of the Rosenbaum-bounds test. a, b, and c indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of the mean for each covariate presented. Further information on the definition of each variable can be found in the 
Appendix 5.1. 
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Table 5.5: Propensity Score Matching NFT_NEW deals 
Panel A: Logistic Regression Output 
    Model 1     Model 2   
Intercept   -1.229c     -1.553b   
RS   -0.023     -0.059   
MTBV   0.368b     0.297c   
CASH RATIO   0.007     0.007   
DEBT-TO-EQUITY   -0.003b     -0.003b   
NET MARGIN   0.001     0.001   
FOREIGN-TO-TOTAL    -0.005     -0.005   
DEVELOPED   0.189     0.137   
CAP CTRLS   -0.006     -0.001   
CARP TAX    -0.012     -0.008   
FX RATE   1.374c     1.390c   
INT         0.438c   
COMMON         0.258   
Pseudo R-squared (in %)   3.96     5.12   
H-L Goodness of Fit test   3.30     4.44   
Mean VIF   1.18     1.19   
N    373     373   
Panel B: Balance of Covariates 
Covariate  
EC 
treated 
EC 
control  
Diff. treated vs 
control 
EC 
treated 
EC 
control  
Diff. treated vs 
control 
RS -3.303 -3.070 -0.233 -3.303 -3.268 -0.035 
MTBV 1.195 1.181 0.014 1.195 1.109 0.086 
CASH RATIO 27.852 29.379 -1.527 27.852 28.573 -0.721 
DEBT-TO-EQUITY 55.714 63.688 -7.974 55.714 46.951 8.763 
NET MARGIN -7.612 -9.480 1.868 -7.612 2.096 -9.708 
FOREIGN-TO-TOTAL  41.727 35.331 6.396 41.727 41.500 0.227 
DEVELOPED 104 106 -  104 101  - 
CAP CTRLS 6.804 6.881 -0.077 6.804 6.454 0.350 
CORP TAX  0.552 0.745 -0.193 0.552 0.556 -0.004 
FX RATE 0.037 0.032 0.005 0.037 0.026 0.011 
INT 
 
- - 43 41 - 
COMMON - - - 51 53 - 
Panel C: Differentials Treated VS Matched M&A Deals 
Mean CAR Treated (in %)   0.23     0.23   
N   109     109   
Mean CAR Control (in %)   1.89b     1.01c   
N   109     109   
Mean (in %) Difference (Treated vs Control)   -1.66     -0.78   
Panel D: Rosenbaum Bounds 
RB: p-value of estimated difference at Γ=1   0.059     0.041   
RB: critical value of Γ at cut-off p=0.05   1.00     1.03   
RB: critical value of Γ at cut-off p=0.10   1.08     1.13   
 
Note: Panel A presents the output of the logistic regression models that were used to estimate the probability of occurrence of an EC relative to alternative single up-front 
payment methods within NFT_NEW deals (deals that constitute non-initial cross-border M&A transactions but in a new country). Panel B presents the balance of covariates 
between treated and control deals in our matching sequences. The PSM technique employs 1-to-1 nearest neighbor matching allowing for replacement. RS corresponds the 
deal’s relative deal size (=deal value/acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); MTBV corresponds to the acquiring firm’s market-to-book ratio 
(measured 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); CASH RATIO corresponds to the ratio of the acquirer’s total cash and cash equivalents to its total assets at the quarter 
prior to the announcement of the deal; DEBT-TO-EQUITY corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of total debt over the aggregate value of number of shares outstanding during 
the quarter prior to the announcement of the deal; NET_MARGIN corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of net profits to revenue during the last quarter prior to the deal’s 
announcement; FOREIGN-TO-TOTAL corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of foreign to total sales during the last quarter prior to the announcement of the deal; 
DEVELOPED corresponds to international deals in which the target resides in a developed country; CAP CTRLS corresponds to the target country’s capital controls in place 
at the time of the deal’s announcement; CORP TAX corresponds to the target country’s corporate tax rate at the time of the deal’s announcement; FX RATE corresponds to 
the exchange rate between the pound sterling and the target’s home currency (as in Kiymaz, 2004) at the time of the deal’s announcement; INT refers to deals in which the 
target operates within an intangible-rich sector (Media and Entertainment, Consumer Products and Services, High Technology and Telecommunications); COMMON refers 
to deals in which the target operates under a Common Law legal frameworks; EC refers to deals financed with an earnout provision. Differences in average covariates are 
tested using the t-test. Panel C reports mean 5-day announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for treated and matched deals. The statistical significance of 
differences in mean returns between the two groups is tested using the T-test for equality of means. Panel D shows the outcome of the Rosenbaum-Bounds test. a, b, and c 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of the mean for each covariate presented. Further information on the definition of each variable can be found in the 
Appendix 5.1. 
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Table 5.6: Multivariate Analysis M&A 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Sample: All All CBA CBA CBA CBA CBA CBA FT FT FT FT FT 
Intercept -0.010 -0.011 0.021 0.009 0.017 0.021 0.031 0.020 -0.034 -0.032 -0.023 -0.021 -0.013 
RS 0.004
a
 0.004
a
 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 
MTBV -0.004
c
 -0.004
b
 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.005 
AGE 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0002 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 
NET MARGIN           0.001
b
 0.001
b
 0.001
b
 0.004
a
 0.004
a
 0.004
a
 0.004
a
 0.001
a
 
UNL 0.032
a
 0.032
a
   0.015
a
 0.015
b
 0.011
c
 0.012
b
 0.012
b
 0.027
b
 0.026
b
 0.028
b
 0.025
c
 0.028 
DVSD 0.002 0.001   -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.015 
DEVELOPED     -0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 0.014 0.036
c
 0.017 0.022 0.072
c
 
CAP CTRLS     0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006
b
 
CORP TAX      -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003 
FX RATE     0.007 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.058 
COMMON         -0.013 -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.006 -0.003 0.009 -0.010 -0.052
a
 
FRENCH         -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013      
GERMAN         -0.016 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018      
SCANDINAVIAN         -0.013 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015      
CIVIL         -0.006 0.001 0.003 -0.009 -0.049
a
 
EC 0.002 -0.003 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.002 0.002 0.128
b
 0.059
c
 0.031 0.001 0.024
b
 
CASH 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.010      
STOCK 0.003 0.002 -0.011 -0.01 -0.009 -0.012 0.001 0.015      
CBA -0.002                  
FT   -0.009 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008        
NFT_NEW       0.001       
NFT_SAME        0.004      
CBA x EC -0.003                  
CBA x CASH 0.003             
CBA x STOCK 0.004             
FT x EC   0.028
b
 0.031
b
 0.032
b
 0.031
b
 0.029
b
        
FT x CASH   0.010 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.014        
FT x STOCK   0.041 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.040        
NFT_NEW x EC       -0.005       
NFT_NEW x CASH            0.002       
NFT_NEW x STOCK            -0.004       
NFT_SAME x EC        -0.013      
NFT_SAME x CASH        -0.011      
NFT_SAME x STOCK        -0.032      
EC x AGE         -0.017
b
     
EC x DEVELOPED          -0.056    
EC x COMMON                 -0.038   
EC x CIVIL                 -0.012   
EC x NET MARGIN                  -0.024
b
  
YFE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj. R-squared (%)  1.97 2.13 1.56 1.88 1.65 1.22 1.13 1.18 2.19 1.14 1.08 2.11 15.43 
F-stat  8.51 9.12 2.50 2.60 2.13 1.61 1.36 1.44 1.64 1.38 1.30 1.64 2.34 
Mean VIF  2.74 2.04 2.16 2.13 3.14 2.44 2.41 3.12 2.35 2.40 2.58 2.42 2.06 
N  4,856 4,856 1,418 1,418 1,418 1,372 1,372 1,372 259 259 259 259 104 
 
Continued 
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Table 5.6 (continued) 
Note: The table illustrates the multivariate analysis on the wealth effects of ECs in international corporate takeovers for the whole sample The dependent variable consists of the announcement period market adjusted 5-day (t-2,t+2) 
excess returns of acquirers which are regressed against a set of explanatory variables. RS corresponds the deal’s relative deal size (=deal value/acquirer’s market value 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); MTBV corresponds to 
the acquiring firm’s market-to-book ratio (measured 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement); AGE corresponds to the number of days between the acquirer’s first recorded day on Datastream and the deal’s announcement day; 
NET_MARGIN corresponds to the acquirer’s ratio of net profits to revenue during the last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement; UNL refers to deals in which the target is an unlisted firm (private or subsidiary); DVSD refers to 
deals in which the acquirer and target operate in different industries, i.e. they do not share the same two-digit SIC code; DEVELOPED corresponds to international deals in which the target resides in a developed country; CAP CTRLS 
corresponds to the target country’s capital controls in place at the time of the deal’s announcement; CORP TAX corresponds to the target country’s corporate tax rate at the time of the deal’s announcement; FX RATE corresponds to the 
exchange rate between the pound sterling and the target’s home currency (as in Kiymaz, 2004) at the time of the deal’s announcement; COMMON refers to deals in which the target operates within a Common Law legal framework; 
FRENCH refers to deals in which the target operates within a French Civil Law legal framework; GERMAN refers to deals in which the target operates within a German Civil Law legal framework; SCANDINAVIAN refers to deals in 
which the target operates within a Scandinavian Civil Law legal framework; CIVIL refers to deals in which the target operates in any of the aforementioned Civil Law legal frameworks (French, German or Scandinavian; EC refers to 
deals financed with an earnout provision; CASH refers to deals fully financed with cash; STOCK refers to deals fully financed with stock; CBA refers to cross-border deals in which the acquirer and target are based in different 
countries; FT corresponds to deals constituting an acquiring firm’s first cross-border M&A ever; NFT_NEW corresponds to deals constituting non-FT cross-border expansions but in unprecedented countries; NFT_SAME corresponds 
to deals constituting non-FT cross-border expansions in a countries in which the acquiring firm has already engaged in an M&A in the past; YFE corresponds to year fixed effects. Regression outputs are estimated using ordinary least 
squares with the coefficients adjusted for possible heteroscedasticity using White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. The intercept measures the excess returns to acquirers after accounting for the effects of all 
explanatory variables. VIF is the Variance Inflation Factor, which quantifies the severity of multicollinearity. Variance inflation is the reciprocal of tolerance.  a, b, and c indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. Further 
information on the definition of each variable can be found in the Appendix 5.1. 
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Table 5.7: Univariate Analysis of International Divestitures 
Panel A: Portfolios by type of divestiture activity and differentials by method of payment 
    ALL CASH STOCK MIXED EC NEC EC vs. NEC EC vs. CASH EC vs. STOCK EC vs. MIXED 
ALL CBA 
Mean 1.90
a
 1.48
a
 10.00
a
 2.37
a
 1.77
a
 1.92
a
 -0.15 0.30 -8.23
a
 -0.60 
t-stat 7.54 5.39 3.60 3.31 2.73 7.03 0.19 0.42 4.36 0.64 
N 829 563 23 139 104 725         
First Time deals (FT) 
Mean 2.62
a
 2.36
b
 13.13
a
 1.72 -0.56 3.28
a
 -3.84 -2.92 -13.69
a
 -2.28 
t-stat 2.88 2.08 2.31 1.03 0.46 3.10 1.61 1.35 3.22 1.09 
N 122 68 10 23 21 101         
Not First Time Mover and New Country (NFT_NEW) 
Mean 2.19
a
 1.66
a
 9.37
a
 2.79
a
 2.03
b
 2.21
a
 -0.18 0.37 -7.34
a
 -0.76 
t-stat 5.54 3.35 3.51 3.26 2.41 5.09 0.14 0.30 3.48 0.59 
N 296 193 10 58 35 261         
Not First Time Mover and Same Country (NFT_SAME) 
Mean 1.48
a
 1.16
a
 1.70 2.21
c
 2.61
b
 1.34
a
 1.27 1.45 0.91 0.40 
t-stat 4.58 3.76 0.97 1.64 2.31 3.98 1.26 1.61 0.20 0.22 
N 411 302 3 58 48 363         
Panel B: Differentials by type of divestiture activity and method of payment 
    ALL CASH STOCK MIXED EC NEC         
FT vs NFT_NEW  
Mean Diff 0.43 0.70 3.76 -1.07 -2.59
c
 1.07         
t-stat 0.51 0.65 0.60 0.63 1.79 1.12         
FT vs NFT_SAME  
Mean Diff 1.13 1.19 11.43 -0.49 -3.17
c
 1.94
b
         
t-stat 1.46 1.41 1.06 0.21 -1.69 2.29         
NFT_NEW vs NFT_SAME  
Mean Diff 0.70 0.50 7.67 0.58 -0.58 0.87         
t-stat 1.38 0.89 1.50 0.36 0.39 1.61         
 
Note: The table presents mean announcement period 5-day (t-2, t+2) cumulative abnormal returns experienced by acquirers in international 
divestitures. Panel A presents portfolios according to the type of divestiture (all international divestiture deals- CBA, FT divestitures 
corresponding to deals constituting an acquiring firm’s first cross-border expansuon ever, NFT_NEW divestitures corresponding to deals 
constituting non-FT cross-border expansions but in unprecedented countries, NFT_SAME divestitures corresponding to deals constituting non-
FT cross-border expansions in countries in which the acquiring firm has already engaged in deal in the past) and method of payment (ALL, 
CASH, STOCK, MIXED, earnout or EC, non-earnout or NEC). Panel A also reports portfolio differentials by method of payment across the 
different types of international divestitures. Panel B presents portfolio differentials between different divestiture types for a given method of 
payment. The statistical significance of differences in returns between groups of acquirers is tested using the T-test for equality of means. a, b, 
and c indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. Further information on the definition of each variable can be found in the 
Appendix 5.1.  
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Appendix 5.1: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Type/Name Description Source 
ALL Refers to the entire sample analysed in this paper. SDC 
Acquirer’s trading history 
(AGE) 
Number of days between day the acquirer’s first recorded day on 
Datastream and deal’s announcement day. 
Datastream 
Crossborder (CBA) 
Dummy = 1 when the deal involvesa non-UK target, and = 0 
when both acquirer and target are UK institutions (= Domestic). 
SDC 
CASH Dummy = 1 when payment is 100% cash. SDC 
Capital Controls (CAP CTRLS) 
Time varying index covering 141 countries. Its values range 
from 1.4 (for the least open economy) to 9.8 (for the most open 
economy). 
Economic 
Freedom of the 
World: 2014 
Annual Report 
Corporate Tax Rate (CORP 
TAX) 
Time varying percentage of taxation on corporate profits across 
countries.  
IMF, OECD, 
World Bank 
COMMON 
Dummy = 1 when the deal is crossborder and the target's nation 
follows the English Common Law legal system, and = 0 
otherwise. 
SDC 
CASH RATIO 
Acquirer’s ratio of total cash and cash equivalents to total assets 
at the quarter prior to the announcement of the deal 
Datastream 
Crossindustry (DVSD) 
Dummy = 1 when acqurier and target do not share the same two-
digit SIC code and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Deal Value (DV) Deal’s transaction value, in millions dollars. SDC 
DEBT-TO-EQUITY 
Acquirer’s total debt as a percentage of common equity value 
during the quarter prior to the announcement of the deal. 
Datastream 
CIVIL 
Dummy = 1 when the deal is crossborder and the target’s nation 
follows a Civil Law legal system (French, German, or 
Scandinavian) and = 0 otherwise.  
SDC 
DEVELOPED 
Dummy =1 when the deal is crossborder and the target’s country 
is a developed one and =0 otherwise.  
IMF, OECD, 
World Bank 
Domestic (DOM) 
Dummy = 1 when acquirer and target are UK based, and = 0 
when target is not a UK company. 
SDC 
Earnout Contract (EC) 
Dummy = 1 when payment includes an earnout provision and = 
0 otherwise (= Non-Earnout or NEC). 
SDC 
FRENCH 
Dummy = 1 when acquisition is crossborder and target’s nation 
follows a French Civil Law legal system, and = 0 otherwise.  
SDC 
FOREIGN-TO-TOTAL  
Acquirer’s foreign sales as a percentage of total sales during the 
last quarter prior to the deal’s announcement. 
Datastream 
Foreign Exchange Rate (FX 
RATE) 
Index constructed using the procedure outlined in Kiymaz 
(2004). A positive (negative) value of the index indicates that the 
Pound Sterling has appreciated (depreciated) relative to the 
currency of the target's nation. 
Datastream 
First Time (FT) 
Dummy = 1 when the deal constitutes an acquiring firm’s first 
crossborder deal ever, and =0 otherwise.  
SDC 
GERMAN 
Dummy = 1 if the deal is crossborder and target’s nation follows 
a German legal system, and = 0 otherwise.  
SDC 
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Appendix 5.1 (continued) 
Intangible (INT) 
Dummy = 1 when target belongs to an intangible-rich sector 
(Media and Entertainment, Consumer Products and Services, 
High Technology and Telecommunications) and = 0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Market-to-Book Value (MTBV) 
Acquirer’s ratio of market value over book value (measured 20 
days prior to the deal’s announcement)  
Datastream 
Non-Earnout (NEC) 
Dummy = 1 for full-cash, or full-stock, or mixed payment 
without earnout provisions, and = 0 when an earnout provision is 
included. 
SDC 
Private (PRV) Dummy = 1 if target is private, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Public (PBL) Dummy = 1 if target is publicly listed, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
Relative Size (RS) Ratio of DV to MV. 
SDC & 
Datastream 
Relative earnout value (REAV) Ratio of earnout value to DV. SDC 
STOCK Dummy = 1 when payment is 100% stock exchange. SDC 
Unlisted (UNL) Dummy = 1 if target is not a listed firm, and = 0 otherwise. SDC 
MIXED 
Dummy = 1 when the payment is a mixture of cash, stock and/or 
other methods of payment, excluding earnout provisions, and = 0 
otherwise. 
SDC 
NET MARGIN 
Acquirer’s ratio of net profit to revenue during the last quarter 
prior to the deal’s announcement 
Datastream 
Not First Time New Country 
(NFT_NEW) 
Dummy = 1 when the deal is not the acquirer’s first ever 
crossborder deal but takes place in an unprecedented country, 
and = 0 otherwise.   
SDC 
Not First Time Same Country 
(NFT_SAME) 
Dummy =1 when the deal is crossborder and takes place in a 
country in which the acquirer has already engaged in an M&A 
deal in the past. 
SDC 
SCANDINAVIAN 
Dummy = 1 when the deal is crossborder and target’s nation 
follows a Scandinavian legal system, and = 0 otherwise.  
SDC 
 
Note: The table defines the variables used in the empirical analysis and indicates the data source used. SDC denotes the 
Thomson-Reuters SDC ONE Banker database. Regarding the use of dummy variables, a sample observation without the value of 
1 has the value of 0. AGE, MV, DV, MTBV, REAV, RS and DEBT are log transformed in subsequent regressions. 
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Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks 
The primary objective of this doctoral thesis was to improve the understanding of the workings 
and wealth effects of contingent earnout payments in corporate takeovers. In the process, I have 
reviewed a large number of studies that not only prompted a series of research questions, but also 
served as the motivation behind the empirical framework adopted in chapters 3 to 5. As the latter 
also incorporate a concluding section, the aim of this chapter is to briefly outline the main 
findings of the included empirical investigations and discuss the implications for the 
shareholders of the involved firms and outside investors. 
The findings of the empirical chapters fill several voids in finance literature. 
Specifically, they provide novel insights on the determinants of the observed variation in 
acquirers’ gains from corporate takeovers. In so doing, the analysis mainly focuses on deals that 
expose acquiring firms to increased information asymmetry and, hence, require the mitigation of 
the inherent risks. Accordingly, a wide array of studies illustrate that in M&A cases subject to 
substantial adverse selection and moral hazard considerations, the choice of contingent earnout 
payments is able to greatly address such concerns. To this end, this thesis contributes to the 
relevant literature by suggesting a series of determinants behind the well-documented superior 
acquirer gains in earnout-financed deals.  
Accordingly, chapter 3 draws from the implications of recent studies suggesting that the 
complex design of earnouts imposes substantial challenges to acquirers, which can ultimately 
offset the implied benefits. The findings therefore complement earlier evidence, suggesting that 
earnouts are designed to reduce asymmetric information and that their efficient design presents a 
crucial condition under which their successful implementation is more feasible. All the more so, 
this chapter contributes to current literature by providing compelling evidence indicating that 
such a possibility increases when financial advisors counsel the involved acquiring firms. 
Specifically, by relying on both parametric and non-parametric methods we show that 
announcements of earnout-financed deals in which consulting firms are advising the acquirers 
generate significantly greater abnormal returns for the latters’ shareholders, relative to (a) 
earnout-financed deals without financial advisors and (b) non-earnout-financed deals regardless 
of the presence of consulting firms.  
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Thus, the ability of financial advisors to address the complexities of the design of 
earnouts more efficiently and, hence, improve their risk-mitigating properties sends a strong 
signal for value creation to market participants. This argument is enhanced as a separate array of 
studies points to the wealth-increasing contributions that financial advisors can make during the 
valuation and negotiation process of the deals they are involved in. To this end, the findings 
extend prior evidence on the role of consulting firms in M&A outcomes and support the view 
that the inclusion of top-tier (reputable) financial advisors is not associated with higher acquirer 
gains in deals that do not involve public targets. In turn, the results suggest that the involvement 
of smaller and less reputable financial advisors in M&As including unlisted targets and financed 
with earnouts enhances their expected outcome. In such deals there is more scope for negotiation 
and, hence, the advice offered to the acquiring firm appears to be very valuable. Therefore, this 
chapter provides robust evidence supporting the presence of a complementarity effect between 
earnouts and financial advisors in small, yet risky, M&As involving unlisted targets.  
Moreover, chapter 4 contributes to current literature by identifying a strong interaction 
between earnout-financing and the acquiring firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility (sigma). 
This interaction is further illustrated to significantly influence the short-run wealth gains accrued 
to acquirers’ shareholders. As an accurate proxy for information asymmetry over a publicly 
traded firm, the examination of the effect of sigma presents new insights on the dynamics 
involved in the determination of earnout acquirers’ short-run equity gains. Specifically, firms 
utilizing this two-part payment method consist of mainly small companies for which public 
information is limited. Consequently, this investigation sheds light on the effect of the release of 
acquirer-specific information, relative to the revelation of the deal’s synergy potential, on the 
overall market reaction to such M&A announcements. In so doing, the empirical findings firmly 
suggest that under increased information asymmetry between acquirers’ managers and outside 
investors the well-documented superior performance of earnout-financed deals, relative to deals 
financed with single up-front payment methods, does not persist. Thus, while the use of earnouts 
addresses information asymmetry between the involved firms in risky M&As, such as 
acquisitions of private targets, it does not appear to generate superior gains for high sigma 
acquirers relative to similar deals, yet financed with single up-front payments. We argue that this 
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is due to the prevalence of the release of acquirer-specific information, which induces an 
upwards reassessment of the firm’s equity value as the market infers that it may be undervalued.  
Aiming to further address such a possibility, we present evidence indicating that, 
relative to acquirers utilizing single up-front payments, earnout acquirers are undervalued prior 
to the announcement of the deal. Consequently, the above suggest that the choice of earnouts 
also serves the potential unwillingness of acquirers’ managers to finance valuation-complex 
deals with undervalued equity. As a result, high sigma earnout acquirers experience a significant 
announcement period wealth gain, yet not statistically superior than that experienced in similar 
cases in which the market would also infer that the acquirer’s stock is under-priced. In contrast, 
under low acquirer sigma the well-documented superior performance of earnouts is manifested. 
As acquirer-specific information release is less severe, the prevalence of the revelation of deal’s 
synergy potential, which is heightened due to the use of earnouts, is priced favourably resulting 
in significant gains.  Moreover, as low sigma acquirers consist of mainly large companies, the 
above extend empirical evidence suggesting that big firms suffer losses at the announcement of 
M&A deals. To this end, the risk-mitigating properties of this contingent payment method send a 
strong signal for value creation that also appears to prevent market participants from inducing a 
size-related discount during the announcement of the deal.   
Lastly, chapter 5 complements and extends evidence reported in previous studies 
regarding the wealth effects of international corporate takeovers. Accordingly, this chapter draws 
from an array of studies indicating that the costs and benefits of international business expansion 
are not uniform across all cross-border M&As. As a result, reported findings illustrate that when 
firms wish to join a multinational network through the acquisition of a foreign firm, earnout-
financing offers a major value-creating opportunity. Specifically, the involved acquirers 
experience positive announcement period abnormal returns that significantly outperform those 
generated by all domestic and remaining cross-border deals. The above contribute to current 
literature, which portrays acquirers in cross-border deals either suffering losses, relative to 
domestic deals, or at best breaking even. Similarly, this chapter extends current evidence on the 
performance of earnouts in international M&As, which suggest that the use of such instruments 
does not offer any additional value gains to acquirers. All the more so, having accounted for 
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potential selection bias considerations, the empirical results further establish earnout-financing as 
the optimal payment method when firms wish to exit their home country for the first time in their 
business history and expand into a new geographic market through a corporate takeover.  
Therefore, the relevant findings suggest that the use of earnouts in first-time 
international M&As allows acquirers to effectively address the inherent risks, thus increasing the 
likelihood of success of the deal and, hence, the probability of experiencing the implied benefits 
of operating within a multinational network. These include arbitraging institutional restrictions, 
capturing informational externalities and cost saving by joint production in marketing and 
manufacturing. To this end, the use of earnouts in initial international expansions is illustrated to 
lead to greater gains when employed in less developed countries, which exhibit a higher level of 
investment risk. In contrast, agency problems and the costly post-merger monitoring 
requirements of earnouts appear to deteriorate the expected synergy gains when globally 
diversified firms choose to expand or diversify further using deferred payments. Nevertheless, 
the lower integration costs characterizing divestitures render the application of earnout-financing 
in non-initial international acquisitions of divested assets value-enhancing. 
Overall, the main findings of this doctoral thesis enhance our understanding of the 
wealth effects of corporate takeovers particularly when substantial valuation disagreements 
between the involved firms, caused by asymmetric information, result in the employment of 
contingent earnout payments. To this end, the included results offer new insights on the factors 
that are likely to enhance the success of such deals, leading to greater gains for acquirers’ 
shareholders as well as providing outside investors with promising investment opportunities. 
Specifically, the conclusions of the empirical chapters improve our knowledge on the wealth 
effects of earnout-financing by shedding light on (a) the role of financial advisors, (b) the impact 
of the acquiring firm’s informational environment and (c) the effect of the extent of the acquiring 
firm’s multinational network on the performance of earnouts in international transactions. The 
investigations of the aforementioned elements illustrate the value-increasing contributions of 
financial advisors towards the efficient design of earnouts as well as suggest that large public 
firms with low idiosyncratic volatility, or firms that engage in the first cross-border deal of their 
business history face substantial value-creating opportunities when using deferred payments. 
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